By Mohamed Shafkath

On November 14, 2024, a video clip from the parliament of New Zealand surfaced the internet. The video shows Hana-Rawhiti Maipi-Clarke, the youngest MP of the current parliament, representing the Te Pāti Māori tearing up a draft of the Treaty Principles Bill, while performing a haka, the traditional war cry of the Māori.

She chanted, “Ka Mate, Ka Mate! Ka Ora, Ka Ora!”, meaning “It is death, it is death! It is life, it is life!” Netizens soon grabbed on to this video and made the haka trending for the following weeks.

What happened that day?

By all accounts, November 14 was a fiery day for the parliament of New Zealand. Politicians had the chance to debate the Treaty Principles Bill for the first time. Willie Jackson, an MP of the Labour Party, was kicked out of the debating chamber after refusing to apologize after calling ACT party leader, David Seymour “a liar.”

David Seymour was also accused of “pulling the strings and running the country like the KKK” by the co-leader of the Te Pāti Māori, Rawiri Waititi. When Hana-Rawhiti Maipi-Clarke was asked to reveal her party’s voting position, she stood up, began performing the haka, tearing up the copy of the bill.

The rest of the MPs from the Te Pāti Māori joined the haka, following them several members of the Green Party and Labour Party, and some spectators from the public gallery also joined them.  Despite all this drama and clashes that day, the Treaty Principle Bill managed to pass its first reading.

The public also showed their resistance to the proposed legislation. On the 7th of November protesters gathered outside the New Zealand Parliament and Seymour’s electorate office in protest its introduction. Lorde, Octavia Spencer, Jason Momoa, and Chris Martin of Coldplay were some celebrities who expressed their opposition to the Bill.

The significant public reaction to the bill was the Hīkoi mō te Tiriti (“March for the Treaty”). The hīkoi (march) began in Cape Reinga, the northernmost point of New Zealand and made its way through the North Island, Auckland and reached the parliament in Wellington on November 14, the day of the first reading, with almost 20,000 supporters. 

On November 19, the final day of the hīkoi, over 42,000 supporters gathered in the parliament grounds. Students and Pākehā (Non-Māori, European New Zealanders) also joined the hīkoi. Wellington police have said there have been “no issues” and that hīkoi marchers have been “peaceful”, however, there was disruption to transport across parts of the Central Business District. The hīkoi presented a petition against the bill with 203,653 signatures. 

The hīkoi has changed politicians’ perception towards the bill. Prime minister Christopher Luxon’s National Party has stated that they won’t be supporting the bill in its second reading, despite their support for it during the first reading. The bill will now undergo further scrutiny and public submissions through the Justice Committee, which will play a crucial role in determining its future.

The Treaty Principles Bill

On February 6, 1840, at Waitangi, in the Bay of Islands, the representatives of the British Crown and more than 500 Māori chiefs signed the Treaty of Waitangi. It is considered as the founding document of New Zealand establishing the legal frameworks for the relationship between the British Crown and the Māori.

This plays a key role in New Zealand’s history and continues to influence the relationship between the two parties. The main point of conflict with the treaty is that the translation of the two versions (English and Māori) do not match with each other in certain contexts.

In 1975, 135 years after the Treaty of Waitangi was signed, the Labour Party passed the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 established the Waitangi Tribunal and provided a legal framework for addressing claims by Māori regarding breaches of the Treaty by the Crown. The Waitangi Tribunal is a permanent commission of inquiry that investigates claims brought by Māori.

The Waitangi Tribunal has the power to interpret the Treaty. The ACT party says that New Zealanders have not been democratically consulted when interpreting the principles, and the newly proposed Treaty Principles Bill is an attempt to incorporate the voices of all New Zealanders through a democratic parliamentary process, rather than through tribunals and courts. 

The newly proposed Treaty Principles Bill outlines three main principles: the government has full power to govern and make laws in the best interests of everyone; the Crown recognizes, respects, and protects the rights of hapū and iwi Māori under the Treaty of Waitangi at the time of signing, but any differing rights will only be recognized if agreed upon in a historical treaty claim settlement; and everyone is equal before the law, entitled to equal protection, benefit, and enjoyment of fundamental human rights without discrimination.

The ACT party’s campaign website for this bill (treaty.nz) says that the interpretation of the treaty as a ‘partnership’ has led to the people being divided into two: land people (tangata whenua) and Treaty people (tangata triti). It further claims each group has different political and legal rights, and this has led to co-governance arrangements and racial quotas in public institutions. The significant part of the problem was that New Zealanders were never consulted on this change. 

What does this mean for the Māori?

Māoris are Polynesian settlers in New Zealand. Their ocean migration to the land of New Zealand happened during the late 13th or early 14th century. Over time, they established their own unique Māori culture. Even though the treaty of Waitangi has given them tribal autonomy, there were conflicts between both communities, mainly on land disputes and its impacts.

The opposition to the bill from the Māori, addresses both the current political context and the historical context of New Zealand. The basis for the opposition and the criticism to the bill comes from the perspective that it undermines the Treaty of Waitangi and its interpretations. 

The Waitangi Tribunal’s report inquiring about the Treaty Principles Bill, states, “Yet by engaging with this policy the Crown is sanctioning a process that will take away indigenous rights.”

It further goes on to say, “We have found that the Treaty Principles Bill policy is unfair, discriminatory, and inconsistent with the principles of partnership and reciprocity, active protection, good government, equity, and redress, and contrary to the article 2 guarantee of rangatiratanga (chieftainship of the Māori).”

It also notices the crown’s failure to engage with the Māori on this policy. The tribunal recommended the Treaty Principles Bill policy to be abolished along with its other recommendations to rectify its shortcomings.

The ACT party is also accused of hiding their racism under the mantra of equal rights for all New Zealanders, they are also accused of taking advantage of the current coalition government to use the parliament to act as the judge, jury and the executioner, where the representation of the indigenous community is very low. 

In conclusion, what the world needs to learn from the hīkoi and the opposition to the bill is the respect for culture and history of communities, the respect should not be limited to being indigenous or not or being minority or not.

However, respect and inclusivity are not the same thing, it’s a matter of the right person being in the right place, regardless of race, religion and color.

David Seymour, the villain of the story, is a Māori himself. The new Bill, being successful in spreading its rhetoric, failed to address its primary stakeholder. Continuation of this act any further would result in opposite of what the bill tries to portray.

Ka Mate, Ka Mate! Ka Ora, Ka Ora!

Mohamed Shafkath is an independent researcher and analyst at Factum. He can be reached through shafkath@factum.lk.

Factum is an Asia-Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Perspective: The New Zealand Parliament Meme: What’s Wrong? appeared first on Newswire.

By Dulmi Thimansa 

On November 14, 2024, Sri Lanka held its first parliamentary elections after a four-year interval. The National People’s Power (NPP), also known as Jathika Jana Balawegaya, emerged as the dominant political force.

The party secured 141 seats in parliament along with an additional 18 seats from the national list, for a total of 159 seats, earning more than two-thirds majority. This marks the highest number of seats ever obtained by a single party in Sri Lankan parliamentary history.

The achievement is particularly significant given that they held only three seats in the previous parliament and were derided by supporters of the then government and main Opposition as the party of the three percent. Since its inception, the NPP has pursued the ambitious goal of becoming a transformative political force in Sri Lanka.

The 2024 elections were shaped by several critical factors that contributed to the NPP’s success. Chief among them was the growing discontent among the electorate with previous administrations. Years of mismanagement, widespread corruption, and a perceived disconnect between lawmakers and the public created a deep sense of frustration.

These grievances were further exacerbated by economic instability, inefficiencies in public services, and a lack of accountability, of which key examples include the VSF scandal, one of many which ultimately brought the government down.

The NPP’s policies and campaign messaging resonated strongly with the electorate, offering a clear alternative to the status quo. The party positioned itself as a champion of systemic reform, promising to dismantle the culture of corruption and inefficiency that had plagued successive governments.

This message of accountability, integrity, and transparency struck a chord with voters who were eager for meaningful change. This approach resonated particularly strongly with the nation’s youth, who became a key demographic in propelling the NPP to its electoral success. 

Moreover, the NPP’s strategic focus on collective governance over individualism played a pivotal role in its success.

By emphasizing the importance of voting for the party and its policies rather than individual candidates, the NPP sought to shift the electorate’s mindset toward prioritizing institutional reform. Their campaign of rooting out corruption and building a more accountable government provided hope to a population disillusioned by decades of unmet promises.

The party’s ability to attract support across ethnic and demographic lines further reinforced its appeal. The NPP not only gained traction in traditionally loyalist regions – the southwestern quadrant in Sri Lanka – but also made inroads into Tamil-majority areas, a testament to its unifying message and inclusive policy framework. 

Excluding Batticaloa, the NPP successfully elected a total of 10 Tamil Members of Parliament (MPs). The elected MPs include three from Jaffna, two each from Vanni and Badulla, and one each from Nuwara Eliya, Matara, and Batticaloa. Furthermore, the NPP’s commitment to inclusive representation was further reinforced with the nomination of one Tamil MP through the party’s National List.

With a strong mandate to govern, the NPP now faces the challenge of delivering on its promises and meeting the high expectations of the electorate. Their success in this endeavor could redefine the political and governance landscape of Sri Lanka for years to come. 

The NPP’s sweeping mandate extended across the nation, including several Tamil-majority areas, reflecting a significant shift in voter sentiment, despite these regions favoring other parties during the presidential election. Within a relatively short period, the NPP successfully repositioned itself as a unifying political force, attracting supporters from diverse political backgrounds.

This was largely achieved through a strategic campaign centered on their overarching vision, famously articulated as “පාර්ලිමේන්තුව මාලිමාවෙන් පුරවමු” (“Let’s fill parliament with NPP”).  The party consistently emphasized the importance of the collective party agenda rather than individual candidates, focusing on institutional change over personal politics – even if this was criticized by some as evidence of the party’s lack of internal democracy.

Despite the NPP’s historic victory, voter turnout in the parliamentary elections was low compared to previous years, with only 65% of eligible voters casting their ballots.

The recent election marked a significant milestone in advancing inclusive governance, highlighted by record-breaking levels of women’s and youth representation in parliament. The newly elected parliament includes 21 women, 19 of whom are NPP members, representing a notable improvement for a country trailing behind its South Asian counterparts in female political participation. Previously, Sri Lanka’s parliament had only 12 women, accounting for a mere 5.8% of total members.

Sri Lanka’s lack of female representation was further underscored during the recent presidential election, where no women contested the race. Dr Harini Amarasuriya’s appointment as Prime Minister has, however, encouraged discussions on increasing female participation across political parties. 

While these developments are promising, the composition of the new cabinet has raised some concerns. Of the 21 cabinet members, only two are women, which some critics view as a missed opportunity to further strengthen gender representation in key leadership roles. This disparity highlights the ongoing challenges in achieving balanced representation at the highest levels of governance, even amidst broader efforts to promote inclusivity.

Furthermore, over 140 newly elected members are complete newcomers to the parliament – though not necessarily to the political system. The new parliament convened on October 18, 2024, introducing a reshuffled cabinet comprising 21 ministers. This assembly signifies a significant break from tradition, featuring a complete overhaul of leadership with many veteran politicians making way for newcomers.

A notable characteristic of this new parliament is the high level of professional expertise among its members. All 159 representatives from the NPP are well-educated professionals, hailing from diverse fields, underscoring a commitment to utilizing specialized knowledge and skills for effective governance in Sri Lanka.

Of particular significance was the appointment of Sugath Wasantha De Silva, the first visually impaired individual to serve as a Member of Parliament. His appointment more or less provides a voice for the disabled community in the country’s legislative processes.

As Sri Lanka leaves behind what the NPP frequently calls a 75-year curse – elite domination of national politics – such milestones are crucial in the road towards greater inclusivity and political participation in “Asia’s oldest democracy.”

Dulmi Thimansa is a student of international relations and diplomacy who works as a research intern at Factum. She can be reached at dulmi@factum.lk.

Factum is an Asia-Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Perspective: In Sri Lanka, a new era of governance appeared first on Newswire.

By Aavin Abeydeera

Asia’s oldest democracy will enter the polls just a few days from the time of the publication of this article. Millions of Sri Lankans will line up at the election booths on the 21st of September this year, to choose Sri Lanka’s tenth executive president. 

Like a great many election cycles, this one has come around at a time of massive social, political, and economic upheaval in the country, but perhaps unlike any other election cycle, this iteration is set to be a free-for-all, with no clear leading figures heading the pre-election rating polls, reflecting the plethora of candidates that have come up and put their hands up in a bid for the presidential seat. However, amongst this sea of candidates, three main figures stand out from the rest, and with them, three vastly different visions of what Sri Lanka will be to its own people, and to the rest of the world.

Of course, as with almost all things political in Sri Lanka, nothing is as simple as meets the eye, with a complex web of broken and reforged alliances connecting all key players to each other.

Incumbent President Ranil Wickremesinghe enjoys his current office not through the fiat of the people’s mandate, but through a parliamentary vote to fill in the vacuum left by President Gotabhaya Rajapaksa when he resigned as president during the Aragalaya protests of 2022. 

Since then, President Wickremesinghe has largely stood as a figure unopposed in terms of real power- despite mixed reactions to his policies, Wickremesinghe has carried on with relative ease in terms of enacting those policies, largely thanks to the parliamentary backing he has from, strangely enough, his main historic rival; the Rajapaksa family-run Sri Lanka People’s Front (SLPP). This complex and oft-strained relationship is ultimately what gives Wickremesinghe his legitimacy and power in parliament, and it is this key point that ultimately divides almost all Sri Lankans. 

Many believe that despite this strange alliance, Wickremesinghe has been a strong enough figure in his own right to not be swayed by SLPP directives, while a great many more Sri Lankans believe that Wickremesinghe, while being a good policymaker, has successfully shoved calls for accountability and justice under the rug, giving them, and ultimately the Rajapaksa family, a certain sense of continued safety and immunity from the allegations of corruption and bringing the country to an economic freefall due to poor economic policies.

Nevertheless, Wickremesinghe has embraced the role of the “benevolent dictator”, and has so far used the strong executive powers at his disposal to drive economic reform and decision-making. His recently released manifesto has a focus on stabilizing the country, and as far as the track record shows, it has been under his watch that the country’s economy has turned upwards since the historic economic crisis of 2022. 

Globally, Wickremesinghe has always swayed towards Atlantic interests and has called for closer ties between Sri Lanka, the US and the European Union. It is perhaps this willingness to deal with the West, and by extension, the IMF, that has allowed Wickremesinghe to course-correct the freefalling Sri Lankan economy, or at least, halt its descent. While he has shown no willingness to do anything less than comply with the strict guidelines set by the IMF for their continued support, Wickremesinghe has pledged to lower the historically high taxes set during his presidency after achieving the macroeconomic goals set by his government. 

Nevertheless, despite a moderately good showing as president, his economic policies remain unpopular, and a great many Sri Lankans view Wickremesinghe’s checkered past and willingness to deal with the SLPP as dealbreakers- his only response so far has been to raise the question; “if not me, who?”. This is indeed a valid question; no other presidential candidate has laid out an alternative to the economic policies that President Wickremesinghe has laid out, even though many of those same candidates have been quick to criticize him for said policies.

Next up on the ticket is seasoned presidential candidate Sajith Premadasa, the current Head of The Opposition in the legislative house of the country. Premadasa, himself the son of a former president, has long aspired to sit in the highest office in the country and made waves when he went up against Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, the eventual winner of that election. Premadasa has consistently polled high approval ratings in the North and the East, and it is there that the bulk of his votes lie. 

Certainly, his calls for the devolution of power, and accountability from the government on behalf of the minority communities of the country have bolstered this support immensely. His policy has certainly been the most progressive, with calls for accountability, good governance, cutting down on the bloated bureaucratic machine in Sri Lanka, as well as dealing with the IMF to ensure that those below the poverty line do not fall under a draconian tax policy. This is not surprising in the slightest, as Premadasa, has historically focused on poverty alleviation and reduction, especially in the Malaiyaha community and those in the Semi-arid regions in the Vanni region of Sri Lanka.

Furthermore, Premadasa has called for political devolution, harkening back to his support in the North and East of the island, and has called for a campaign of rooting out corruption in the country, with the Rajapaksa clan, especially in his crosshairs.

Nevertheless, despite a relatively robust policy manifesto, detractors question whether Premadasa has the will to reach such lofty goals. This is a valid concern- Premadasa has repeatedly called for the abolition of the executive presidency, and if his wish comes true, Premadasa will find himself in the big seat with none of the powers and privileges that will be needed to enact his policies. 

Globally, it is not too difficult to ascertain if he will play ball with the West- he has been a supporter of the IMF programs and has historically looked towards the Western Hemisphere in expanding the Sri Lankan trade account. However, Premadasa has also called for increased national autonomy in decision-making and will look for increased autonomy from India and China on the global stage, while seeking to expand trade with countries in the Asia Pacific.

Despite these two candidates come from political dynasties with presidents in their ranks, it is this same prestige that has held them back from perhaps getting the fullest support that they could have gained- Sri Lanka has long been a hotbed of corruption and nepotism, and despite their grand promises, both Wickremesinghe and Premadasa hail from these dynasties and the traditions of corruption and nepotism that come with them. 

Especially in the context of the Protests of 2022, neither candidate has the firmest grip on disillusioned voters who have long since framed, and perhaps rightly so, these seasoned political figures as nothing more than charlatans. And perhaps this has been why, Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who had been nothing more than a nominal third power in the polling booths, has now become a very serious contender for the commander in chief of the country.

Hailing from the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)-led National People’s Power front, Dissanayaka’s appeal lies mainly in the fact that he, alongside his party, has not partaken in the dynastic politics that have permeated Sri Lankan politics for the last seven decades, despite attempts (sometimes violent) to achieve their goal of being in power. 

The changes Dissanayake’s platform has promised to make have been extensive, from reforming the much-maligned constitution and abolishing certain aspects of the executive presidency to laying out plans for rooting out corruption and galvanizing the state mechanism against corrupt elements. 

However, Dissanayake deviates from the other candidates in that he has stated that the current IMF conditions have been unduly harsh and that reparations should be extracted from those who were in power, rather than the tax-paying public. Nevertheless, how he intends to reform these conditions, negotiate them, or present alternatives to this dilemma is uncertain. This has been a hallmark criticism of his- while the vision is grandiose, no one is certain as to how exactly AKD will execute his vision. Besides, there are legitimate and well-founded fears that the NPP once in power, will backslide on the modicum of progress made post-2022 and will revert back to expanding the public sector, and nationalizing institutions.

What one can see here is that AKD does not perhaps have the best policy portfolio, or even the most defined policy portfolio either. What he does have is a clean slate. He does not hail from a ruling tradition, and therefore, is unencumbered by the burden of having to pander to party lines and interest groups that seek to further their own interests. In AKD, lies the Sri Lankan people’s first great hope, for a “systemic change”.

As to who will win, no one knows, and perhaps no one will know either. For the first time in decades, no candidate has been afforded confidence and assurance of their seat, as they have found themselves asking an increasingly disillusioned Sri Lanka for their vote. And it is this disillusioned Sri Lankan public, and not any meagre presidential candidate, that has been the most interesting element in this election cycle.

Post-2022, there has been a blossoming of conscious political thought and an awakening of higher consciousness in the Sri Lankan public, and there has been recognition of the fact that systemic change is what is needed, and changing the flag at the top of the mast will ultimately be a futile manoeuvre in changing the ship as a whole. With this awakening, the Sri Lankan people have not just looked to these candidates’ appeal as charismatic leaders, but also as policymakers, and have questioned and scrutinized those who surround these candidates, having the insight to know that Sri Lanka will not be electing just a president, they will be electing a new regime, good or bad.

Perhaps like no other time in history, the Sri Lankan vote carries real power- power to enact change, and power to display the people’s mandate, and show that Sri Lanka will no longer take it on the chin, and will fight back against their rulers, and will act as the sword that hangs over Damocles’ head if need be.

Aavin Abeydeera is an undergraduate at the Faculty of Law of the University of Colombo. A graduate of the BCIS, his interests range from geopolitics, economics, and foreign policy to culture and sports. He can be reached at aavinabeydeera@gmail.com.

Factum is an Asia-Pacific focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, Strategic Communications, and Climate Outreach accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Perspective: Sri Lanka to the Polls appeared first on Newswire.

By Uditha Devapriya

There are decades when years happen, years when months happen, and days when decades happen. Then there is Bangladesh. The images coming out of Dhaka over the last few weeks should astonish anybody who thought that Sheikh Hasina, who won a fifth consecutive term as Prime Minister in January this year, would ensure business as usual in the country. Yet for the hundreds of thousands of students and youth activists who marched out into the streets against her, “business and usual” was never going to be an option.

Hasina’s exact whereabouts are uncertain, but she is in India. Not because her party, the Awami League, has been stridently pro-Indian, but also because she has nowhere else to go. Reports indicate that she and her sister Rehana are on her way to London, where she has sought political asylum. The UK, reeling under an upsurge in anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim riots, has yet to respond to her request. Until it does, she will remain in India. Meanwhile, in Bangladesh, the military, under the country’s Army-General Waqar-uz-Zaman, has formed an interim government, and has called for everyone’s cooperation.

The protests have been bloody. The death toll on Sunday alone was 90. So far more than 250 have been killed. The government’s response to them was to call protesters terrorists if not descendants of “razakars” (Pakistani collaborators) and then argue that the government and military were practicing restraint. It also tried to reduce the demonstrations to the job quota system. Yet the protests weren’t just about the quota. The quota system, with all its flaws, was the trigger. What it led to was something bigger: a spontaneous combustion of dissent against a government widely seen as corrupt and authoritarian.

Hasina’s Awami League has been in power since 2008. Consider what has transpired since then. Sri Lanka has seen three governments. The United States has seen four. When she came to power, Manmohan Singh was India’s Prime Minister. Russia, which was part of the G8 then, had someone other than Vladimir Putin as President. She has been in power longer than any other democratically elected South Asian head of state since then.

It would be tempting to say that incumbency fatigue was what undid the Awami League. But that would be the tip of the iceberg. During the last 16 years, Sheikh Hasina managed to tame the country’s Opposition, jailing her main rival Khaled Zia. The Opposition, for its part, responded by boycotting elections. Not surprisingly, in all the elections she has faced since 2008 – 2014, 2018, and 2024 – her party received more than 70 percent. The latest polls, declared as free and fair by some observers, have been criticized by the US, UK, and various human rights bodies. In any case, the low voter turnout – 41 percent – revealed the level of disillusionment that had swept across the country.

The economy also figured prominently in the protests. Over the last few years, the country has made impressive strides on several indicators, including exports. It has been held up as a model for other countries, including Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, since last year, there has been a decline in growth. Inflation is hovering at 10 percent, while unemployment, particularly among the youth, has grown. Earlier this year, the country’s Finance Minister tried to pacify critics by saying that the government’s reforms were “beginning to bear fruit.” Yet as even the anti-quota protests showed, job opportunities are diminishing, and this has been felt most strongly by undergraduates and the youth in general. As for development, critics point out that this has been limited to largescale infrastructure projects.

The extent and scale of these protests certainly ruffled the government. As in Sri Lanka, the Prime Minister declared curfews, cut off social and the internet, and alleged that certain nefarious elements had taken over the demonstrations. In Hasina’s case, these elements happen to be hardcore Islamists. Her government’s narrative, hence, was that the protests had been coopted by anti-Indian and anti-Hindu elements, Islamist radicals who want to undermine the country’s secularism. This line has been taken by the right-wing conservative Indian media as well: more than one outlet claim, somewhat outrageously, that the ISIS is behind the protests. To be sure, videos of some protesters attacking Hindu councilors, temples, and homes have added to these rumors. However, the protesters themselves have called for calm and condemned these attacks on social media.

All these point to another important aspect, the geopolitics of the protests. Not unlike Sri Lanka, Bangladesh’s foreign policy has pivoted on three powers, India, China, and the US. Under Hasina, Bangladesh solidified relations with India, to the point where she was seen as Delhi’s preferred candidate. This did not win her any favors with the people. Indeed, at this year’s election, anti-government forces whipped up an “India Out” campaign.

Analysts note that India-Bangladesh relations may take a hit after Hasina’s relations, though considering the extent of bilateral trade – Bangladesh is India’s biggest trade partner in South Asia while India is Bangladesh’s second biggest trade partner in Asia – there may not be a dramatic rupture in economic ties.

During her term, Hasina attempted, to India’s consternation, to balance Delhi and Beijing. Shortly after a visit to India last June, she flew to China with a delegation of almost 200 members. She expected the Chinese to respond positively to her request for a USD 5 billion low interest loan, but that never materialized. Observers noted that Hasina’s tilt to India, which had cost her support among her people, had turned Beijing away.

This leaves the US, which has its own designs in the region. Partly because of historical reasons – the US sided with Pakistan during the 1971 Liberation War – the Awami League has never enjoyed good, sustained relations with Washington. The United States, for its part, has responded lukewarmly at best and hostilely at worst to Hasina.

Nevertheless, Washington clearly sees Bangladesh as an important part of its containment strategy against China. It has requested the country to sign various defense agreements. Dhaka, as expected, has declined. Given the US’s history of regime change, media reports have surfaced about Hasina’s resignation being orchestrated by an external party. Indeed, immediately after last January’s election, Hasina herself went on record stating that one country had tried to make a deal with her. She did not name the country, except to say that the person who approached her was a “white man.”

It goes without saying that Hasina’s resignation has provided an opening to any party that wants to expand its sphere of influence in the region without going through India. Until now, Washington’s interventions in South Asia have been, at best, contingent on India’s wishes. Regardless of the alignment of interests between the two countries, particularly over China, it is in the United States’ interest to establish a power base in South Asia independent of New Delhi. This seems somewhat unlikely in the short-term, but given the scale of anti-Indian sentiment in Bangladesh, it remains a distinct possibility in the medium to long term. China is not likely to remain silent, but we will know more only when the military, and the new government, comes out clear on its foreign policy. What we do know so far is that the US has welcomed the interim government.

The situation in Bangladesh offers potent lessons for other countries, specifically in South Asia. For years, Bangladesh was touted as an economic success story. Yet economic success, measured on conventional metrics, has not been and will not be enough to pacify mass resistance. In Sri Lanka, too, a government is pushing through economic policies, much of which it says has been on the recommendation of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Yet without a clear audit of what the people feel and how they are responding to these reforms, there will always be space for mass uprisings.

What happens next in Bangladesh is anybody’s guess. So far, a number of names have been floated as possible candidates for Prime Minister. These include lawyers, ex-police and military officials, retired civil servants and bureaucrats, political advisors, and economists and policymakers. The country remains in turmoil, with no functioning government. As in Sri Lanka in 2022, MPs’ houses have been burnt down. This is natural in any situation of mass resistance to, and anger against, the political establishment. Whether the military can or will intervene to restore law and order remains to be seen. One thing remains clear, however: there can never be a return to the way things were. Bangladesh has lived through 16 years of Awami League rule. This is the morning after.

Uditha Devapriya is the Chief Analyst – International Relations at Factum and can be reached at uditha@factum.lk.

Factum is an Asia-Pacific focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, Strategic Communications, and Climate Outreach accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Special Perspective: Bangladesh after Sheikh Hasina appeared first on Newswire.

By Uditha Devapriya

At the time of his death on May 19, in a helicopter crash that has yet to be fully investigated, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi had risen through the ranks. Sanctioned by the West and nicknamed the “Butcher of Tehran” for his uncompromising attitude to protesters, he was seen as the successor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Under his watch Iran went through some pretty turbulent times, including a spate of protests in 2021 following the death in custody of a 22-year-old woman. But it also saw through a transformation in its foreign relations, signalling an outreach to Asia and the Global South.

Raisi’s death raises speculation about what will follow in Iran. He had been virtually groomed for succession after Khamenei’s death. Under his watch Iran became more conservative, one could say less tolerant of dissent. But he also raised the country’s profile in the Global South, joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and becoming a member of BRICS. External developments, including of course the Russia-Ukraine War and the Israel-Gaza War, reinforced its links with not just Russia and China, but also India.

Donald Trump’s unilateral abrogation of the US-Iran nuclear agreement signalled to Tehran that the US could not be trusted. Joe Biden’s silent manoeuvres following his election – he became president around the same time Raisi did in Iran – did little to mend the damage. What Western analysts miss out in their commentaries on the deal and its subsequent breakdown is that the Iranian government could not be forced to buy the agreement: it would accept it only if the deal could be sold to hardline conservative elements. Trump’s belligerence more or less pre-empted those possibilities.

Then there was the pandemic. With the restoration of Western sanctions, Iran’s health sector came to a screeching halt. Rather than doing what any superpower capable of a great many things would have done, which is relaxing sanctions, Washington chose to continue them. Western analysts who pontificate on human rights violations in Iran – which are real, as they are in countries like ours – ignore the hatred of the West that spread throughout Iran because of US policies. Ebrahim Raisi’s tenure should be seen in light of these developments, even if, as reports indicate, certain Iranians did celebrate his death.

How exactly has the country responded to the death of their president? Iran is a complex society, and like all complex non-Western societies has been muddled up and misinterpreted by the West. The truth is that we don’t know how Iranians have responded to Raisi’s death. Any open celebration of his passing will almost certainly be censored and suppressed. But more than one Western media outlet has taken a handful of incidents as representative of the mood across the country. This is detabale.

On the other hand, it is plausible that many protesters are celebrating the fact that Raisi will not succeed Khameini. Yet even considering this, it is questionable whether, as one protester puts it, “The death of Raisi has made the people of Iran very happy.”

The bottom line is that Iranian society, with or without Raisi, cannot be understood without a wider understanding of its modern history, the geopolitical intrigues which shaped the theocratic State to what it is today. From the 1953 CIA-sponsored coup to the Revolution, from the Iran-Iraq War to the sabotage of Iran’s nuclear programme, Western officials and commentators seem to have short memories. Iranian politics today is a consequence of these developments, just as American politics today is a consequence of the polarisations which have grown in American society since 9/11.

In 2009, at the height of protests against then President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, the Iranian historian Ervand Abrahamian noted that, despite the many criticisms one could make of it, the Islamic Republic had withstood Western pressure for three full decades. Dismissing four commonly cited reasons for this – the numerous cleric-sponsored reigns of terror, the Iran-Iraq War, oil revenues, and the appeal of Shi’ism – he argued that Iran had been able to continue the way it has because of the clerics’ ability to appropriate the populist rhetoric of the radical intelligentsia minus their secular cosmopolitanism.

Critics of the Islamic Republic tend to consider pre-1979 Iranian society as having been qualitatively better for citizens in general and women in particular. But this would be like claiming that Russia before Stalin and the Bolsheviks was better for all. Iran under the Shah was oppressive and authoritarian. The 1979 Revolution, not unlike the aragalaya in Sri Lanka, drew in every political group opposed to the Shah. For a while, this movement became dominated by radical-secular progressives. Raisi figured in among the Islamists who usurped the progressives while advocating for a more egalitarian social order. In this, they succeeded beyond expectations; as Abrahamian points out,

“In three decades, the regime has come close to eliminating illiteracy among the post-revolutionary generations, reducing the overall rate from 53 percent to 15 percent. The rate among women has fallen from 65 percent to 20 percent. The state has increased the number of students enrolled in primary schools from 4,768,000 to 5,700,000, in secondary schools from 2.1 million to over 7.6 million, in technical schools from 201,000 to 509,000, and in universities from 154,000 to over 1.5 million. The percentage of women in university student populations has gone up from 30 percent to 62 percent.”

The situation has improved steadily since then. World Bank data, for instance, show a rise in youth female literacy from 66 percent in 1985 to 99 percent in 2022. This underlies perhaps the most enduring paradox in Iranian society today, its concurrent entrenchment of social welfare and religious conservatism, especially in relation to women. Such paradoxes cannot be understood without reference to the 1953 coup, which sowed among Islamist groups a perpetual suspicion of the West and put them in the same league as radical anti-imperialist progressives. And they cannot be resolved by resorting to the conventional Western solution of colour revolutions and regime change operations.

For these reasons, Raisi’s death hasn’t actually let to a fluttering of hope among Western analysts. The consensus seems to be that his death will do nothing to stall the further Islamisation of Iranian society, and that he will be succeeded by an even more conservative and anti-Western leader. Meanwhile, the world order, specifically in the Global South, is changing so fast that Western narratives no longer cut it.

With or without Raisi, there is unlikely to be a revival of the Obama nuclear agreement, notwithstanding Joe Biden’s gestures. That was a one-hit wonder which did little to assuage Islamist fears of the West or the American right’s deep-seated Islamophobia. In itself, it was not a failure. But like all such initiatives, it was ultimately doomed to failure. Raisi’s tenure marked a heightening of tensions with the West in general, and the US in particular, in light of its abrogation. This will continue, for a long time.

Uditha Devapriya is the Chief Analyst – International Relations at Factum and can be reached at uditha@factum.lk.

Factum is an Asia-Pacific focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, Strategic Communications, and Climate Outreach accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Special Perspective: Deconstructing Iran after Raisi appeared first on Newswire.

By Vinod Moonesinghe

This year, Sri Lankans celebrate their traditional mid-April Solar New Year amidst controversy. Known to the Sinhalese as Aluth Avurudhu and to the Tamils as Puthandu, the New Year is marked by the transition of the Sun from the constellation Pisces, known in Sanskrit (the language of Indic astrologers) as Meena Rashi, into the constellation Aries, Mesha Rashi. This generally takes place on 13 or 14 of April.

The festival has not been without controversy in the past. In 2008, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) government of Tamil Nadu attempted to legislate its replacement by the Hindu harvest festival of Thai Pongal, with the Tamil Nadu New Year (Declaration) Bill. 

However, widespread opposition swiftly emerged, reflecting the festival’s entrenched roots and cultural importance. Ultimately, the Puthandu holiday was preserved in honour of the esteemed Dalit Buddhist leader, B. R. Ambedkar, when the Tamil Nadu Assembly quietly rescinded the controversial legislation, reaffirming the enduring vitality of the Tamil New Year festivities.

The hullabaloo this year came about because the 42-seer astrology panel of the Ministry of Buddha Sasana, Religious and Cultural Affairs could not decide on the auspicious time schedule. The majority ruled that people should light their hearths at 23:06 on 13 April and consume their first meal at 00:06 on April 14. This ruling caused a storm, with the seer minority predicting dire consequences, while more practical people pointed out that midnight was when demons and spirits climb trees – a thoroughly inauspicious time. 

Others pointed out that, based on the boundaries laid by the International Astronomical Union, the Sun’s procession into Mesha Rashi takes place on 18 April. This occurs owing to the earth’s axial precession, in which the Earth’s axis slowly wobbles over time.

The sidereal year, which determines the Avurudhu calculation, exceeds the tropical year (on which the Gregorian calendar in use today is based) slightly, leading to a gradual divergence in dates over time. Indeed, in antiquity, the sun’s transition into Aries aligned with the equinox, indicating the ancient roots of the festival.

The Babylonians first developed the Zodiac system about 2,500 years ago, and it may have travelled to India in the cultural baggage of the Achaemenid Persian. Hence Mesha Sankranti, the festival of solar transition to Aries, must post-date this. However, the modern festival may have evolved from a fusion of a “spring” harvest festival with Mesha Sankranti. We find references to the New Year based on the transition in the Sangam literature, between 300 BCE and 300 CE. 

The festival diffused throughout India and several of its nations celebrate it today. Notably, Bengalis mark Pohela Boishakh and Malayalees revel at Vishu, while Sikhs celebrate Vaishak as the start of Spring. Nepalis also observe it as the Biska Jatra and the Maithils of Nepal and Bihar as Jul Sital. However, its spread did not stop at the borders of old, unified India. The people of Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand partake in Songkran, also known as Songkan, Thyingmai, Pi Mai, and Choul Chnam Thmey. The Dai people of Yunnan province, who are Theravada Buddhists, linguistically related to Thais, celebrate it as the “Water Sprinkling Festival”, called Pōshuǐ jié in Chinese.

Water sprinkling or splashing constitutes a specifically Southeast Asian feature of the festival (although in some villages in South India, a separate water-splashing festival called Okhali takes place on the same day). It may have originated from the Sub-continental bathing ritual, becoming a ritual of “bathing the Buddha” (statue). A hot day, water pots at hand, neighbours dressed in their best, the temptation must have been irresistible!

The Buddha-statue-bathing ritual still takes place, but is followed by water-splashing, in which everyone carries a vessel of water and splashes everyone in sight, this “sprinkling” being in the manner of a blessing, ritually washing away sins. Nowadays, some people use water pistols or even garden hoses as more efficient means of spreading hydraulic blessings.

Water splashing has become a huge tourist attraction and, proving that New Year controversy is not limited to the Sub-continent, has provoked its share of uproar. People (both male and female) going topless in what is a religious festival has caused police action. Another source of controversy has been foreign tourists getting drunk and cavorting publicly with prostitutes, causing resentment.

Even worse, a diplomatic incident nearly took place when Singapore organised a water festival in 2014, to the chagrin of the Thailand Tourism Authority, which claimed copyright. Consequently, Singapore toned down its festivities.

Dragon-boat racing constitutes another feature of the Southeast Asian Solar New Year, differing from its Sub-continental relative. This tradition probably came down from China, which has had dragon-boat races for over two millennia. Teams row their dragon boats as fast as possible on rivers and lakes to win prizes.

Apart from these innovations, most of the Southeast Asian rituals and festivities follow their Indo-Sri Lankan roots, such as ritualistic house-cleaning, observing the inauspicious intercalary time, Buddhist religious activity, honouring one’s elders, eating New Year rice and specially-prepared sweetmeats, and playing traditional games. The betel leaf is a common symbol.

This shared festive tradition stands as one of the oldest and most cherished traditions in the South and Southeast Asian region, resonating deeply with the cultural fabric of communities across borders, symbolising unity and shared heritage. It serves as a compelling example of how cultural practices disseminated in ancient times. 

While some historians speculate that Songkran may have been introduced to Thailand during the Chola Empire’s brief rule, the widespread observance of the festival among cultures untouched by Chola influence suggests a predominantly more peaceful, organic diffusion rather than forcible imposition. The existence of parallel Hindu festivals in India and Buddhist celebrations in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia indicates transmission through migration and cultural exchange. 

Notwithstanding past and ongoing controversies, the South and Southeast Asian New Year celebrations exemplify the rich tapestry of cultural intermingling and mutual enrichment that characterises the history of the region. They foster bonds of kinship and solidarity transcending geographical boundaries, across the Bay of Bengal. Together they constitute one possible aspect of an alternative, bottom-up, people-based cultural globalism to combat “McWorld” – commerce-driven, mono-cultural globalisation.

Vinod Moonesinghe read mechanical engineering at the University of Westminster, and worked in Sri Lanka in the tea machinery and motor spares industries, as well as the railways. He later turned to journalism and writing history. He served as chair of the Board of Governors of the Ceylon German Technical Training Institute.

Factum is an Asia Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, Strategic Communications, and Climate and Environment accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Perspective : “Avurudhu” in South-East Asia appeared first on Newswire.

By Jagath Liyanarachchi

Background

Keheliya Rambukwella, Minister of Mass Media and Ali Sabry, President’s Counsel, Minister of Justice presented a cabinet paper on April 1, 2022, seeking permission from the Cabinet of Ministers to present a draft of a bill to “protect society from the harm caused by false propaganda on the internet.”

This had been approved by the Cabinet of Ministers on April 19, 2021. Thereafter, on or about February 21, 2022, the Minister of Public Security had been handed over the responsibility of acting further on the draft bill.

As such, Tiran Alles, the Minister of Public Security, presented to the Cabinet of Ministers the cabinet paper bearing No. 23/1025/626/011 alongside the draft bill prepared by the Legal Draftsman to “protect society from the harm caused by false propaganda on the internet”, and sought approval for the same.

The Cabinet of Ministers granted its policy-wise approval on May 30, 2023. The Cabinet of Ministers decided that the Online Safety Bill could be presented in Parliament after the Electronic Broadcast Regulatory Authority Bill is tabled in parliament for consideration.

When the Cabinet was convened on August 8, 2023, it was informed that the Online Safety Bill could be presented to the Cabinet of Ministers for approval. Accordingly, Tiran Alles, the Minister of Public Security presented the Online Safety Bill under Cabinet paper dated August 29, 2023 bearing No. 01/10 (O.S.B /2022 (memorandum No. 34/2023), and sought approval from the Cabinet of Ministers for the said Bill, and for it to be published in the Gazette and to be presented to the Parliament.

The Cabinet of Ministers approved the said memorandum on September 4, 2023, and the Online Safety Bill was published in the government gazette on September 18, 2023, as directed by the Minister of Public Security. Thereafter, Tiran Alles, the Minister of Public Security presented the said bill to the Parliament for its first reading on October 23, 2023.

Public Protests

When the bill was published in the Gazette, several parties launched protests against it. Thse included civil society organizations, trade unions, professionals in the Information Technology sector, entrepreneurs, and the Bar Association of Sri Lanka and other lawyers’ collectives too voiced their protest.

Also, Asian Internet Coalition, which consists of 13 internet service providers, had shown their displeasure by way of a letter addressed to the Minister of Public Security.

Supreme Court Determination

As provided for in Article 121 of the Constitution, the citizens of the country have the right to question the constitutionality of a bill, by way of a petition to the Supreme Court, within 14 days from the date of such bill being included in the Order paper of the Parliament. Accordingly, 47 petitions were filed in the Supreme Court against this Bill.

At the commencement of supporting the petitions, the Deputy Solicitor General representing the Attorney General tendered a lengthy document to Court and stated that the government is ready to incorporate amendments at the committee stage of the Bill. As per the said document, it was evident that the government was ready to amend 30 sections of the Bill. (The draft Bill consisted of 52 sections).

The petitions were supported on October 18 and 19, 2023, and the Speaker of the Parliament presented the determination of the Supreme Court to the Parliament on 07th November, 2023.

According to the said determination, if sections 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 36, 37, 42, 45, 53 and 56 of the draft bill were to be passed as they are, provisions of Article 84(2) of the Constitution shall be invoked, and as such, it was to be passed by a 2/3rd special majority including the MPs who are not present.

However, if the said sections are amended at the committee stage in line with the amendments proposed by the Supreme Court in its determination, this bill could be passed with a simple majority. It was further stated in the determination that the rest of the provisions of the bill were not inconsistent with the Constitution.

Accordingly, if the draft bill was to be passed by a simple majority, amendments as recommended by the Supreme Court for 32 sections were to be incorporated at the committee stage.  

Adoption of the Draft Bill

The debate on the draft bill was held on January 23 and 24, 2024. Before commencing the debate, the Opposition brought forward an objection stating that although this bill has been forwarded to the relevant Sectoral Oversight Committee according to the standing orders of the Parliament, no proper report has been submitted to the Parliament yet.

Therefore, the Opposition objected against the commencement of the debate on this bill. They further requested to not hold the debate on the bill, since the Attorney General has not agreed to incorporate the amendments recommended by the Expert committee appointed by the subject Minister. 

Thereafter, a vote was held to decide whether the bill should be taken up for debate or not, and 83 votes were cast in favour of the decision to hold the debate, against which 50 votes were casted. Henceforth, the debate commenced. Another vote was held at the end of the second reading of the bill, for which 108 votes were cast in favour of the bill and 62 against it. 

When the government incorporated amendments during the committee stage, the opposition took up the objection that such amendments were not in line with the Supreme Court determination. However, although Vijitha Herath MP asked for a vote at the end of the third reading, the Speaker stated that the allocated time to request for a vote has come to an end, and therefore he will consider it to be marking the enactment of the draft bill. Hence, the third reading was passed without a vote. 

Objectives of the Act

Section 3 of the Act sets out the objectives of the Act as follows: 

To protect persons against harm caused by communication of prohibited statements online;

To ensure protection from communication of statements in contempt of court or prejudicial to the maintenance of the authority and impartiality of the judiciary;

To introduce measures to detect, prevent and safeguard against the misuses of online accounts and bots to commit offences under this Act; and

To prevent the financing, promotion and other support of online locations which repeatedly communicate prohibited statements in Sri Lanka, by way of online account or through an online location.

Offences Under the Act 

Several classes of offences have been introduced under the Act.

Communication of prohibited statements online.

Committing child abuse by way of an online statement.                     

Making bots to commit an offence.

Offences pertaining to declared online locations.

Prohibited Statements

The Act has identified statements which are prohibited publishing online, and publishing of such statements has been identified as a criminal offence. The said offences are included in Sections 12 to 20 of the Act.

Posing a threat to national security, public health or public order or promoting feelings of ill-will and hostility between different classes of people, by communicating a false statement. Being convicted of this offence will make a person liable for imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or for a fine not exceeding five hundred thousand rupees or both. (Section 12).

Communication of a false statement which amounts to contempt of court under any relevant written law. The provisions of said relevant written laws shall, mutatis mutandis, apply in sentencing such person. (Section 13).

Any person, by communicating a false statement online, gives provocation to any person to cause the offence of rioting, shall be liable (a) for an imprisonment up to 5 years or to a fine up to Rs. 500,000/- when rioting has been committed; OR (b) for an imprisonment up to 3 years or to a fine up to Rs. 300,000/- when rioting has not been committed (Section 14).

Causing disturbance to any assembly of religious ceremony by communicating a false statement online. On conviction, such a person shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or to a fine not exceeding three hundred thousand rupees, or to both (Section 15)

Communicating a false statement online, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings. On conviction, such a person shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or to a fine not exceeding three hundred thousand rupees or to both. (Section 16).

Committing the offence of online cheating by communicating a false statement to any person by way of an online account or through an online location. On conviction, such a person shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years, or to a fine not exceeding seven hundred thousand rupees or to both. (Section 17).

Committing the offence of online cheating by personation, by means of an online account. On conviction, such a person shall be liable to imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or to a fine not exceeding three hundred thousand rupees or to both (Section 18).

Circulating false statement online, with intent to cause mutiny or an offence against the State. On conviction, such a person shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years, or to a fine not exceeding seven hundred thousand rupees or to both (Section 19).

Communicating willful statements with intention to cause harassment. On conviction, such a person shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or to a fine not exceeding five hundred thousand rupees or to both (Section 20).

Committing Child Abuse Online

Any person, who, by way of an online account or through an online location, commits child abuse, i.e., which constitutes an offence within the meaning of sections 286A, 288, 288A, 288B, 308A, 360A, 360B, 360C, 363, 364A, 365 of the Penal Code, and publishes any photograph, audio or video of abusive or pornographic nature relating to a child. (Section 21)

Making or Altering Bots to Commit an Offence

Making or altering a bot with the intention of communicating or enabling any other person to communicate, by means of a bot, a statement which constitutes an offence under this Act. (Section 22)

Magistrate’s Courts are empowered to inquire into cases filed against these offences. 

Measures to be Taken by the Commission with regard to Prohibited Statements (Section 23)

A person aggrieved by the communication of a prohibited statement may make a complaint providing information pertaining to such communication to the Commission. The Commission shall carry out investigations through the officers of the Commission, and upon being satisfied that sufficient material exists to show that a prohibited statement is communicated, it may issue notice to the person who communicated such prohibited statement to take measures to prevent the circulation of such prohibited statement.

A person to whom such notice has been issued shall comply with such notice within 24 hours. Where any person fails to comply with such notice, the Commission shall issue a notice to the internet service provider or internet intermediary on whose online location such prohibited statement has been communicated –

To disable access by the end users in Sri Lanka to such prohibited statement; or

To remove such prohibited statement from such online location.

When a person or an internet service provider or internet intermediary, as the case may be, fails to act in accordance with the above provisions, the Commission may apply to the Magistrate’s Court by way of petition and affidavit to obtain an order directing such person or internet service provider or internet intermediary to comply with such provisions.

Applying for a Court Order to Prevent Circulation of Prohibited Statements (Section 24)

Any person affected by the communication of any prohibited statement may apply to the Magistrate’s Court by way of petition and affidavit to obtain an order to prevent the circulation of such information.

Upon considering such application, the Magistrate may issue a conditional order to such person or the internet service provider or internet intermediary on whose online location such prohibited statement has been communicated.

Declared Online Locations

The Commission may declare in a Gazette notification an online location as a “declared online location”, if three different prohibited statements have been communicated to the end users in Sri Lanka on such online location in respect of which conditional orders were made absolute by the Magistrate under section 24, and at least three of such statements had first been communicated to the end users in Sri Lanka on such online location within six months prior to the date of a declaration under this section is made (An online location means any website, webpage, chatroom or forum, or any other thing that is hosted on a computer and can be seen, heard or otherwise perceived by means of the internet).

If any owner or operator of a declared online location fails to comply with the notice, the Commission or any person authorized by the Commission may apply to the Magistrate for an order directing owner or operator to disable access by the end users in Sri Lanka to such declared online location or to communicate to all end users in Sri Lanka who access such declared online location, a notice declaring that the online location is the subject of a declaration. Such persons, however, have the right to show cause as to why the conditional order may be not made absolute, and the Court may proceed to make such Order absolute or otherwise, based on the facts and circumstances of the case.

Where the owner or operator of a declared online location fails to comply with such order, such owner or operator of a declared online location commits an offence and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six years or to a fine not exceeding ten million rupees. (Section 28)

An internet service provider and/or an internet intermediary must take reasonable steps to ensure that any paid content is not communicated in Sri Lanka on the declared online location, nor such declared online location is promoted. Receiving any payment from such an online location is also prohibited. A person who fails to comply with the said provisions commits an offence and shall on conviction by a competent Magistrate’s Court be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years or to a fine not exceeding ten million rupees, which are empowered to do so. (Section 29)

Any person soliciting, receiving or agreeing to receive any financial or other material benefit as an inducement or reward for operating a declared online location commits an offence. (Section 30)

A person expending or applying any property to help or promote the communication of prohibited statements to the end users in Sri Lanka on a declared online location commits an offence. (Section 31)

Abatement Of Fake Online Accounts And Coordinated Fake Behaviour 

The Commission is empowered to notify an internet intermediary to abate fake online accounts and coordinate fake behaviour. Also, Section 18 of the Act cites that maintaining such fake online accounts is an offence punishable by imprisonment.

Registration Of Social Media Platforms 

Section 11(j) of the Act cites that the websites providing social media platforms to the end users in Sri Lanka should be registered by the Commission in such manner as may be specified by rules made under this Act.

Online Safety Commission

This Commission consists of 5 members, who are appointed by the President, upon receiving approval by the Constitutional Council. The tenure of members of the Commission is 3 years.

The President has the power to remove any member citing reasons, with the approval of the Constitutional Council, after holding an investigation. (Section 7)

Powers and Functions of the Commission (Section 11)

To issue directives to persons, internet service providers or internet intermediaries, who have published or communicated or whose service has been used to communicate any prohibited statement, requiring them to provide to persons who have been adversely affected by any prohibited statement, an opportunity of responding to such prohibited statement; 

To issue notices to persons who communicate prohibited statements, to stop the communication of such statements;

To issue notices to persons who issue communications, internet service providers and internet intermediaries; 

To register the websites providing social media platforms;

To introduce codes of practice for social media platforms;

To issue notices to any internet service provider or internet intermediary to disable access to an online location which contains a prohibited statement;

Challenges To The Legitimacy Of The Act

The drafting of the bill was extremely confidential, and even a member of the drafting committee resigned midway, after showing his protest. 

Also, no stakeholder has been consulted when preparing this draft bill. 

Initially, preparing the draft bill was under the purview of the Ministry of Justice, and then it was suddenly handed over to the Ministry of Public Security. The Information Officer of the Ministry of Public Security has stated that such handing over was done without any note or memo in writing. 

When the draft bill was published in the Gazette, civil societies collectively requested the subject Minister to reevaluate the draft bill, but he paid no attention or consideration to such request. 

Before supporting the Applications before the Supreme Court, the Attorney General tendered a document to Court and informed that the government expects to incorporate amendments to 30 sections of the bill during the committee stage. Expected amendments to 30 sections of the bill out of 56 overall clearly signify the existence of serious errors in the bill. 

51 petitions were filed at the Supreme Court against this bill, which marked the highest number of petitions against a single draft bill and signifies the extent of protest from the public.

As per the Supreme Court determination, if the bill is to be passed by a simple majority, 32 sections were to be amended. As such, the Supreme Court ordered to amend more than half of the bill during committee stage.  

However, some amendments recommended to be incorporated to the bill by the Supreme Court were not incorporated at the committee stage in the Parliament. 

The Leader of the Opposition stated in a public meeting that 9 amendments recommended by the Supreme Court to be incorporated to the bill were left out, hence the Opposition is intending to present a No Confidence Motion against the Speaker.

Although the bill was directed to a Sectoral Oversight Committee as per the standing orders of the Parliament, since there was no proper report forwarded by them, the Opposition argues that holding the debate is unlawful.

The opposition alleges that although Vijitha Herath MP asked for a vote at the end of the third reading, the Speaker proceeded to adopt the bill into legislation stating that the allocated time to request for a vote has come to an end.

After the vote was concluded, many civil society organizations collectively requested the Speaker to not certify an Act which had not incorporated amendments as recommended by the Supreme Court. 

United Nations Human Rights Council, through a message posted on X, stated that this Act will have a negative impact on the rights of Sri Lankans including their right to express. 

Impact On Rights To Speech And Expression

When persons making certain statements are informed to stop publicizing their statements consequent to a direction / order pertaining to prohibited statements under the Act is made by the said non-independent commission, Presumption of Innocence is challenged.

Also, there is a possibility that social media activists will be afraid to express themselves when a non-independent commission is vested with the authority to make binding orders. 

Decisions of a non-independent commission could be politically-motivated, hence it will obstruct the right of citizens to freely express themselves. 

The offences pertaining to prohibited statements under this act are not definite and leaves room for broad interpretations, which imposes an unnecessary limit on the right to express.

As the offence termed ‘Prohibited Statements’ has been given room for a very broad interpretation, directives of the commission could be issued against creators who publish creative communication content online.

Especially, considering the gravity, seriousness and onerous nature in deciding the truthfulness or the lack of it of a particular statement, as legal measures will be taken even against publications that were made in good faith, opportunities to express will be vehemently restricted. 

As there is a condition that Social Media platforms have to be registered, any social media platform that does not obey such condition could leave Sri Lanka, there is a risk that opportunities of the citizens to express will be further curtailed.  

Also, as internet service providers and social media platforms could be criminally responsible under this act, it will prompt such ventures to leave the Sri Lankan market, and there is a risk of expression of opinions on social media being limited or rather coming to a complete stop.  

Internet service providers leaving the Sri Lankan market will be extremely detrimental and prejudicial to those who are engaged in online businesses and marketing. 

As some bot activity carried on by foreign companies pertaining to Sri Lanka cannot be stopped due to technical reasons, only citizens residing in Sri Lanka can be held responsible for such offences. 

When shedding light on how Section 3 of the ICCPR Act and Section 120 of the Penal Code have been (mis)used by successive governments, it is most pertinent to note that there is a huge risk for the provisions proposed by this act being used to oppress persons with opposing ideologies.

Positives in the Bill / Act  

All offences under the act have been classified as Non-Cognizable Offences i.e., any person charged with an offence under this act could not be arrested without a warrant.

All offences under the act have been classified as bailable.

Jagath Liyanarachchi is an Attorney-at-Law who can be reached at jagathliyanarachchi@gmail.com.

Factum is an Asia Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s. 

The post Factum Special Perspective: Online Safety Act – Its Ambit and its Impact appeared first on Newswire.

By Adnan Rehmat

An unexpected drone and missile attack by Iran on targets inside Pakistan on January 16, 2024, and Islamabad’s angry diplomatic reaction have added a potentially new destabilizing dimension in the already deadly situation in the Mideast. If not handled properly it may have potentially damaging geopolitical and geostrategic consequences for South Asia that as a region was largely war-free for now.

Pakistan and Iran share an often porous 900 km border and an ethnic population of Baloch people on both sides. Seven million ethnic Baloch live in the Balochistan province in Pakistan and two million in the Sistan-Balochistan province in Iran. The majority Baloch demographic on the Pakistan side are Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims on the Iran side – reflecting the overall general sectarian majorities in the two countries.

This separate religious sectarian divides in Pakistan and Iran are reflected in sectarian-focused militancy by outlawed militant groups based on both sides that have been operating in each other’s countries. These groups fighting mainly security forces of their own countries as part of ideologically driven resistance often support each other, finding common cause in fighting their own state.

This covert support among non-state actors ends up fueling diplomatic tensions between Tehran and Islamabad who blame each other for not doing enough to stamp out militancy support against them from militant groups finding sanctuary in the other state.  

On the Iran side, two Sunni militant groups fighting Shia Tehran that draw low visibility support from Pakistan based groups fighting Islamabad include Jaish ul-Adl [Army of Justice] and Jundallah [Soldiers of Allah]. It was against alleged Jaish al-Adl targets in Pakistan that Iran rained missiles and drones on January 16, 2024.   

Jaish -al-Adl is an Iranian Sunni Salafi separatist militant organization that operates mainly in Sistan-Balochistan region bordering Pakistan. It was founded in 2012 by members breaking away from Jundallah, also a Sunni Iranian group that had been considerably weakened by the capture and hanging of its charismatic leader Abdulmalik Regi in 2010.

Jaish al-Adl is fighting for a free Sistan-Balochistan and for greater rights of Baloch people on both sides of the border, hence its support among outlawed Pakistani militant groups based in Pakistani Balochistan province.

Jundallah, the parent faction of Jaish, is also a Sunni Salafi militant organization seeking a unified Balochistan state comprising regions dominated by nine million ethnic Baloch on both sides of the Pakistan-Iran border. Also declared a terrorist group by both Iran and US, Jundallah claims to have killed up to 400 Iranian military personnel. Once a kinetic force, its operations were scaled back dramatically after its founder Regis was captured and killed over a decade ago. It once boasted of support from Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda.

On the Pakistani side, the province of Balochistan has been a hotbed of insurgency and revolt by Baloch nationalists and Islamist militants against the governments of Pakistan and Iran. The conflict has witnessed several phases over the past few decades with hundreds of casualties and continues to date.

The key Pakistan-based Baloch separatist groups involved in this conflict include the Balochistan Liberation Army, the Balochistan Liberation Front, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba. The Pakistani military has been fighting these separatist groups in Balochistan and in its cover exercises huge influence over political matters in the province that often generates popular resentment, including support for the militant groups.

Militant groups in both countries, often working in concert, are at times able to simultaneously unnerve Tehran and Islamabad. The native insurgencies that often collaborate across borders sometimes generates angry rebukes from the two capitals accusing the other side of not doing enough to stamp out the groups responsible for them.

The main concern for South Asia is the fear that the hot pursuit of targets by Iran and Pakistan in each other’s territories may flare up and conflate with the ongoing Mideast crisis and bring an unwanted state-involved war into the region. Pakistan already has tense ties with three of its four neighbors – India, Afghanistan, Iran and China – and it cannot afford to allow a tense bilateral moment to morph into a regional conflagration that may escalate.

For now, Islamabad has done well by exercising restraint and restricting its riposte to Iran’s hostile act. It would do even better by getting its foreign minister to engage with his counterpart in Iran so that both sides can ensure that diplomats, not generals call the shots here and long-term political solutions are found to political problems.

South Asia is already a cauldron of cold war varieties – from India-Pakistan, Afghanistan-Pakistan, Maldives-India and India-Sri Lanka cornucopia of diplomatic tensions. All these countries have good ties and strong diplomatic clout with Tehran in a Middle Eastern neighborhood where Iran is not popular. It is in their, as well as South Asia’s, interests to push diplomacy upfront to prevent the Iran-Pakistan flare-up from becoming the perfect opportunity for external actors to expand the Middle Eastern conflict to South Asia.

Adnan Rehmat is an analyst based in Islamabad.

Factum is an Asia Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

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By Ramindu Perera

Last week, South Africa referred Israel’s actions in the occupied Gaza Strip to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) arguing that the military operations amount to the crime of genocide. The oral hearings of the case were held on 11 and 12 January at the Hague, and the case has already attracted significant attention.

The ICJ is the judicial organ of the United Nations, and South Africa is seeking a provisional order requiring Israel to suspend their military operations. At this stage, South Africa does not have to prove that genocide is actually committed. To obtain a provisional order, establishing a prima facie case suggesting that there is substantive evidence concerning genocide is adequate.

The Crime of Crimes

Genocide is considered the gravest crime in international criminal law. This is known as the “crime of crimes.” The Genocide Convention was adopted in 1948 in the aftermath of the second world war in which six million Jews were exterminated by Nazi Germany. The object and the purpose of the Convention was to prevent such an occurrence again.

Thus, the convention attributes a duty on state parties to act to “prevent and punish” genocide.  Article 8 of the Convention states that any state party can call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take necessary action to prevent and suppress acts of genocide. Both South Africa and Israel are parties to the Genocide Convention, and South Africa relies on the aforementioned provisions of the Convention to invoke charges against Israel.

Unlike domestic law, international law does not have a formidable enforcement mechanism. Thus, even though ICJ can rule on inter-state disputes, if a state party chooses to disregard the ruling, there is nothing much that can be done against such a country. For instance, in 2022, during the Russian invasion, Ukraine lodged a complaint with the ICJ and obtained a provisional order asking Russia to suspend military operations.

However, Russia did not accept the order. That case too involved the Genocide Convention as Ukraine requested the ICJ to clarify the application of the Genocide definition in the Ukrainian context where Russia was alleging Ukraine of committing Genocide against ethnic Russians living in Eastern Ukraine.

However, if the ICJ accepts South Africa’s allegations, that would bring a significant loss for Israel at the diplomatic level. Further, the Western allies of Israel — countries like the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany would face a difficult situation because their support would be counted as aiding and abetting a genocidal war. Anticipating these possible repercussions, Western countries have already rushed to dismiss South Africa’s genocide claims.

While the United States has declared the genocidal claim as “meritless”, Germany has decided to intervene in the case as a non-party supporting Israel’s standing. Meanwhile, several countries from the Global South — countries belonging the to Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and non-Muslim countries like Bolivia, Colombia, and Brazil have declared their support to South Africa’s intervention.

Arguments and Counterarguments

At the oral hearing rounds, both South Africa and Israel presented their cases before the ICJ. The Genocide Convention defines genocide as acts “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” Thus, acts such as killing members of the group, causing serious bodily and mental harm, and inflicting conditions that would bring physical destruction in whole or in part are defined as genocidal acts.

The indiscriminate bombing that has killed more than 23,000 civilians in the Gaza strip, displacement of 85 percent of the population, attacks on medical facilities while the population are in a dire need of medical attention are among facts South Africa brought in to describe the genocidal situation in Gaza.

To establish the crime, one must prove that there has been a genocidal intent. South Africa relies on several statements issued by Israeli high officials including the Prime Minister which indicate the intention of destroying Palestine as a national group. For instance, in a statement issued on 13th October 2023, the Israel Energy Minister stated:

“All the civilian population in Gaza is ordered to leave immediately, we will win. They will not receive a drop of water or a single battery until they leave the world.”

The Israeli counter-submission for these types of statements was that they were “random statements”, and some of them have been taken out of context. The challenging part in genocide cases is establishing intent because it is not easy to prove that at the point of committing the act, the state in question had the specific intent of destroying a particular group. It is accepted that intent can be inferred from actions of a state.

However, due to this complexity, in a previous case in which Bosnia brought allegations against Serbia on genocide claims (2007), the ICJ refrained from attributing responsibility to Serbia even though it found the Srebrenica massacre as genocidal. The reason was the failure to establish specific intent of genocide.

The main premise of Israel’s defense was that it was acting in self-defense — which is a principle well recognized by the United Nations Charter. The self-defense argument appears to be in a weak position for two reasons.

First, legitimate self-defense does not extend to the extent of permitting genocide. Prohibition of genocide is considered a peremptory norm in international law. Thus, the prohibition is absolute — no derogation is permitted from the prohibition. Simply, you cannot commit genocide in the name of self-defense.

Secondly, the status of Palestine as an occupied territory raises the question of the validity of the self-defense argument. Under international law, states exercise self-defense vis-à-vis other states. Since the 1967 war, Palestine has been considered to be an occupied territory by Israel. 

This position was affirmed by the ICJ in 2004 in a case that examined the legality of Israel constructing a wall that infiltrated the occupied territories in Palestine (Israeli Wall Advisory opinion). It is debatable whether the self-defense argument can be brought concerning a territory that is under your own occupation.

Though Israel denies the status of occupation, particularly since disengagement from Gaza in 2006, many international bodies including the United Nations have repeatedly held that Israel is the occupying power due to the control it exerts.

Future of Humanitarianism

The South African case is significant because it signifies a certain turning point in how humanitarian arguments are used in international politics. The invocation of humanitarian arguments to bring the conduct of other states into scrutiny was something that became common after the 1990s.

Starting from NATO bombings on Yugoslavia in the late 1990s, humanitarianism was often raised by the Western hegemonic bloc according to their geo-political agendas.

In most of these instances, the “accused” belonged to formerly colonized countries, the Global South. It was always formerly colonial masters — the ones who once thought that they had a civilizational mission to make non-European peoples “civilized” —who questioned the behavior of states in the Global South. Humanitarianism became the ideology of the unipolar world order that emerged aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

With how events are unfolding aftermath of the Israel assault on Gaza, it seems that the tide has taken an interesting turn. While the West unashamedly defends Israel’s horrendous behavior, it is countries from the Global South — from Iran to China, from South Africa to Brazil that have come forward for those who are being massacred.

Among other tools, international law has also been used to confront Israel’s misdeeds. Ironically, countries like the US and Germany, which so far preached the virtue of humanitarianism to the brown, black, and yellow people in the Global South, now have taken a position shielding Israel — the perpetrator of possible war crimes, and crimes against humanity from accusations.

After Gaza, what would be the future of Western humanitarianism? The appeal of Western humanitarianism was any way in decline due to the atrocities intervening forces committed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. After defending Israel’s horrific crimes in broad daylight, would the Western Bloc have the moral standing to talk the human rights language again, and question other countries?

Does South Africa’s intervention at the ICJ mark the end of the monopoly the West enjoyed concerning humanitarianism? Does this case indicate a new beginning, where the Global South has started using the same forums and discourses to question powerful Western countries and their allies? Whatever the answers to these questions are, it appears that South Africa has made a brilliant intervention — an intervention deserving due acknowledgment.

Ramindu Perera is a lecturer attached to the Department of Legal Studies of the Open University of Sri Lanka. He can be reached at raminduezln@gmail.com.

Factum is an Asia Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

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By Rear Admiral Y. N. Jayarathna (Retd)

Naval assets are tools through which a country’s geopolitical standing is constantly being tested – especially in contested waters.

After Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel on October 7, the US promptly dispatched two carrier battle groups to the Gulf and the Mediterranean. The purpose was to deter potential anti-Israeli elements rallying around to attack Israel.

Global powers constantly use their naval prowess to showcase their intentions by deploying their naval assets in various parts of the world. Most of the time these naval assets will be used to meet specific national interests. Sri Lanka is no different: it has done the same in the past and will be doing the same in the future.

The Sri Lankan President stated that a decision has been taken to dispatch a Sri Lankan Naval Vessel to Bab El Mandeb to protect international shipping lines from Houthi attacks.

While this statement should be taken with a pinch of salt, particularly with regard to how willing the political leadership would be to invest in these vessels via operational expenses, surveillance equipment, and supporting logistics at a time of dire economic crisis at home, this is at the same time a welcoming opportunity that the Navy should not miss.

Sri Lanka Navy and the National Interest

The Sri Lanka Navy has executed its naval deployments in meeting national interests on previous occasions as well. The then Royal Ceylon Navy was involved in transferring the sacred Tooth Relics of the Buddha by ship to and from Myanmar in 1950.

From more recent times, the Navy embarked on a hallmark deployment in hunting down separatist terrorist floating warehouses from 2007 to 2008. Once the military will and political will synergized, a bold decision was taken to go after the center of gravity of the separatist terrorists. The fleet of coastal freighters engaged in gunrunning and seeking refuge in high-seas at ranges. The enemy felt, wrongly, the Navy would not dare approach these seas.

Then, later, with the looming drug menace, the Navy again went out to the high seas. This time it ventured into the south of the Arabian Sea, in search of Iranian dhows that acted as the mother ships to transfer drugs to Sri Lankan fishing vessels.

Before that decision was taken in 2019, the Sri Lankan Navy sought assistance from the Indian Navy and the Bahrain based Combined Maritime Force (CMF) as the Sri Lankan Navy concluded that the Arabian Sea was not an operational area for them. But when both India and the CMF declined to provide assistance on the pretext of vessel unavailability, the NHQ decided to engage in the operation by itself. The rest is history, with arrests of several mother vessels and Sri Lankan fishing vessels engaged in the peddling of drugs.

In deploying Naval assets, the primary factor to consider is simply, what for? What is the necessity? Is it in our national interest?

In the cases mentioned above, there was a clear national interest, particularly considering that the South Arabian Sea as an area of operational interests. At the same time, for separatist terrorism the vast sea area towards the south and south-east, reaching up to immediate periphery of the Australian Exclusive Economic Zone, was an area of interest.

The question to ask here is, would Bab-El-Mandeb also constitute a national interest? This analysis intends to discuss that prospect against the need to balance the cost of operational expenses.

The Purpose of Being a “Club Member”

It would be good to take part in regional naval affairs as these would enhance our credibility and gain us acceptance as a regional partner.

Do we have to go to great lengths to prove this, however? The author believes that we need not as our Navy is already performing a major role that has been appreciated in many naval forums.

We have ensured that our maritime jurisdiction remains safe and secure and have collaborated with all Search and Rescue Regions adjacent to us in coordinating maritime affairs. Further, we are already an active partner in securing the drug routes to Australia, the Maldives, and the BoB region.

The major navies would want to jump into these hotspots not to engage in fighting but to train their men and machinery. How much you learn by operating in these “hotspots” is known by these Navies and no simulation can possibly replace it. It is a matter of operating close to the hotspots but NOT within the hotspots.

In the mid-1980s US Navy learnt some hard lessons in their skirmishes in the Strait of Hormuz when they were challenged by Iranian small boats. The US tactics heavily depended on airpower (helicopters primarily) more than naval power.

In such high tempo, intense, and dynamic conflicts, the machinery and the men behave very differently. In one of several instances, the USS Vincennes shot down Iranian Air Flight 655 on July 3, 1988. The flight took off from Bandar Abbas and was mistakenly identified as a fast-approaching speedboat.

For the USSR of that time, it was the moment of retaliation as Russians had been blamed for shooting down Korean Airlines Flight 007 over the Sakhalin Islands on September 1, 1983. In just days, the US Navy deployment changed as naval assets were withdrawn, and hostilities gradually died down in the Strait of Hormuz.

Are we ready for these kinds of situations? Are we ready to get involved in more international engagements and geostrategic pressures when we have run into a mess managing our own affairs?

History indicates that the purposes of these “extraordinary” decisions to reach out for global affairs are two-fold. On one hand these are distractions from internal political issues and on the other hand, they are situations in which you can be both present and not present at the same time! In other words, they are convenient ways by which we can commit to something through words, but not through actions!

The author, having analyzed the President’s thought process in media bulletin, feels it to be a set of empty words, where the underlying thought may be brilliant but at the same time lacks a proper action plan or strategy. Had the President walked his talked this island nation would not have been like this in the context of global competition dictated by maritime matters.

To operate in these tense waters, our Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) will need new installations in the form of thermal cameras and stabilized platforms, which we have not replaced since 2009. We would need better Electronic Warfare suits as not all our EW equipment is now operational.

On the weaponry front, the OPVs are still capable of effectively countering surface and drone threats. It is a matter of revitalizing the old training techniques we used to counter the aerial threats and potential missile attacks. Any drone or surface vessels that are approaching our own units can be brought under a tremendous “cone of fire” thereby destroying them. 

However, Houthis are sending missiles as well. The asymmetric nature of the warfare has changed a lot in technological terms, so much so that the US Navy is competing with a non-state actor who uses commercial drones, anti-ship missiles, and small manned and unmanned surface vessels.

This is the ideal testing ground for India’s defense industry that has expanded exponentially in recent years, and there they are too. On the pretext of protecting the Indian national interests, this is the time to test how combat effective the radars, sensors, surveillance instruments, and even the new combat helicopters. These situations do not present in this format frequently to be there yet not-to-be there.

The Navy Should Not Miss This Moment

The President’s statement at a time of economic crisis in the island nation is an opportunity the Navy should not miss. Since 2022, there hardly has been any capital investment in the armed forces let alone in the Navy. Despite boasting of a large defense budget, the author has determined that there were lesser than 30% of State capital expenditure spent on defense budgets. Thus, the Head of State’s “wishes” would need to be exploited to the hilt so as to obtain investments in today’s operational necessities.

The second reason why SL Navy should not miss this opportunity is that it provides the Navy with a reason to operate in an oceanic area that has a direct bearing on our battle against drug peddling in the Arabian Sea. The author as a maritime practitioner has come across no regional or extra-regional navy that is interested in intercepting drugs and narcotics in Arabian Sea bound for Sri Lanka.

Thus, it is time we extend our “operational interest” to the Gulf of Yemen and Arabian Sea (though perhaps not in the northern part) whilst amalgamating our national interest in fighting the drug menace from the sea with the political interest of operating in partnership with other countries in the south of the Red Sea.

The only drawback the author foresees is that Sri Lanka will be tagged as a “partner” for US led initiatives, thereby indirectly hinting at a possible association with the QUAD camp at the expense of China camp! The free-media opinion makers will endorse these perspectives, possibly the Indian defense analysts more than our own political leaders!

By operating in the south of the Red Sea, what do we stand to get? After all, if the Government go ahead and invested in absolutely required technological necessities, the Sri Lanka Navy can reach out and operate in partnership with regional and extra-regional navies.

This belies another problem. Would Iran and the Gulf countries endorse our presence? The political thinking in the Gulf countries has changed a lot in the last five years and the global divisions that have resulted from the recent Israel-Gaza War are significant and cannot be simply forgotten. If these Gulf countries were totally in support of the US, we would have seen a Gulf Coalition by now. But do we see any?

The author is of the view that there is a growing tide of global opinion, and this tide is against the US and Europe and not necessarily Sri Lanka. In that sense, the author believes that we need not worry about burning our fingers yet. On the other hand, a country’s naval assets cannot be the sacrificial lamb or the price for political miscalculations – a point that has much relevance, given that history is full of such costly blunders.

Rear Admiral Y. N. Jayarathna (Retd) was the Chief of Staff and Chief Hydrographer of the Sri Lanka Navy and Joint Chief Hydrographer to the Sri Lankan government. On retirement his services have been secured by the United Nations as an International Consultant for Undersea Cables. He can be reached at ynjayarathna@hotmail.com.

Factum is an Asia Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Special Perspective: Houthis, the Red Sea, and Sri Lankan Politics appeared first on Newswire.

By Vinod Moonesinghe

On November 2, 1917, British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour wrote a letter to Lord Rothschild, promising support for the creation of a Jewish National Home in Palestine.

A week later, the government made public this Balfour Declaration, making it the first public expression of support for the Zionist cause. This caused concern, not merely among Palestinians, but also among the British Jewish community – not least because Balfour was a known anti-Semite.

On September 5, 1918, the New York Times published a letter from US President Woodrow Wilson to Zionist Organization of America Vice President Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, in which he endorsed the Zionist project and effectively supported the Balfour Declaration. In fact, he had given his prior approval to the Balfour Declaration but had kept it secret for nearly a year.

Strong opposition existed to the Balfour Declaration, in the State Departments, and among the US Jewish community. Secretary of State Robert Lansing pointed out to Wilson that the US was at war with Germany, but not with the Ottoman Empire, which ruled Palestine; that many Jews opposed it; and that many Christians would oppose it.

A prominent Jewish Wilson supporter, ex-Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire Henry Morgenthau wrote regarding the Balfour Declaration:

“What an error it would be, at the very time when the primary message to the world of the Jewish people and their religion should be one of peace, brotherhood, and the international mind, to set up a limited nationalist state and thereby appear to create a physical boundary to their religious influence.”

The Central Conference of American Rabbis expressed their dismay at the Resolution, asserting that the Jewish ideal was “not the establishment of a Jewish state – not the reassertion of Jewish nationality which has long been outgrown.”

Several Jewish rabbis formed a “National Committee of Rabbis Opposed to Zionism”, and one of their number, Rabbi Samuel Schulman, said that the Jewish “destiny is not to become a little oriental people in Palestine.”

This sentiment probably reflected their (correct) analysis that the attempt to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine reflected a desire on the part of anti-Semites to rid themselves of an “undesirable” population. In 1921 the US Congress passed the Emergency Quota Act, which reduced Jewish immigration (and Eastern and Southern European immigration in general) considerably, reducing it even further by the 1924 Immigration Act.

King-Crane Commission

Nevertheless, the Zionist minority proved to have more impact, possibly due to the backing it received from the cosmopolitan Rothschild banking family and other Jewish bankers, as well as from prominent Jewish liberals such as Supreme Court judge Louis D. Brandeis and Christian Zionists such as tycoon William E Blackstone.

Consequently, the commissioners of the King-Crane Commission started out with pro-Zionist ideas. This Commission, officially the “1919 Inter-Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey”, grew out of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, as an attempt to reconcile the positions of Britain and France – which sought to extend their empires into the former Ottoman provinces – and the US, which remained suspicious of their aims.

President Wilson appointed theologian Henry Churchill King and businessman Charles Richard Crane to the Commission, the French and British refusal to appoint commissioners leaving them as the only members.

After extensive discussions with all parties, the Commission, noting that “Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine”, and despite its “deep sense of sympathy for the Jewish cause”, recommended:

“… that only a greatly reduced Zionist program be attempted by the Peace Conference, and even that, only very gradually initiated. This would have to mean that Jewish immigration should be definitely limited, and that the project for making Palestine distinctly a Jewish commonwealth should be given up.”

The findings of the Commission were kept secret for years, and were ignored by the Paris Peace Conference, which went ahead with the Anglo-French plans for dividing the Turkish spoils between them. In the US, the report only saw the light of day after Congress voted in 1922 to support the establishment of a Jewish Homeland in Palestine.

Following intensive lobbying by the Zionists, Republican Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and Republican New York Representative Hamilton Fish III introduced a joint resolution of the US Congress “favoring the re-creation of Palestine as the national home of the Jewish race.”

Although its passing was a foregone conclusion, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of Representatives convened a hearing on the subject. Proponents of the resolution disparaged the Palestinians as uncivilized and used the classic colonial “terra nullius” argument, calling Palestine an “underdeveloped and underpopulated” “deserted country”. Some politicians invoked “Manifest Destiny”, equating Jewish settlers to the White settlers of North America, the “nomadic” Palestinians to American Indians.

However, its opponents put up a valiant fight, with Rabbis Isaac Landman of Long Island and David Philipson of Cincinnati opposing Zionism from Reform Judaism’s universalist humanist viewpoint. They pointed out that the Jewish community was deeply divided on the issue (further evidence that electoral politics did not influence elections as much as lobby intrigue).

Two Palestinian representatives and ex-Zionist Yale English Literature Professor Edward Bliss Reed presented the real ground situation, refuting the negative propaganda about Palestinians. Reed, who had been in Palestine, bemoaned the delay in publishing the King-Crane Commission report, echoed by the Palestinians. Their efforts were insufficient to overcome pro-Zionist sentiment, but they did manage to change the resolution to “favoring the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.”

Oil and policy

The King-Crane Commission also (and perhaps unsurprisingly) recommended that “the United States of America be asked to undertake the single Mandate for all Syria.” The Commissioners seem to have been sincere and to have taken a moral viewpoint in drawing their conclusions, but one wonders if geopolitical considerations may not have impinged on their consciences.

In 1919, Standard Oil of New York (Socony, later Mobil) and Standard Oil of New Jersey (Esso, later Exxon) attempted to stake a claim to petroleum concessions in the “Mesopotamia-Palestine” region, but Britain, the predominant power in the Middle East until the end of the Second World War, blocked them. Not until 1928 did US oil companies begin to make inroads in the Middle East, as Socony, Esso, Gulf Oil, and Standard Oil of California (Socal) began exploiting oilfields in Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

These petroleum interests, which depended on the goodwill of the rulers of the various Arab countries, laid down the State Department’s agenda for the region. Hence, the State Department took up a stance against the establishment of a Jewish homeland. This stance remained in place until the end of the British mandate in Palestine.

After World War II, Britain, much weakened and burdened by war debts, could no longer sustain an overseas military presence, and began ceding its “responsibilities” in the Middle East to the US.

By 1939, following the Palestinian Revolt, the British began to look into the legitimate concerns of the Palestinians, and sought to limit Jewish immigration. Facing increased Nazi discrimination and violence yet excluded from Britain and the USA by restrictive immigration laws, Jewish refugees flooded into Palestine, boosting the Jewish population by 500,000 by 1946.

Zionist militant groups such as Irgun Tzwai Leumi (Etzel) and Lehumei Herut Yisrael (Lehi) began terrorist campaigns against Palestinians and British alike, being joined after the Second World War by the majority Haganah faction. The terrorists benefitted very much from purchases of US war surplus materials (despite these weapons being used against a US ally), enabling them to carry out attacks on the British and pushing them towards abandoning the region.

The British favored establishing a single Palestinian-Jewish state, since this would not cause conflict with the populations of the Arab nations, which were vital to British strategic interests. They believed U.S. financial and military support was essential for overseeing Palestine, hoping to influence Arab-Jewish coexistence.

However, the US government, following the recommendations of US lawyer Earl G. Harrison, who had looked into the Jewish refugee issue, began pressuring Britain to let 100,000 more Jewish Nazi Holocaust survivors into Palestine.

The British attempted to persuade the US to take at least a portion of these refugees but to no avail. The Zionists, who used the Nazi Holocaust as a bargaining chip to establish a Jewish homeland, preferred delaying their relocation rather than resettling them in the USA. US Jewish opinion, which had opposed Zionism before the War, had hardened due to the Nazi Holocaust, and become more amenable to a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

Autonomy or Partition

In an effort to establish shared responsibility with the US for a Palestinian policy and in anticipation of potential Arab resistance to an increased influx of Jewish immigrants into Palestine, the British government proposed a collaborative inquiry. The US decision to co-lead this inquiry may be seen as a strategic move aimed at curbing the influence of political Zionism by framing the situation as a broader Jewish refugee problem.

The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, featuring representatives from both Britain and the United States, convened in Washington, DC in January 1946.

Tasked with examining the political, economic, and social conditions in Mandatory Palestine, its responsibilities extended to evaluating the well-being of the region’s inhabitants, engaging with representatives from the Arab and Jewish communities, and presenting recommendations crucial for both interim measures and lasting solutions to the challenges at hand.

The Anglo-American Committee recommended the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine, which US President Truman welcomed. However, he did not welcome the other recommendations, which included establishing an independent state in Palestine in which neither Jew nor Palestinian dominated, but which protected the rights of all citizens.

A new joint committee, consisting of British Deputy Prime Minister Herbert Morrison and US diplomat Henry F Grady, looked into how the recommendations were to be carried out. In July, they announced the Morrison-Grady Plan, also known as the Provincial Autonomy Plan, for the creation of a federal Palestine, with autonomous Jewish and Palestinian regions, and with Jerusalem, Bethlehem and the Negev under a UN-appointed trusteeship.

The Palestinians rejected the plan, proposing instead that a unitary Palestine be created in which the Jewish minority’s rights would be guaranteed. The Zionists rejected it outright, preferring a new plan to partition Palestine.

President Truman initially welcomed the plan, which the State Department backed, but the Zionist lobby mounted a furious campaign against it. Although confessing privately that he preferred the Morrison-Grady solution, Truman backed away from the Palestine issue, leaving it to the State Department to battle the Zionist lobby.

One issue which affected his stance arose from geopolitics: in the midst of the emerging Cold War, the US focused on European defense, and could spare money for Palestine but not troops. Given that neither the Palestinians nor the Zionists would agree to the Morrison-Grady solution, troops would be required to enforce it, and especially to suppress Zionist terrorism.

Partition

Britain now sought to transfer the Palestine issue to the UN to facilitate troop removal from the conflict with Zionist forces. The US government backed a partition plan, and lobbied UN members to pass Resolution 181, which gave 55% of Palestine to the 31% of the population that was Jewish.

On May 14, 1948, Truman recognized the new state of Israel, only minutes after its declaration of independence. Despite the Zionist state annexing a further 22% of Palestine and ethnically cleansing 750,000 Palestinians from the territories it held, the US and its allies continued to back the Jewish Apartheid state.

At the time, Israel had a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of about USD 323 million (equivalent to USD 4.0 billion today). By its capture of Palestinian territories and by expropriating Palestinian property, the new state had anyway garnered considerable wealth. In 2008, McMaster University’s Atif Kabursi estimated that Israeli plunder of Palestinians amounted to USD 3 billion at 1948 values, or nearly USD 300 billion at 2008 prices.

Nevertheless, the US guaranteed Israel USD 135 million (equivalent to USD 1.684 billion today) in aid over three years. This proved to be the first drops in a flood of monetary aid which gushed from Washington to Tel Aviv. Over the next 72 years, the US paid Israel USD 318 billion (adjusted for inflation) in aid. By 2023, the US was giving Israel USD 3.8 billion annually as military aid.

US backing proved essential to the creation of Israel. Unbroken US economic, diplomatic, and military support has continued to guarantee its existence, as well as to underwrite its military adventures and illegal occupation of what remains of Palestine, as well as its illegal occupation of Syrian and Lebanese territories.

Vinod Moonesinghe read mechanical engineering at the University of Westminster, and worked in Sri Lanka in the tea machinery and motor spares industries, as well as the railways. He later turned to journalism and writing history. He served as chair of the Board of Governors of the Ceylon German Technical Training Institute.

Factum is an Asia Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

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By Aavin Abeydeera

Having passed away at the age of 100, Kissinger’s death was mourned by many, and celebrated by an equally loud number in the international community. Hailed as a hero, and feared as a Machiavellian villain, Kissinger’s legacy is a result of his checkered actions and past, mirroring the State he served so loyally.

Central to Kissinger’s diplomatic philosophy was realpolitik, a pragmatic approach to international relations that prioritizes strategic objectives over ideological considerations. 

Serving as both National Security Advisor and Secretary of State under Presidents Nixon and Ford, Kissinger orchestrated a recalibration of US foreign policy, placing an emphasis on power dynamics and national interest. This approach, transcending borders, significantly influenced global geopolitics, including the intricate landscape of the Asia-Pacific.

Realpolitik, while serving the purpose of doing away with ideological hubris, undid the United States’ commitment to upholding democracy, and acted as a harbinger of the state’s increasingly aggressive intervention-based foreign policy in the decades to come.

In fact, one could argue that it was Kissinger who laid the groundwork for the United States to embrace a role as “global policeman”, one that served its interests first, and not to its ideological vision. 

Kissinger’s legacy is fraught with controversy, notably his associations with authoritarian regimes. Critics contend that in the pursuit of stability and anti-communist alliances, ethical considerations were compromised.

The allegations of involvement in Operation Condor, a campaign against political dissidents in Latin America, underscore the ethical dilemmas in Kissinger’s approach to foreign policy. If the US was born with the spirit of spreading democracy, Kissinger warped it to spreading security and order as America liked it, even at the cost of democracy.

In 1971, Kissinger’s secret mission to Beijing heralded a groundbreaking shift in global affairs: the normalization of relations between the United States and China. This diplomatic maneuver, driven by strategic considerations and the desire for a counterbalance to the Soviet Union, reverberated profoundly in the Asia-Pacific.

The aftermath was threefold. The ensuing Sino-Soviet split ensured that the Soviet Union lost a certain credibility as the steward of the global communist cause, ensuring that the United States’ global position was strengthened.

Kissinger’s role in legitimizing mainland China’s government ensured that the PRC would join the international community, give its people legitimacy on the global stage, and that one of the largest nations on Earth would join the UN Security Council, giving the PRC unprecedented power and legitimacy as a nation in the Asia-Pacific.

Thirdly and most importantly was the ensuing rise of China as a global power is a result of Kissinger’s deft geopolitical calculations.

In retrospect, Kissinger’s machinations to delegitimize the Soviet Union through giving power to China would lead to China becoming a rising world superpower, rivalling even its one-time ally the US. If one must explain China’s present role in the Asia-Pacific, one must ponder whether Kissinger saw the long-term ramifications of his moves.

While the above is certainly important, it was Kissinger’s involvement in the Vietnam War that is most obviously taken as an example of his global legacy, and more specifically, his legacy in the Asia-Pacific. His involvement in the war was marked by attempts to break peace, culminating in the Paris Peace Accords of 1973.

The complexities of these negotiations and the subsequent fall of Saigon in 1975, however, underscore the challenges inherent in Kissinger’s pursuit of diplomatic solutions in Southeast Asia. Additionally, the covert bombing campaign in Cambodia, aimed at disrupting North Vietnamese supply lines, remains a contentious aspect of his legacy.

Critics assert that the pursuit of strategic goals may have, at times, overshadowed the humanitarian implications of such military actions. The question is, if Kissinger’s aggressive policies did nothing to ensure stability in the region, was his use of the terrifying power at the US’s disposal justified at all?

A nuanced examination of Kissinger’s legacy in the Asia-Pacific reveals a strategic recalibration with far-reaching consequences. The normalization of relations with China, while contributing to the geopolitical dynamics of the Cold War, prompts scrutiny regarding its long-term implications. The subsequent ascendancy of China as a global power invites reflection on the enduring influence of Kissinger’s diplomatic initiatives.

Henry Kissinger’s legacy is complex, weaving together diplomatic achievements and moral quandaries. In Asia and beyond, his maneuvers continue to shape global dynamics. As policymakers grapple with the consequences of his policies, the tension between geopolitical imperatives and ethical considerations remains a central theme.

Aavin Abeydeera studied at the Bandaranaike Center for International Studies (BCIS). He is interested in learning and writing about the world and how it operates. His interests range from geopolitics, economics, and foreign policy to culture and sports.

Factum is an Asia-Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

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By Uditha Devapriya

On Friday, November 24, the Mullaitivu Magistrate’s Court issued an order prohibiting events dedicated to the commemoration of LTTE soldiers on Maaveerar Naal or Hero’s Day, which falls today, November 27. The order had been prompted by complaints from the Mullaitivu police. Meanwhile, some websites report that the headstones of fallen LTTE cadres have been demolished and activists involved with their commemoration have been harassed, with one activist taken away by police while attending an event honoring their families. At the same time, the Mallakalam Magistrate’s Court has rejected petitions by the Manipay, Palaly, Thellipalai, and Achuveli police to ban such events.

The Manipay police argue that these events glorify terrorism, more or less conflating the commemoration of dead LTTE soldiers with the celebration of the outfit to which they belonged. Such arguments have made it possible for the government to deny any space for remembering the fallen from “the other side” of the conflict. Intertwined with this are concerns that such remembrance may legitimize separatist demands and terrorist outfits. Yet lost in all that is the question of whether a State can deny the community the right to memorialize its dead and to commemorate the past.

In Sri Lanka, the right to memorialize remains contentious, especially given the lack of any tangible progress on postwar reconciliation. Mourning the dead, particularly fallen soldiers, has become a political act for both sides. What has complicated this are the narratives that each side has built up regarding not just the ethnic conflict but also the politics, society, and history of the country. The State’s narrative is triumphalist and demonizes those who differ from its view, while the Tamil community, victimized for so long, sees the end of the war as the victory of a powerful military over a minority community. It is in light of these issues that one must evaluate the petitions against Maaveerar Naal.

Though not explicitly enshrined in the United Nations Charter or Declaration of Human Rights, the right to memorialize forms an important part of international humanitarian law, transitional justice, and post-conflict reconciliation.

In 2005 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 60/147, the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law. Guided by the UN Charter, Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on Human Rights, “and other human rights instruments”, the document focuses on remedies and reparations for victims of war crimes and violations of international human rights law. These include not just reparations and damages but also access to information, public apologies, and commemorations. The Resolution, in that regard, goes beyond a restrictive and financial interpretation of remedies, and emphasizes restorative justice. 

Restorative justice, in fact, is a cornerstone of international humanitarian law. Its objective is to avoid pitting former warring parties against each other and instead reach a consensus or common ground on the way forward after a conflict has ended. This is not as easy as it may sound, for reasons that will be outlined later. But international law is rooted in restorative justice, and one of the ways of achieving such justice is enabling all parties to a conflict to mourn their dead and, in mourning for them, to facilitate discussions about what happened during a war and how society can prevent a relapse into war. This is why memorialization is an important toolkit of transitional justice, and why it must be viewed in tandem with other processes, including truth and reconciliation commissions.

In that respect memorialization serves several functions. It promotes reconciliation, national identity, healing, truth-telling, and civic engagement. It also provides an opportunity to revisit the past, painful as it may seem, and engage with and confront dominant historical narratives. While government initiatives like truth and reconciliation commissions take time and are seen as imposed from above, commemorations and tributes are more grassroots and bring communities together. “Memory initiatives” and “sites of conscience” empower communities to view a traumatic event like a war or a genocide from a different angle, and reflect on how it impacted its victims. In their most basic sense, these processes also help remind us that such events occurred, and that the aim is not so much finding out why they happened as ensuring they never happen again.

As historian Shamara Wettimuny has aptly pointed out, we should be willing to look at uncomfortable histories. This is true of memorialization as well, with the caveat that such uncomfortable histories should provoke us into questioning dominant narratives. However, there are certain problems here. Memorials can themselves become politicized, encouraging dissension rather than discussion. As one report observes, memorial sites in Sri Lanka that commemorate victims of terrorism can defeat the very purpose for which such sites are built in the first place. They can also reinforce certain narratives about wars and conflicts, thus undermining their progressive potential. This is as true of State-led and funded memorials as memorials built by and belonging to “the other side.”

One solution to this would be to distinguish between combatants and civilians and identify those for whom memorial sites have been built with the latter group. In the case of both Maaveerar Naal (the LTTE) and Victory Day (the Sri Lankan military), however, this is more difficult than may first seem. Memorial sites and commemorative events in Sri Lanka lack inclusivity, which is what has enabled polarization and has fed into the great postwar divide between a triumphant South and a defeated North. Against this backdrop it makes little to no sense to raze down memorials and issue petitions against remembrance events in the north and east. A more constructive approach would be to emphasize the identity of those being remembered: not as members of a terrorist outfit, but civilians who, in the course of a struggle they thought as just and justifiable, took up arms.

The issue, however, is that narratives breed counternarratives, and these tend to be used in the service of political ends as well. In the north, for instance, the remembrance of fallen LTTE soldiers has been conflated, rather unfairly, with celebration of separatist and terrorist sentiments. Yet recent episodes, such as the cancellation of a lecture by a Tamil human rights activist at the University of Jaffna on grounds of her reference to the LTTE as a fascist organization, can provide a pretext for political forces to reinforce this conflation, to use memorialization for less than benign political ends. Fortunately, the academic culture in the region appears to be progressive on these fronts, as the response of the University of Jaffna Teachers’ Association to the lecture cancellation episode makes clear.

On the other hand, geopolitics plays a part in memorialization as well. During its 30-year history the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict became internalized in other countries, prominently India. In 2010, a year after the end of the war, the Sri Lankan government built a memorial for the 1,200 Indian Peacekeeping Force soldiers who lost their lives during their mission in Sri Lanka. This, and the 10 Para Memorial in Palaly, are the only such memorials dedicated to these soldiers; the Indian government has not built a similar monument. On the other hand, the Mullivaikal Muttram, built in Thanjavur in Tamil Nadu in November 2013, reflects on the lives of Tamil civilians lost during the final phase of Eelam War IV. Sponsored by the World Tamil Confederation, its opening ceremony saw the participation of diverse political parties, including the Communist Party of India and the BJP. Similar sites have been or are being built elsewhere, including one in Brampton, Toronto.

In this regard, the purpose of memorial sites and remembrance events should be not merely to prevent wars from repeating, but to bring communities together. For this, such initiatives have to be cognizant of local realities. There are enough and more examples of memorial sites and memory initiatives that were forgotten not long after they were built, because they were seen as either imposed from above or excluding certain groups. They should also be linked to other mechanisms which aim at bridging different communities, such as truth and reconciliation commissions but also, more importantly, education reforms, including history syllabus reforms. Without such mechanisms, memorialization will not achieve its objectives. Historically, the Sri Lankan State, regardless of the party in power, has not been sensitive to the need for memorialization. This needs urgent redressing, especially since the government has built up a reputation for bulldozing rather than building memorial sites.

Uditha Devapriya is the Chief Analyst – International Relations at Factum and can be reached at uditha@factum.lk.

Factum is an Asia Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

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By Jagath Liyanaarachchi

Online Safety Bill

According to the directive of the Minister of Public Security, Tiran Alas, the Online Safety Bill was published in the Gazette on 18-09-2023. On 2023-10-03, the bill was tabled in the Parliament for the first reading.

The Bill envisages the establishment of a Commission for the Safety of Online Systems, the banning of certain online communications, and the banning of fake online accounts, etc.

Social media activists, media organizations, lawyers’ organizations, and civil activists raised severe concerns over this bill. The government is accused of restricting the freedom of speech and expression, especially by the provisions of this bill and the critics claim that social media activists who criticize the government can be targeted by the provisions of this Act.

Supreme Court ruling

After the Bill was tabled in Parliament, 51 petitions were filed in the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Bill. After examining the petitions by a three-member bench of Supreme Court judges, according to Article 120 of the Constitution, the decision was communicated to the Speaker. The decision was announced by the Deputy Speaker in Parliament on 07-11-2023.

According to that decision, sections 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13,14, 15,16,17,18,19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26,27,28,29, 30,31, 32, 36, 37, 42, 45, 53 and 56 can be approved as mentioned in the Bill, if passed by a special majority of two third including the absent Members of the Parliament, according to the provisions mentioned in Article 84(2) of the Constitution.

According to the amendments proposed by the Supreme Court in its decision, if the said articles are amended at the committee stage, this bill can be passed by a simple majority. The Supreme Court said that other provisions of the Bill are in line with the Constitution.

Alternative scenarios regarding the way forward of the Bill

Accordingly, there are several options before the government regarding the bill. They are

1. Passing the Bill as it is by a special two-thirds majority.
2. Incorporating the Supreme Court’s recommendations at the committee stage and passing the bill by a simple majority.
3. Amending the bill by incorporating amendments suggested by media activists and civil organizations at the committee stage.
4. Withdrawal of the Bill without going to a second reading.

Among these, the most likely option is to pass the Bill by a simple majority, incorporating the amendments recommended by the Supreme Court at the committee stage.

Limitations on adding amendments at committee time

There are two things that Parliament should consider when amending the Bill at the committee stage.

1. Incorporation of the amendments recommended by the Supreme Court. If these recommendations are not incorporated the bill must be passed by a special majority of two-thirds.
2. The Parliament has a legal obligation to act within the limitations set by Article 78(3) of the Constitution when amending the articles not mentioned in the Supreme Court decision. Those restrictions mean that any amendment made to a Bill in Parliament should not be outside the essence and principles of that bill.

Articles recommended by the Supreme Court to be amended

Supreme Court recommended amending 31 of the 56 articles to pass the Bill by a simple majority. The Parliament may not deviate from the Supreme Court’s decision when amending those articles at the committee stage. But Parliament may amend other articles at the committee stage within the limits of Article 78(3) of the Constitution.

Critics emphasized the independence of the commission, broadness of interpretations of offenses, powers of the commission, etc. related to the active provisions of the Bill. Supreme Court has recommended to amend almost all of these articles.

Other articles are related to general procedural matters and amending those articles brings no substantive change to the impact of this Act.

What can civil society do now?

1. Request the bill to be withdrawn and re-drafted after extensive discussion
2. Urging MPs to abstain from voting in favour of the bill
3. Intervening in making rules if the bill is passed

Importance of Drafting a new Bill

The current Bill was drafted without consultation with any of the stakeholders, and there was a lot of opposition to this bill from all parties, both locally as well as internationally.

Unofficial information also circulated that the bill would be withdrawn by the Minister in charge of the subject. Also, as discussed above, it is suggested that 31 of the 56 articles of the draft should be amended.

Therefore, the best option for the government is to withdraw this Bill with a plan to prepare a new draft. The best practice is to discuss this with the relevant stakeholders.

Through such an activity, both the government and the citizens have the opportunity to formulate a more positive law while getting confirmation about the legality of that law. And the possibility of getting international recognition is also available.

Jagath Liyanarachchi is an Attorney-at-Law who can be reached at jagathliyanarachchi@gmail.com.

Factum is an Asia Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

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By Tahira Sheriff

In a world brimming with challenges, the power of unity, collaboration, and shared purpose shines ever more brightly. Such is the saga of my journey through the Professional Fellowship Exchange Program organized by the U.S. Department of State.

Over five weeks, I figured among 20 exceptional fellows from Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan who embarked on a journey in the United States that redefined the boundaries of possibility, fostering collaboration, innovation, and the exchange of ideas.

At the heart of this expedition lay an economic empowerment-focused program, nurtured by the Gaylord College of Journalism and Mass Communications at the University of Oklahoma. This initiative exemplified the potential of cross-cultural exchange and collaboration, facilitated by the unwavering support of the US Embassy of Sri Lanka. 

At the core of this journey stood the Alengko Foundation, our vision devoted to extending emergency relief and enhancing livelihoods in rural Sri Lankan communities. Fueled by a passion for social work, my selection for this program aimed to broaden my perspective, uncover novel avenues of growth, and amplify and share the resounding impact story of my foundation.

Envisioning an endeavour of this magnitude required the guidance and dedication of exceptional mentors. Elanie Steyn, of the Gaylord College of Journalism and Mass Communications at the University of Oklahoma, and Jeff Moore, the Executive Director of the Ronnie K. Irani Center for the Creation of Economic Wealth, curated an experience that would forever shape my journey. 

Their strategic placement led me to a partnership that felt serendipitous – Tulsa Area United Way. Here, guided by the insights of Brent Sadler, Vice President of Community Investments, the intricacies of non-profit operations and fundraising unfurled before me like a captivating narrative.

The resounding importance of selfless collaboration echoed through interactions with esteemed organizations like Good Will, Food Bank, the YWCA, and grassroots initiatives such as Iron Gate, Sand Springs Community Center, The Center, Tulsa Day Center, Women in Recovery, Just Hope, and so on: the list never seems to end.

Every step on this path was fortified by the generosity of hearts and minds. Alison Anthony, the President and CEO of Tulsa Area United Way, alongside Brent Sadler epitomized this spirit by opening the doors of Tulsa Area United Way to fellows like me for many years and sharing wisdom that transcended mere networking. Rather, it was a celebration of shared aspirations and a collective determination to ignite positive change within communities.

While my experience exceeded my expectations, some fellows faced differing circumstances. Their anticipated hosts did not always align with their professional criteria, leading to mixed expectations. In such situations, it’s crucial to embrace the broader essence of fellowships. 

These experiences are designed to promote cross-cultural appreciation, immersing ourselves in one another’s values and traditions, and fostering connections that nurture not only our professional paths but also our souls. While a valuable host is an asset, the program’s core value lies beyond.

Unlike many other exchange programs, I was fortunate to both work and live closely with my hosts and fellow participants. This proximity not only fostered comfort but also allowed for a deeper connection with their cultures and traditions. The assurance of 19 likeminded souls to share the American chapter of my journey proved invaluable, enriching my experience beyond measure.

What began as an opportunity to enhance my nonprofit foundation evolved into something far more profound. Beyond the technical skills acquired and the expertise exchanged, the essence of this experience lay in the bonds woven within our diverse cohort. Each day of learning, discovery, and growth transformed strangers into family.

This program showcased the power of cross-cultural exchange and collaboration. For instance, my counterparts from India and Pakistan, once divided by stigmas and misconceptions, departed as close friends who celebrated each other’s nations and beliefs.

The barriers of generations were shattered by shared experiences, opening hearts and minds to new perspectives. Elanie Steyn’s promise of a unique experience became an understatement, as the bonds within our diverse group transformed us into a family.

As our journey converged with 172 fellows from 49 countries in a culminating week-long conference hosted by the US State Department in Washington, the magnitude of our shared journey was unmistakable. The camaraderie among the 20 of us, combined with the Oklahoma family we had built up, was to say the least palpable.

As our time culminated in Washington, the realization hit that the connections we forged transcended borders. Goodbyes were laden with a bittersweet sadness, knowing that the void left in our hearts was a testament to the depth of our newfound relationships.

Woven by shared values, beliefs, and aspirations to effect positive change in our respective nations united us, making it clear that we were not just fellows, but kindred spirits united by a common mission.

In retrospect, the Professional Fellowship Exchange Program transcended mere professional development. It bestowed upon us a tapestry of alliances that were committed to sculpting a brighter future. As I return to my work at the Alengko Foundation, I carry with me the lessons, memories, and friendships forged during those five remarkable weeks.

This program serves as a perpetual reminder that the most enduring change is forged through collaboration that transcends borders. Our shared odyssey extended far beyond networking – it rekindled my motivation, renewed my inspiration, and fortified my resolve to be the change I yearn to witness in this world.

As we each return to our corners of the globe, we do so armed with an unbreakable bond and a shared dream of a better tomorrow. The program’s impact will always remind me that collaboration knows no boundaries and that change is best achieved when we stand together.

Tahira Sheriff is the cofounder of Alengko Foundation in Sri Lanka. With a background in organizations like the United Nations and the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, she founded the Alengko Foundation with the vision of fostering transformation and positivity among marginalized communities in rural Sri Lanka. Her belief in the power of kindness as a catalyst for change is a driving force in her work, her books, and her daily life.

Factum is an Asia Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

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By Sanja de Silva Jayatilleka

The Valdai Discussion Club, established in 2004, held its 20th meeting in Sochi, Russia from October 2 to 5, seeing over 140 “leading experts” from 42 countries attending the conference despite ongoing hostilities between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin attended the conference for the plenary session on the last day, to be interviewed and to answer the delegates’ questions for over 3 hours.

The theme of the conference was “Fair Multipolarity: How to ensure Security and Development for Everyone”, laying the conceptual foundations for a more equitable global order.

Multipolarity in a “Hierarchy-Free Future”

Multipolarity being the theme of the conference, it was analyzed in all its aspects. The moderator of the panel on the subject, Professor Emeritus of Politics from the University of Kent Richard Sakwa proposed the term “Heterarchy” to describe the new order of multipolarity, suggesting that no country will be hegemonic within that order. This new order would pursue a “positive peace” and be driven by a “developmental agenda.”

The new Valdai expert’s Report on multipolarity (“Maturity Certificate”) asserts, in accordance with Russia’s 2023 Foreign Policy Concept, that while multipolarity continues to take shape, it has “definitely become irreversible.”

It sees the emerging new order as an “Asynchronous Multipolarity”, where international relations are evolving in different segments at different speeds and times, undermining the stable structure required by a hierarchical system.

It acknowledges that the International Order is governed by the distribution of power, recognizing however that there is more than just military power that determines it. The report declares that there are other powers that can be “weaponized”, reflecting the complexity of international relations, where for one, the US dollar overwhelmingly dominates the global financial system.

A response of the major powers of the global South is the present tendency towards de-dollarization pursuant to the unilateral sanctions regime imposed on Russia. While the US $ continues to dominate and will do so for the foreseeable future, those countries especially of the BRICS wished not to limit their options in global trade and to pursue their economic and foreign policy guided by their own national interest and developmental compulsions.

It indicates that the digital sphere as another area of competition where the West dominates, although China, earlier than Russia, had found it necessary to develop their own digital platforms to mitigate their vulnerability to strategic shocks, as has Russia which also developed its own digital platforms. It hopes that China and Russia could become exporters of “digital sovereignty” in the future.  

BRICS

“BRICS has arrived!” declared Dr Matab, part of the Indian delegation. The intention of the BRICS Plus group is not to replace one version of domination by another, he said, adding that instead, it sees it as evolving into a truly representative global economic system of governance.

“BRICS is a vision not an organization,” he said, one which takes responsibility for shaping a new world order. Another Indian perspective was that BRICS plus emerged to rebalance the world order, and recommended going beyond State level engagement to connectivity of youth, think-tanks, and BRICS games. Indian currency is being used in 22 countries at present, he said, while China’s is used in 120.

Brazil’s Dr Nogueira, formerly Vice President of the BRICS’ New Development Bank said that progress is slow due to the resistance of Central Banks. Not all members of the BRICS are in a rush to create a BRICS currency, with some such as India preferring to take time to make a final decision. The new currency was not intended to replace local currencies, and the USD would remain the dominant reserve currency.

Russia will take over the presidency of the BRICS bank in two years, when Brazil’s ex-President Dilma Rousseff completes her two years as President of the Bank. Russia will also host the BRICS Plus summit in 2024, where 200 events have already been planned, including BRICS games.

The Chinese vision for BRICS was not to topple nor overhaul but only to restructure the current global financial and economic architecture; to gradually modify the global system to represent the more than 50% of the world’s population.

The South African delegate, Dr Maharajah asserted that one cannot solve the world’s problem with a homogenous group such as the G7. The BRICS Plus shows the embrace of complexity in international relations but there was a need for the increase of regional voices to understand regional dynamics within which the world’s problems take place. This would make for a more stable international system, he said, noting South Africa’s example of inviting the African Union states to its BRICS conference this year.

Valdai goes nuclear

A somewhat controversial moment at the conference occurred when Russia’s preeminent strategic studies intellectual, Emeritus Professor Sergei Karaganov who has been described as the Russia’s Kissinger (and is a real-life friend of Henry Kissinger) reiterated his recent writings, widely criticized in academic and policy circles in the country, recommending a change to Russia’s nuclear policy to lower its threshold of the use of nuclear weapons to include the first use of tactical nuclear weapons.

He thought that the deterrent capacity of nuclear weapons was no longer effective, evidenced by the West’s enthusiastic military support to Ukraine against a fellow nuclear power, Russia. He said that the efficiency of deterrence needs to be enhanced by using tactical nukes against a third non-nuclear country openly supplying Ukraine with weapons, in order to stop the escalation of the conflict towards the Third World War by the irresponsible behavior of the Western coalition.

Sri Lanka’s Dr Dayan Jayatilleka promptly stood up to intervene saying that as a country which had contributed so much to humanity, more than most countries, Russia should not let it be said that it initiated its very destruction. He warned that any use of tactical nukes would invite a western response and could lead to an escalation, with retaliatory tac-nuke strikes carried out against Crimea or the Donbas.

He also exhorted that what the on-going situation needed instead was to have new Marshals Zhukov, Timoshenko and Rokossovsky, heroes of the Red Army’s counteroffensive against the Nazis, while the very suggestion of tactical nuclear weapons would indicate Russian weakness, not strength.

The loud round of approving applause for his intervention from the mainly Russian audience indicated that Emeritus Prof Karaganov’s view on this was not widely popular and was regarded with as much consternation by his compatriots as by most of the foreign delegates.

The Chinese delegate said that a first strike went against China’s nuclear policy and would be viewed unfavorably by China, while interested in the outcome of such action by Russia. The Indian panelist, a former Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva at the same time as Dr Dayan, firmly asserted that such a policy would not be supported by India which was very concerned at its suggestion.

When the same question was posed by Professor Karaganov to President Putin on the last day, and President Putin was unambiguous in his response that Russia does not need to change its nuclear policy, as they had stationed thousands of missiles and any strike on Russia would trigger a massive automatic retaliation that could reach anywhere in the world, no matter where it originated.

According to Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s revelation at Valdai this time, the irresponsible actions of then British Prime Minister Boris Johnson who reportedly flew to Kiev to advise president Zelensky not to negotiate the Minsk agreement, which had been virtually concluded for a peaceful settlement between the Russia and Ukraine, has resulted in a possible future confrontation, however unlikely, between powerful, nuclear armed former adversaries.

Sanja de Silva Jayatilleka is the author of “Mission Impossible – Geneva” (Vijitha Yapa, Colombo, 2017). She was a participant by invitation at the Valdai 20th annual conference.

Factum is an Asia-Pacific focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

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By Muhammad Aftab Alam

A review of Proposed Legislation in Pakistan and Sri Lanka 

In September 2023, the Sri Lankan government introduced an Online Safety Bill to establish an “Online Safety Commission”, the purported objective being “to prevent the use of online accounts and inauthentic online accounts for prohibited purposes and to suppress the financing and other support of communication of false statements of fact.”

Similar attempts were made by the Federal Cabinet of Pakistan in July 2023 when it approved  a Bill to constitute an E-Safety Authority, to regulate the establishment, registration and operation of Social Network Platforms (SNPs) throughout Pakistan.

The Bill in Pakistan was approved by the Federal Cabinet as part of a package of other Bills, including the Personal Data Protection Bill 2023, the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Amendment) Bill 2023, the Official Secrets (Amendment) Bill 2023, and the Pakistan Army (Amendment) Bill 2023.

Many of these Bills were passed by the Parliament before the dissolution of the National Assembly on August 19. However, several stakeholders including the Pakistan Digital Editors Alliance (PDEA), Asia Internet Coalition (AIC), digital rights activists, and journalists expressed serious concern over Cabinet’s approval of the E-Safety Authority Bill.

In response, the government dropped the idea to enact the Bill.

The following is a quick overview of the Pakistani and Sri Lankan Bills. 

Pakistan’s E-Safety Authority Bill 2023 claims to “promote online safety and prevent online harm.” The Bill proposes to “counter hate speech, hate crime, violence, fake news and other unlawful content on Social Network and to ensure the implementation and limitations enshrined in Article 19 of the Constitution [of Pakistan].”

This Bill grants exclusive powers to the Federal Government the power to establish an E-Safety Authority in Pakistan and appoint or remove its chairman and 12 members.

According to the Bill, the Authority shall regulate the establishment, registration, and operation of Social Network Platforms (SNPs) in Pakistan; regulate content on SNPs; block access to material that promotes, incites, instructs, and depicts abhorrent violent conduct; prescribe fines for the contravention of the provisions of the Act or rules and regulations; and refer matters and complaints related to offences to the concerned law enforcement agencies and authorities.

The Authority also shall have the power “to access to any device, any apparatus, data or any other material connected with such system, for the purpose of searching any information or data contained in or available to such device.” 

The Bill empowers the Federal Government to establish Social Network Complaints Commission(s) or SNCCs to receive and decide on complaints against any aspect of content or expression shared by Social Network Registration Holder(s).

In this regard, the Federal Government can appoint Social Network Appellate Tribunals to deal with appeals against the decisions of the SNCCs. The decision of the Social Network Appellate Tribunals can, of course, be challenged in the High Court. 

The Bill prohibits the establishment, operation or continuation of operation or activity of a SNP without registration with the Authority. It requires “online information and content delivery system such as web TV channels, YouTube channels (including vlogs), Netflix, Amazon Prime, Over The Top (OTT) Channels, etc.” to register as an SNP with the Authority.

The SNPs also cover or include social networking sites or other such content made available for viewing over the internet, any cloud-based content distribution service that permits a person to become a registered user, establish an account, or create a public profile for the purpose of allowing the user to post and share user-generated content on platforms like Twitter, Facebook, Snapchat, Instagram, and Tik Tok.

All registered SNPs are required NOT to air any “Prohibited Content” which includes, but is not limited to content against the Islamic values and the national ideology of Pakistan; derogatory remarks about any religion, sect, community; content likely to incite, aid, abet, glamorize or justify violence; and anything which has been banned for exhibition or distribution under the applicable laws or by any Court possessing competent jurisdiction. 

The Bill proposes fines up to PKR 2 million for an SNP operator who violates or abets the violation of any of the provisions of the Act or Rules or Regulations therein. In case of repetition of the alleged violation, the person can be put behind bars for three years. 

Moreover, the Bill proposes imprisonment of five years and fine up to PKR 3 million if an alleged violation is committed by a person who does not hold a registration to operate a Social Network Platform in the country. 

Sri Lanka’s Online Safety Bill 2023 seems to imitate what had been proposed in Pakistan in August 2023. The Sri Lankan Bill aims to “prohibit online communication of certain statements of fact in Sri Lanka; to prevent the use of online accounts and inauthentic online accounts for prohibited purposes; prohibited purposes; to suppress the financing and other support of communication of false statements of fact.” 

The Bill proposes the establishment of an Online Safety Commission to “make provisions to prohibit online communication of certain statements of fact in Sri Lanka and implement above-referred purposes of the Bill. The President of Sri Lanka shall have discretionary powers to appoint and remove its chairman and members. 

The Commission purports to have the mandate to register the websites providing social media platforms to the end users in Sri Lanka. It will be able to issue Codes of Practice for service providers and internet intermediaries who provide internet-based communication services to end users in Sri Lanka. 

The Bill defines a false statement as “a statement that is known or believed by its maker to be incorrect or untrue and is made especially with intent to deceive or mislead but does not include a caution, an opinion or imputation made in good faith.” The Commission shall have powers to stop the communication of such statements. 

The Bill declares a variety of statements as “prohibited statements.” These include statements “posing” as a threat to national security, public health, or public order, or those which promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different classes of people; statements which amount to contempt of court; statements which provoke any individual through intentional insults via the communication of “false statements”; and so on. 

The Commission shall operate as a complaint authority against “prohibited statements” and shall be authorized to stop all communication of such statements. Furthermore, the Commission can issue notices to the internet access service provider or internet intermediary: disable access by end users in Sri Lanka to such prohibited statement; or remove such prohibited statement from such online locations.

The Bill also authorizes the Magistrate’s Court to issue order upon a petition to prevent circulation of a “prohibited statement.” Non-compliance of orders of the Court can result in fine up to LKR 10 million, depending upon the nature of the “offence.”

Under the Bill, the Commission can declare any website, webpage, chatroom or forum, or any other medium that can be seen, heard, or otherwise perceived by means of the internet as a “Declared Online Location.” Non-compliance with the orders under the Bill can put the owner or operator of such website, webpage, chatroom, or so on behind bars for a period up to six years, along with a fine of up to LKR 10 million. 

A perusal of the proposed Bills shows that the structure of proposed laws varies in some respects between the two. However, both have many similarities in the intent and substance. The Bills empower the President in Sri Lanka and the Federal Government in Pakistan to appoint and remove members of the Commission or Authority.

The purposes or objectives of the Bills are overbroad, vague, and misleading. If enacted, the Commission (in Sri Lanka) or Authority (in Pakistan) will have extraordinary powers to regulate, block, and remove online content.

Such unbridled powers will result in online censorship and the curbing of political dissent. This is evident from the fact that the PTA in Pakistan blocked more than a million websites and webpages between 2016 and 2020 under Section 37 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) 2016.

Prescribing criminal penalties against online free speech is highly problematic. In Pakistan, more than 25 journalists have faced criminal charges under PECA due to social media posts and other communications since its enactment. There is no doubt that deliberations and consultations are needed to make these Bills more acceptable and practical. 

Muhammad Aftab Alam is a media law expert based in Islamabad. He can be reached via X (formerly Twitter) on @aftabalam_77.

Factum is an Asia Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

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By Rathindra Kuruwita 

On October 7, Hamas launched a rocket barrage of at least 3,000 missiles against Israel. This was followed by an invasion by land and on air. Militants broke through the Gaza-Israel barrier and forced their way through the Gaza border, entering and attacking Israeli communities and military installations, and killing at least a thousand Israelis in the process.

There has been a lot of casualties in the resulting conflict between Israeli forces and Hamas. Yet no other entity has suffered a greater loss of reputation than has the IDF and Mossad. Over the decades, these two organizations had built up a reputation for efficiency, and their exploits have been and continue to be glorified in books, films, and television series. This explains why people still argue that Mossad let the attack unfold, as part of a 4D chess move. 

The success of the Hamas attack, as well as IDF’s inability to dislodge Hamas from all the areas they had captured during October 7, is an indication that Hezbollah is now not the only serious militant group that Israel has to contend with. 

The number of Israelis who lost their lives in the recent conflict exceeds the US casualties on 9/11 when taken as a proportion of total population. While more Israelis succumbed during the Second Intifada, with over 1,000 casualties between 2000 and 2005, that is over five years, the current toll comes from just 24 hours of fighting.

In contrast, during the war against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in 1967, Israel incurred only 700 casualties, predominantly among soldiers. The ongoing Israeli response has resulted in nearly 600 Palestinian fatalities, including many civilians. Unfortunately, the toll is anticipated to rise significantly as Israeli operations are set to continue in Gaza in the days ahead.

Gaza is a tightly monitored area. Israel uses the latest technology to keep Palestinians under surveillance. Gaza also has limited access points. The only safe access point is at the Egyptian border and the Egyptian government is not a friend of Hamas.

So how did Hamas smuggle in all the material needed to build the rockets and where did they learn to operate the gliders under the watchful eyes of Israeli surveillance? There were probably thousands of Hamas members involved in the preparation of the attack. That is a lot of people with access to information and the fact that Mossad did not get wind of this is an indication that their human intelligence in Gaza had weakened, despite what everyone believed. 

Over the past decades Israel has increasingly relied on signals intelligence. As Amir Avivi, a retired Israeli general, told AP, Hamas found a way around the Israeli technological superiority by going back to the Stone Age, that is by not using phones or computers.

This was also a case of Israel underestimating Hamas and Palestinians. There was growing unrest among Palestinians over the last year, due to the exponential expansion of Israeli settlements, settler violence against Palestinian civilians, and clashes in Jenin and at the Al-Aqsa Mosque, which killed almost 250 Palestinians and 32 Israelis. In parallel, there was a drive to normalize relations between Arab nations and Israel.

There had been signs that something big was about to happen. It has been revealed that Egypt had warned Israel of an impending attack, but this warning had been ignored.

Benjamin Netanyahu and his team knew they were stepping on the toes of Palestinians but didn’t care because they believed Hamas was not capable of mounting a serious attack, apart from impotently launching some rockets at the Iron Dome. 

No matter how one looks at it, then, this was a colossal security failure in Israel, a clear sign that military and intelligence weaknesses, which were barely noticeable to the most discerning of analysts during Israel’s war with Hezbollah in 2006, had grown.

The Israeli security forces has atrophied during the decades it spent engaging in COIN against unarmed Palestinians and weak militant groups. On the other hand, the Palestinians, who have been living in inhumane conditions for decades, have grown tougher.

Israel has an incredibly good Airforce, and it will pummel Palestinian positions for the coming days. Thousands of Palestinians will die. It will also make life miserable for Palestinians by cutting off electricity and water. Millions will suffer.

Israel also has powerful allies that can cut off UN funding that Palestinians in Gaza desperately need. Given that Israel has not suffered a major long-term setback of this sort in its history, it will do everything in its power to make Palestine suffer.

It is unlikely that Hamas didn’t see this coming. So why did it go ahead with the attack?

Over the past decades Arab states had severed ties with Israel. While Palestinians did not receive any tangible assistance apart from Iran and Syria, the solidarity of other Arab states stood as a strong marker for the Arab world’s recognition of the suffering of the Palestinians. In recent times, however, certain Arab states, like Saudi Arabia, have normalized relations with Israel, and these moves have come at the exclusion of the Palestinians. 

A few weeks ago, during a meeting with US President Joe Biden, Benjamin Netanyahu said that a “historic peace between Israel and Saudi Arabia” was within reach. Hamas probably felt that it was game over for Palestinians once that transpired.

Considering the current bout of violence, normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel seems to have suffered a setback. If the gambit works and rapprochement between Arab nations and Israel derails, Hamas may think the short-term suffering of Palestinians was worth it. Running an insurgency, after all, is not for the faint of heart.

Rathindra Kuruwita is a journalist and a researcher from Colombo, Sri Lanka. He holds a MSc in Strategic Studies from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU, Singapore. He was also a fellow at Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, USA, and a participant of the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) conducted by the U.S. Department of State. He writes on security and international relations to several publications and has written extensively on the Sri Lanka-China relationship.

Factum is an Asia-Pacific focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

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By Jagath Liyanarachchi

On September 18, 2023, the Draft Online Safety Bill was published in the Sri Lankan Government Gazette on the orders of the Minister of Justice. The following is a brief introduction to the Bill.

Objectives of the Bill

As stated in Section 3, the purpose of the Bill Is

• To protect persons against damage caused by false statements or threatening, alarming, or distressing statements;
• To ensure protection from statements that are in contempt of court or prejudicial to the maintenance of order and impartiality of the judiciary;
• To introduce measures to detect, prevent, and safeguard against the misuses of online accounts and bots to commit offenses under this Bill; and
• To prevent the financing, promotion, and other support of online accounts which repeatedly communicate false statements of fact in Sri Lanka.

Offenses under the Bill (Section 12 to 25)

• Communication of false statements of fact in Sri Lanka
• False statements amounting to contempt of court
• Provocation of riots without reason through false statements
• Disturbing a religious assembly through false statements
• Communication of false statements with the intention of offending religious sentiments
• Communication of false statements with the intention of outraging religious feelings
• Cheating through an online location
• Cheating by impersonation
• Intentional insult by false statement with intent to provoke a breach of peace
• Circulating false report with intent to cause mutiny or an offense against the State
• Communicating statements of fact to cause harassment
• Child abuse through an online location
• Making or altering bots to commit an offense

For these offenses, a punishment of 5 years’ imprisonment and/or a fine, or 3 years’ imprisonment and/or a fine can be imposed. All offenses are non-cognizable and bailable.

As per Section 32, the Magistrate’s Court can list as a declared online location any site which disseminates three or more prohibited statements to end users in Sri Lanka.

Here, “online location” can mean either stored on a computer, viewable, listenable, or via the Internet, website, web page, reference website, or other channel such as a forum.

Relief available under the Bill to a person offended by an online publication

An aggrieved person can complain to the Online Safety Commission. The statement in question can be banned after an investigation, and circulation of such statements can be prevented by direct notification to the circulator.

Within 24 hours after receiving the order, the offender must act according to the instructions. If that person fails to do so, an order to

• Disable access by end users in Sri Lanka to the online location containing such communication of the statement of fact in Sri Lanka, or
• Remove the relevant communication of the prohibited statement in Sri Lanka from the online location containing such communication

shall be made to the relevant Internet Service Provider or Intermediary Service. 

Any person affected by the communication of any prohibited statement may apply to the Magistrate’s Court by way of petition and affidavit to obtain an order to prevent the circulation of such statements.

Liability of service providers in relation to communication

Where a person who engages in providing the following services fails to adhere to the relevant Code of Practice issued by the Commission by way of regulations made under this Bill, and thereby causes wrongful loss to any other person, such a person shall be liable to pay damages by way of compensation to the person who suffered the loss.

• An internet intermediary service
• A telecommunication service
• A service of giving public access to the internet or
• A computer resource service

Preventing fake online accounts and organized counterfeiting

To prevent the creation of fake online accounts and organized counterfeiting, the Commission has the power to notify an Internet Intermediary Service to suspend such accounts for a period of time. 

Registration of Social Media Platforms

Social media websites and platforms in Sri Lanka need to register in the manner specified under Section 11 (K).

Commission on Security of Online Systems (Online Safety Commission)

This Commission consists of six people appointed by the President.

Powers of the Commission

• To issue directives to persons who communicate prohibited statements under this Bill
• To issue directives to persons, internet service providers or internet intermediaries 
• To issue orders pertaining to registration of social media platforms
• To introduce a code of conduct for social media platforms
• To inform internet service providers and internet intermediaries to disable online sites that make prohibited statements

Implications for the right to free speech and expression

• A non independent commission giving judgments regarding prohibited statements and stopping such statements can challenge the presumption of innocence.
• The offenses for prohibited statements set forth in this Bill are non-specific and can be given wide meaning, which can limit the right of expression.
• A Commission appointed by the President and removed by the President has no independence, the decisions of such a Commission may be political and can hinder  the free expression of citizens.
• As the Bill states that social media platforms must be registered, social media platforms which do not adhere to the conditions stipulated in this Bill may leave the country. Citizens will lose the freedom of expression.
• Some of the bot activities carried out through foreign organizations related to Sri Lanka cannot be suspended on technical grounds. Only citizens of Sri Lanka can be made liable for such an offense.
• When considering the misuse of Section 3 of ICCPR and Section 120 of the Penal Code, there is a high risk of the provisions of this Bill being used to suppress dissent.

Positive features of the Bill

• Persons committing offenses under the Bill can only be arrested with a warrant.
• All offenses under the Bill are bailable.
• False statements have been defined.

Jagath Liyanarachchi is an Attorney-at-Law who can be reached at jagathliyanarachchi@gmail.com.

Factum is an Asia Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post The Draft Online Safety Bill: All you need to know ? appeared first on Newswire.

By Shakthi de Silva

Of late, headlines have been dominated by news of the BRICS deciding, at its 15th Summit in Johannesburg, to add six new members from 2024. The news should not necessarily come as a surprise, as the original members, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, agreed during the 14th BRICS Summit in Beijing to add new members to the bloc.

What is of importance are the ramifications that multilateral forums like the BRICS and SCO may have on the international order. How should the increase in members be interpreted? Will a multipolar order augur more stability in the world? Before we unpack both questions, let us first explore what makes the group important. 

BRICS presently accounts for 42 percent of the world’s population and 32 percent of the global economy, and has been viewed by some as a Global South alternative to the G7, especially after it formed the New Development Bank in 2014. The grouping was initially formed with the intention of facilitating the transition from a unipolar world, dominated by the United States and its 1945 institutions, to a multipolar world order.

These countries believed that the latter, i.e. a multipolar order, would allow developing nations greater opportunities to enhance economic cooperation and establish alternative financial arrangements and institutions. Indeed, the fact that, to date, 40 nations have applied to be part of the BRICS shows that the forum has effectively tapped into the Global South’s apprehensions towards US financial dominance.

Although BRICS nations have surpassed the G7 in terms of GDP based on purchasing power parity, starry-eyed analysts remain disconsolate as BRICS economies have not done well in recent years. This has intensified claims from some quarters that the bloc is no longer as significant as it was once thought to be. It is in this backdrop that BRICS admitted Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia (Africa’s second most populous nation), Iran, Saudi Arabia, and UAE to its fold. Many believe that China played a major role in this expansion.

In recent years, China has gradually increased its footprint around the world. As recently, as March this year, Beijing brokered a major breakthrough by rekindling diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran after a hiatus of seven years.

The inclusion of both nations in the BRICS a few months later could, therefore, also be attributed to Beijing. Speaking at the China-Africa Leaders’ Dialogue, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that African nations should join the People’s Republic of China in “unequivocally opposing vestiges of colonialism and hegemonism” and help create a more “just and equitable international order”, presumably more along the lines of Chinese interests at the expense of the West.

De-dollarization involves a country’s decision to reduce dependence on the US dollar in global trade and instead shift to alternative exchange methods such using local currency. Studies indicate that the share of the US dollar (USD) in Russia-China bilateral trade fell from nearly 90 percent in 2015 to just 46 percent by 2020.

The two nations also launched a cross-border payment mechanism in response to Western efforts to keep Russia out of the US-dominated Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) network. In that regard, Western concerns of de-dollarization intensified following news that Saudi Arabia, UAE and Iran – three major oil producing nations – are among those newly included in the bloc.

Oil has historically been traded using the US dollar. Some argue that if all BRICS nations decide to permanently trade oil using their local currency it would have significant ramifications on American economic hegemony. Others debunk such claims citing examples where oil has already been settled in Yuan, Russian Ruble, and the Indian Rupee without a corresponding move to comprehensively de-dollarize.

Regardless of whether BRICS nations do end up permanently using local currency to trade oil or not, trends towards de-dollarization are already visible according to some who cite IMF reports indicating a declining share of USD held by Central Banks and Argentina’s decision to pay off its debt to the IMF using Yuan. 

Gita Gopinath, the IMF’s Deputy Managing Director, among others, have warned that the US decision to weaponize the dollar against some nations would contribute to the erosion of its role in the global financial architecture. Such apprehensions intensified after Saudi Arabia’s Finance Minister announced earlier this year that they were considering the possibility of trading in other currencies alongside the US dollar.

Others discount such fears by claiming that de-dollarization requires the harmonization of economic policies of BRICS nations, which unlikely, as each BRICS nation has a unique economic landscape and varied economic interests. They argue that the difficultly of harmonizing economic policies, coupled with the fact that the US maintains strong trade relations with most of the BRICS economies, make this possibility doubtful.

Regardless of whether de-dollarization does or does not materialize in the near term, BRICS powers appear to be increasingly inclined to wield their agency in global politics and enhance existing relations with other nations from the Global South. 

This trend is also evident when one examines recent developments in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The organization was founded in Shanghai in 2001 and, at the onset, consisted of several Central Asian nations alongside China and Russia. It was formed chiefly to deal with three evils in the region (terrorism, separatism, and extremism), as well as to enhance diplomatic and economic ties between its members.

Sri Lanka was granted Dialogue Partner status in 2009 while India and Pakistan became full members in 2017. Iran became the latest member to join the grouping in 2023. Speaking at the SCO, Iranian President Raisi stated, in no uncertain terms, that the grouping should actively look into using their national currencies and it should limit the use of the US Dollar for international financial transactions.

Including Iran, the SCO now has 43 percent of the world’s population and a combined GDP of 30 percent, a 13-fold increase since its founding. If SCO members do decide to adopt such measures, a combined SCO and BRICS move to transact with local currencies would spell out serious negative ramifications on the US economy. 

Does a multipolar world carry a higher probability for international peace and stability? Should we welcome steps taken by great powers to join multilateral arrangements? On both questions, international relations scholars disagree. Classical Realists who follow the writings of Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger believe multipolar arrangements are more likely to result in a balance of power. Such balances of power would ensure that great powers are not able to easily engage in belligerent measures.

This is because other great powers would clamp down on such aspirations and actively balance against it, thereby ensuring international stability. Stability is, therefore, most likely to ensue through multipolarity according to Classical Realists.

Structural Realists or Neo-Realists such as Kenneth Waltz, on the other hand, contend that bipolarity – as was visible during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union – is more likely to lead to international stability. They cite the multipolar power arrangement during the pre-World War I period as evidence suggesting that multipolar orders are inherently more dangerous and unpredictable. 

Although disagreements persist over which international power configuration is most likely to engender international stability, it is increasingly evident that the world is becoming more multipolar. The growth in membership of SCO and BRICS makes this evident to all of us. If so, should Sri Lanka welcome these developments? Yes.

Increased interactions may lead to stronger connections between nations and may also limit tendencies to behave aggressively. Moreover, as a small state dependent on amicable ties with contending great powers such as the US, China, and India, it makes strategic sense to use multilateral forums as avenues to enhance existing bilateral ties with great powers. In sum, I believe that the increase in membership should be welcomed.

Moreover, if extant norms and rules of international conduct continue to be formally acknowledged and adhered to by both institutions’ members, then the probability of international stability in a multipolar world order is equally likely. 

Shakthi de Silva is a Non-Resident Vasey Fellow at Pacific Forum International (2023-2024) and a Visiting Lecturer at the Royal Institute of Colombo, where he teaches courses on International Relations. He previously served as a Lecturer at the University of Colombo (Sri Lanka) and as a Researcher for think tanks in the Sri Lankan Defence Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His publications have been featured in the Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Journal on Defence & Policy Analysis, and South Asian Survey.

Factum is an Asia Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

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