The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has urged the Sri Lankan government to extend the public consultation period on the recently published draft Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill, citing concerns over the timing and limited opportunity for meaningful engagement.

The draft bill, published on the Ministry of Justice website, invites public comments within one month of release.

However, the CPA criticized its publication during a period of national crisis following Cyclone Ditwah, stating it restricts inclusive participation and undermines transparency in the legislative process.

While welcoming the decision to publish the draft for public feedback, the CPA emphasized that the bill must be evaluated not merely as an improvement over the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), but against the fundamental rights enshrined in Sri Lanka’s Constitution and the country’s international human rights obligations. (Newswire)

The full statement:

Initial Comments on the Draft Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill

18 December 2025

The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has been alerted to the draft Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill (Bill) published on the website of the Ministry of Justice, which invited public comments within a month of its publication. Whilst the government publicly announced in August its intention to publish a draft Bill for public comments, the publication at the present moment, when Sri Lanka is confronted with multiple challenges in the aftermath of Cyclone Ditwah, raises serious concerns. 

Such a context limits meaningful public engagement of any proposed legislation, and the limited time further impedes an inclusive and transparent law reform process. Whilst CPA appreciates the decision of the government to place the Bill in the public domain for comment, we urge for further time for comments and discussion.

With the hope that more time is provided for a fuller comment on the Bill, CPA shares these initial comments with the view of constructive engagement and public awareness of key areas requiring attention. At the outset, CPA emphasises that the benchmark against which this Bill must be assessed is not merely whether it represents an improvement over the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), but whether the Bill, in and of itself, complies with the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Sri Lanka and with Sri Lanka’s international human rights obligations. 

It must be borne in mind that the PTA was never constitutional, nor did its drafters claim that it was. No meaningful effort was made to ensure compliance with fundamental rights standards and due process safeguards, as it was taken as granted that the legislation could be enacted with a special two-thirds majority in Parliament. The result has been a draconian law that has been used for decades to target and suppress the rights of citizens, with limited debate as to what is meant by terrorism and the need for extremely broad terror laws in a post war context.

It is within this broader context that CPA sets out these initial observations on the draft Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill. The following are several clauses that raises concerns:

The Offence of Terrorism and Other Offences

• The definition of the offence of Terrorism remains broad, seemingly designed in a manner that can be used to suppress dissent, rather than being limited to actual acts of terrorism. One of the main criticisms of the Anti-Terrorism Bill of 2024 was that it may have been used against those who protest against the Government, and while the present Bill contains a provision that seems to exclude protestors in clause 3(4), this clause is vague as to what will and will not be defined as terrorism in the course of a lawful protest.

Arrests made by Members of the Armed Forces or Coast Guard

• Clause 24 of the Bill provides that when a suspect is arrested by the armed forces or the coast guard, then they shall ‘without unnecessary delay, and in any event within a period not exceeding twenty-four hours’ be produced before the Officer – in – Charge of the nearest police station. When contrasted with clause 23, which requires a police officer making an arrest to produce the suspect before the OIC ‘forthwith’, it raises the question as to why the same urgency is not seen with the armed forces. This perpetuates the norm of militarising the powers of arrest and detention.

Pre-Trial Detention and Detention Orders

• As per clause 28(1), a person can be held in remand for up to a year. As per clause 28(2), if there is a Detention Order made against the person, then in combination, the period of remand and detention can extend up to two years. This means that a person can languish in detention for up to two years without being charged with a crime. Such a long period again raises questions of the power of the State to target individuals, exacerbated by Sri Lanka’s history of long periods of remand and detention, which has contributed to abuse and violence.

Proscription Orders

• Clause 63 gives sweeping powers to the executive to proscribe an organisation, similar to what was seen in the 2024 Bill. Coupled with the wide power of the President to impose restrictions on such an organisation, the criminalisation of acts related to the organisation in terms of clause 6 gives the State a wide power to use this law to restrict freedom of association and crackdown on dissent.

Curfew Order and Prohibited Places

• The Bill provides power under clause 65 for the President to issue a curfew order and under clause 66 for the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence to issue a direction that a place is a prohibited place. These clauses are broad and vague, thus making them susceptible to abuse.

The above are some clauses that raise concerns, though CPA notes that a fuller and in-depth study of the Bill is required for a comprehensive review and comment, which we hope to do in 2026. In the spirit of constructive engagement, CPA urges the authorities to provide greater time for public comments and consultation, enabling the citizens to be aware of proposed laws and facilitate a law-making process that is transparent, inclusive and contributes to upholding the rule of law and democracy in Sri Lanka.

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Protection of the State from Terrorism Act, No. of 2026: Observations from an information integrity perspective

By Dr Sanjana Hattotuwa

From the primary perspective of the integrity of information, and privileged communications, this bill’s forward presentation as a human rights improvement on the PTA obscures the reality that its core architecture, ranging from administrative detention, military powers, proscription regimes, and broad speech offences, replicates the essential features that made the PTA objectionable.

Posted online four days ago, the bill is open to public input for a month.

As journalist S. Rubatheesan wrote in the Sunday Times3, “Under the proposed Terrorism Act, those who commit an act of terrorism will be handed hefty penalties ranging from a twenty-year jail term with fines to life imprisonment after a High Court trial. The new law titled “Protection of the State from Terrorism Act, No. of 2026″ has been published by the Ministry of Justice and National Integration and will replace the current Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA).”

General concerns

Oversight limitations

Section 78 defines “confidential information” to include information about the “functions, movements, or whereabouts of a specified person,” conduct of investigations, and “any secret code, word, password or encryption detail relating to national security.” Gathering or supplying such information with knowledge it could be used for terrorism is criminalised under section 8(2).

This definition of “confidential information” is overbroad, and likely by design (which is problematic). Information about the “functions, movements, or whereabouts of a specified person” could be interpreted to encompass social media posts documenting military checkpoints in the north and east, photographs showing troop deployments in the face of civilian protests, or even tweets noting the presence of intelligence personnel at public events. Tamil civil society organisations have long used social media platforms to document militarisation in their communities. These activities that could now constitute gathering confidential information.

The inclusion of information about “the conduct of any official activity, including any law enforcement or military measure which is intended to be carried out or is being carried out, or has been carried out” extends the definition to cover essentially any reporting on security operations. A Facebook post describing a police raid, a WhatsApp message warning neighbours about an ongoing cordon-and-search operation, or  YouTube video documenting an arrest could all involve confidential information under this definition. The criminalisation under section 8(2) requires only that the person “knowingly or having reasonable grounds to believe” the information could be used for terrorism.

The reference to “secret code, word, password or encryption detail relating to national security” creates particular problems for encrypted communications. This language in the draft appears designed to capture not just sovereign encrypted communications, and related architectures4 but potentially any encryption that security agencies wish to access. If investigators claim that a suspect’s encrypted communications relate to national security, the encryption keys themselves become “confidential information” and anyone who possesses or transmits them faces potential liability. This provision works in tandem with section 55’s decryption orders, creating both a compulsion mechanism and a criminal offence framework around encrypted communications.

The reporting obligation

Section 15 criminalises failure to report information about terrorism offences, with penalties of up to seven years imprisonment. This provision places journalists, lawyers, doctors, religious figures, and community workers in impossible positions. A journalist who learns of alleged militant activity during an investigation, a lawyer who receives confidential information from a client or a priest who hears something in confession would face criminal liability for not immediately informing police.

Social media platform administrators, moderators of online forums, and administrators of messaging groups could face liability if they become aware of content that might relate to terrorism offences and fail to report it. A moderator of a Tamil diaspora Facebook group who sees posts that could be interpreted as supporting a proscribed organisation faces a choice between reporting community members to police or risking seven years imprisonment. The chilling effect on online community spaces would be substantial.

Journalists who receive information through encrypted channels face particular exposure. An investigative journalist using Signal or WhatsApp to communicate with sources in the north and east might learn of activities that could constitute offences  under this Act, perhaps information about individuals who formerly had LTTE connections, or about community members who have expressed support for Tamil political causes that the government considers impermissible. The journalist’s failure to report this information to police would itself be criminal, regardless of source protection principles.

The provision also threatens the security of encrypted communications indirectly. If individuals know that anyone who becomes aware of certain information must report it, they will be reluctant to share sensitive material even through encrypted apps, and channels. E2EE protects the communication in transit, but cannot protect against a recipient who faces criminal liability for not forwarding the content to authorities. This creates a massive surveillance, and chilling effect without requiring any technical interception. The Protection of the State from Terrorism Act, No. of 2026 essentially, and incredibly conscripts recipients themselves as informants.

Lawyers, and especially criminal lawyers will face significant challenges. A lawyer in Jaffna whose client communicates via encrypted messaging about past associations with Tamil militant groups must either breach attorney-client privilege by reporting to police or face prosecution for failing to provide information. The “reasonable excuse” defence places the burden on the lawyer to prove that professional confidentiality constitutes a reasonable excuse. Given that Protection of the State from Terrorism Act, No. of 2026 explicitly overrides other written laws under section 74 (The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other written law, and in the event of any conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of this Act and such other written law, the provisions of this Act shall prevail”), this is a very high burden of proof that lawyers, through no fault of their own, and for merely rendering legal services or advice, have to accommodate.

Military powers over civilians

The extension of police powers to military personnel under section 19 has direct implications for digital communications and devices. All powers of search and seizure that police possess now vest equally in armed forces members. This includes powers under section 20 to “take into custody any document, thing or article” connected with offences under the Act, language that encompasses mobile phones, laptops, storage devices, and any medium containing digital communications. A soldier who seizes a mobile phone at a checkpoint in Mullaitivu operates outside any civilian oversight framework. The new law’s 24-hour window before handover to police under section 24 creates a period during which military personnel, including through duress, and potentially even torture could access device contents, copy data, or extract information without any procedural safeguards.

For E2EE, this creates serious risks. Military personnel could coerce detainees to unlock devices or provide passwords during the handover period, before any judicial oversight comes into play. Given documented patterns of abuse during military detention, asymmetrically impacting Tamils, and Tamil speaking peoples including Muslims, the risk that this coercion may involve torture is not theoretical. It is established fact. Material obtained during this crucial window, including, potentially, the contents of encrypted messaging applications, could then inform subsequent investigation even if not formally admitted as evidence. There’s also the potential for devices of suspects to be targeted with spyware, creating long-tail surveillance risks, and surveillance trails even after the subject has been released.

The intersection with section 55’s decryption powers is also significant. Section 55 requires a magistrate’s order for compelled decryption, but nothing prevents military personnel from obtaining passwords or biometric access during the initial detention period. By the time a suspect is produced before a magistrate, their encrypted communications may already have been accessed without any judicial authorisation.

Tamil diaspora communities could be potentially impacted as well. Many maintain active social media connections with family and friends in Sri Lanka, sharing news about community events, documenting ground conditions, discussing political developments, and publishing content memorialising war time events, including around enforced disappearances. Under the draft law, a Tamil diaspora activist in say New York who shares vital, granular information received via WhatsApp from friends or relatives in Jaffna around the military’s targeting of memorialisation events7 or the on-going instrumentalisation of the existing PTA to target Tamil journalists covering mass graves could potentially be committing offences under Sri Lankan law, that section 2(c) explicitly extends to citizens resident outside Sri Lanka (i.e., even dual citizens).

Impact on information integrity, and privileged communications

Section 55: Core surveillance and decryption powers

This section grants magistrates authority to order the unlocking of encrypted communications and to authorise interception of electronic communications. The scope extends to postal messages, electronic mail, telephone conversations, voice communications, internet exchanges, video conferences, and “any communication through any other medium.” It also permits access to “any analogue or digital data or information exchange or transfer system.” The breadth of this language appears designed to capture all forms of digital, and online communications, including those protected by end-to-end encryption.

Related sections a>ecting online communications

Section 3(2)(h) and (j) criminalise interference with electronic systems, computerised networks, cyber environments, domains assigned to Sri Lanka, and “electronic, analogue, digital or other wire-linked or wireless transmission system[s].” These provisions establish the underlying offences that sections like 55 would be used to investigate.

Section 9 on encouragement of terrorism applies to anyone who “publishes or causes to be published any statement, or speaks any word or words, or makes any sign or visible representation” with intent to encourage terrorism. The recklessness standard in subsection (3) lowers the threshold considerably, one need not intend encouragement, merely be reckless as to whether encouragement occurs.

Section 10 specifically addresses dissemination of terrorist publications and explicitly covers electronic transmission. Subsection (1)(e) criminalises transmitting contents of terrorist publications, whilst subsection (2)(e) specifies “transmits the contents of a terrorist publication electronically.” Subsection (1)(d) captures those who “provide a service to others that enables them to obtain, read, listen to or look at a terrorist publication”, language that could potentially implicate ISPs (like Dialog), platforms (like Facebook), hosting services (like Google Drive), or even individuals sharing links.

Section 11 defines the scope of “statement or publication” for sections 9 and 10 to include “internet,” “electronic media,” and “other form of public notice or dissemination.” This definition confirms that online commentary, social media posts, and digital content fall within these offences.

Section 53 grants investigative access to telecommunications, satellite, digital service, and data service providers. Police may obtain orders requiring disclosure of information about services provided, data stored or archived, and records of uploading or downloading. This provision operates alongside section 55 but targets service providers rather than encrypted content directly. For example, Starlink services in Sri Lanka were recently only enabled after data interception capabilities were ensured9. This can be read as a measure that prefigured the publication of the Protection of the State from

Terrorism Act, No. of 2026 draft, and is clearly enabled by it.

Implications for E2EE communications

Section 55(1)(a) specifically addresses encryption by authorising orders “directing any person who provides locking or encryption services pertaining to any communication or storage services or equipment for any data or information or other thing, to unlock or unencrypt the service or equipment and provide information contained therein.” This language raises significant concerns for E2EE platforms where the provider may not possess decryption keys by design. The bill assumes technical capability that doesn’t exist with some, leading, strong E2EE implementations, and apps (like the Signal or Session apps for example).

Very limited guardrails

Section 11(1) provides exceptions for content “published in good faith with due diligence for the benefit of the public or in the national interest” and “opinion, legitimate criticism, satire, parody, caution or imputation made in good faith.” These carve-outs offer some protection for journalistic and political speech, though “good faith” remains undefined, and subject to partisan, political, prosecutorial and judicial interpretation, especially given Sri Lanka’s history of judicial, and institutional capture.

The bill requires magisterial approval for most surveillance powers under section 55, and ex parte applications may be heard in camera. However, the threshold for obtaining such orders (“reasonable grounds to suspect”) is low, potentially leading to loose, and wide application (arguably, and as noted earlier, asymmetrically implicating, and injuriously impacting minority communities, especially in the North, and East).

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The Supreme Court’s determination concerning the Anti-Terrorism Bill has been conveyed to the Speaker of the House, Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena. 

Addressing the Parliament today, Deputy Speaker Ajith Rajapakse informed the Parliament in this regard.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court has determined that certain clauses in the Anti-Terrorism Bill must be approved by a special majority or through a referendum.

The Supreme Court further says the bill could also be passed by a simple majority if the amendments recommended by the court are incorporated. (NewsWire)

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The proposed Anti-Terrorism Bill was tabled in the Parliament of Sri Lanka today (Jan 10). 

The Bill was presented by the Minister of Justice Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe this morning. 

The Anti-Terrorism Bill has been proposed to replace the controversial Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). (NewsWire)

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The UN Human Rights Office has raised serious concerns over two bills under consideration in the Sri Lankan Parliament – the revised Anti-Terrorism Bill and the Online Safety Bill.

Issuing a statement, the UN Human Rights Office said the bills give the authorities a range of expansive powers and can also impose restrictions on human rights, not in line with international human rights law.

The Anti-Terrorism Bill is intended to replace the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which has long been of concern to the UN human rights mechanisms. While some positive revisions have been made in the draft, including the removal of the death penalty as a possible punishment, there are still major concerns about the scope and discriminatory effects of many provisions in the revised draft.

Restrictions to the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly are very likely to fail to meet requirements of necessity and proportionality, it said.

The UN Human Rights Office further said the Bill still includes an overly broad definition of terrorism and grants wide powers to the police – and to the military – to stop, question and search, and to arrest and detain people, with inadequate judicial oversight. 

Other issues remain over the imposition of curfews, restriction orders and the designation of prohibited places, all of which raise concerns about the scope of powers granted to the executive without sufficient checks and balances, it said.

With respect to the Online Safety Bill, the UN Human Rights Office said it believes it will severely regulate and restrict online communication, including by the general public and will give authorities unfettered discretion to label and restrict expressions they disagree with as “false statements”.

Many sections of the Bill contain vaguely defined terms and definitions of offences which leave significant room for arbitrary and subjective interpretation and could potentially criminalize nearly all forms of legitimate expression, creating an environment that has a chilling effect on freedom of expression, it said.

The UN Human Rights Office has urged the Government to undertake further meaningful consultation with civil society and UN independent experts and to make substantial revisions to the draft laws in order to bring them into full compliance with Sri Lanka’s international human rights obligations. (NewsWire)

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US Ambassador Julie Chung has called on Sri Lankan authorities to ensure the rights of the people are safeguarded in relation to the Online Safety Bill and the anti-terrorism legislation.

Taking to ‘X’, Ambassador Chung said as Sri Lanka deliberates the Online Safety Bill, it’s crucial to include input from the tech sector, civil society, and diverse experts.

“Preserving freedom of expression is essential as it’s a fundamental right that is non-negotiable and must be safeguarded,” she said.

Ambassador Chung also urged the Sri Lankan government to honor its pledge to revise its anti-terrorism legislation in alignment with international standards and best practices in other democracies.

She further said that Sri Lankans deserve both security and fundamental freedoms. 

“Striking the right balance through effective legislation will ensure both, enabling lawful freedom of assembly and empowering law enforcement to tackle threats effectively,” Ambassador Chung added. (NewsWire)

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The proposed Anti-Terrorism Bill will be further delayed, Minister of Justice Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe informed Parliament today.

Speaking in Parliament, the Justice Minister said the Bill will not be rushed and, instead, the views of concerned parties will be taken into consideration.

He further stated that the Anti-Terrorism Bill will, thereafter, be presented to Parliament after making the relevant amendments. (NewsWire)

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The presentation of the Anti-Terrorism Bill to the Parliament will be delayed, Minister of Justice Dr. Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe announced.

The Justice Minister stated that the decision has been taken based on requests that were made by various groups, including opposition political parties. 

He further stated that it is expected to present the Bill to Parliament by the end of April or the first week of May.

The BAR Association of Sri Lanka (BASL) had earlier called on the Government to delay the presentation of the Anti-Terrorism Bill to Parliament.

The BASL had claimed that the Bill had been Gazetted without proper discussions with relevant parties. (NewsWire)

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