By Hannes Romare

Exclusive to Factum and Newswire from EPIS Thinktank on Foreign and Security Policy

The Chagos Islands, or The British Indian Ocean Territory? Is the Chagos archipelago a part of Mauritius or does it belong to the United Kingdom? These questions will soon get a definite answer as a deal on the status of the Chagos Islands seems to be closed soon. Negotiations between the government of the United Kingdom and the government of Mauritius, over the status of the Chagos Islands, have been ongoing since 2022. The dispute of the islands sheds light on the British colonial legacy and how it still to this day affects its former colonial territories. 

Mauritius became a British colony in 1814 after French cessation of the island as part of the Treaty of Paris. In 1968, Mauritius gained its independence. However, while the UK agreed to granting Mauritius its independence in 1968, three years earlier, it had divided its colony and broken off the Chagos archipelago to form a new colony called The British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). These islands had been administered as part of Mauritius since the 18th century. The reason for the dividing of the colonial territory lies in the strategic value of the Chagos Islands and its location in the Indian Ocean. 

In 1966, the UK had agreed to building a US military base on the largest island of the Chagos archipelago: Diego Garcia. The island was chosen for its strategic location and due to the fact that the Chagos archipelago was “uninhabited”. However, in reality, the Chagos Islands were not uninhabited but instead hosted a population of around 1,500 to 2,000 people who had lived there for centuries. Between 1967 and 1973, the UK and US displaced the Chagossian population by forcing them to move and then preventing them from returning home. The joint UK-US military base is still being used today as a basis for the maintenance of regional stability and humanitarian response. 

The British control over the Chagos archipelago is legally contested and controversial. In 2010, The UK established the Chagos Maritime Protected Area (MPA), which is one of the world’s largest officially designated maritime protected areas. The marine reserve covers 640,000 square kilometres of ocean water and around 70 islands and seven atolls of the Chagos archipelago. The maritime protected area protects coral atolls and has one of the healthiest reef systems in the world. 

However, in 2010, leaked documents between British and US state representatives showed that the establishment of the Chagos Maritime Protected Area not only served the protection of the environment and biodiversity. The leaked documents showed that representatives from both the UK and the US viewed the establishment of the Chagos MPA as a way to ensure the long-term prevention of the displaced Chagossian population and their descendents from returning to and resettling in the Chagos Islands. The establishment of the Chagos Maritime Protected Area was deemed illegal by the Permanent Court of Arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 

Indeed, time and time again, the UK’s control over the Chagos Islands has been judicially contested and denounced. The ICJ stated in 2019 an advisory opinion which read that the UK had to end its administration of the islands and that the decolonisation of Mauritius could not be seen as completed until the Chagos Islands were reunited with Mauritius. As a consequence of the ICJ’s advisory opinion, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution where they stated that the UK must “withdraw its colonial administration…” from the Chagos archipelago. 

Even though the British control over the Chagos Islands has been contested, the UK has been unwilling to give up its control over the archipelago. It is not until now, in 2025, that the UK cessation of the Chagos Islands to Mauritius seems to be near. Despite the seemingly obvious right of Mauritanian ownership of the Chagos Islands, the new deal between the UK and Mauritius, where Mauritius regains control and ownership of the archipelago and the UK gets to lease its military base on Diego Garcia for 99 years with a possible extension of 40 years, has been met with opposition in the UK. Tory-leader Kemi Badenoch has stated that it is not in the British national interest to “give away” the islands to Mauritius. 

This kind of rhetoric which insinuates that the cessation of the Chagos Islands is the UK “giving away” rather than “giving back” the islands to Mauritius is problematic. It creates a narrative that denies Mauritius’s historical right to the archipelago and denies the suffering caused to the Chagossians who were forcibly removed from their homes and displaced. The return of the Chagos Islands to Mauritius and allowing the displaced Chagossians to return to their homes is long overdue.

While one can understand that the UK does not want to lose their military base on the strategically placed Diego Garcia, the establishment of the military base was only possible because of the British colonial rule of the area and their forcible displacement of the population of the islands. Also, the UK will be allowed to continue operating the base for at least 99 years, if not 139 years. Therefore, they will not lose their strategic military position in the Indian Ocean. There is no reason to further delay the returning of the Chagos Islands to Mauritius. 

The dispute over the Chagos Islands shows that colonialism is not a thing that strictly is in the past. The decolonisation period is not over. The former colonial powers of the world still benefit from their former colonial empires, often at the expense of their former colonies. Mauritius has a right to the Chagos Islands. The Chagossians have a right to be able to return to their homes. It is good that the UK finally is agreeing to cede its control of the Chagos archipelago. As the ICJ stated: The decolonisation of Mauritius cannot be seen as completed until the UK ends its administration of the Chagos Islands and gives them back to Mauritius. 

Hannes Romare is a Research Fellow at the EPIS ThinkTank on Foreign and Security Policy. His research focuses on Security and Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. He is based in Lund, Sweden. EPIS Thinktank for international foreign and security policy serves as a bridge between students and practice. Students from all disciplines become active through publications in the magazine and blog, delegations at conferences and in contact with practitioners. EPIS engages in political debate, fact-based and neutral.

Factum is an Asia-Pacific focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, Strategic Communications, and Climate Outreach accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

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By Jayson Cainglet

At 09:20 (Manila Time) on the morning of March 11, 2025, the Prosecutor General of the International Criminal Court served an arrest warrant for crimes against humanity on former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte.

14 hours later, the plane that would bring Mr Duterte to the Hague in the Netherlands left the country, making him the first Asian former head of state to be arrested by the ICC.

The event marks a pivotal moment for justice and accountability in Asia. It was a day of reckoning for the thousands killed and their families, for the survivors and witnesses who courageously narrated their stories in whispers at the height of Mr Duterte’s bloody war against his own people.

It was a day that those who stood up against the six-year carnage thought would never come – the human rights defenders, journalists, community organizations, the clergy, public interest lawyers, forensic experts, and ordinary citizens that fearlessly chronicled each case that now runs in the thousands, and which formed the basis of the ICC’s case against Mr Duterte.

The Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC stated that Mr Duterte has been arrested in the context of the Office’s ongoing investigation into the situation of the country. It added that on the basis of its independent and impartial investigations, Mr Duterte, as founder and head of the Davao Death Squad when he was the Mayor of Davao City, and subsequently as the President of the Philippines, was 

“… criminally responsible for the crime against humanity of murder [Article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute] committed in the Philippines between November 1, 2011 and March 16, 2019.”

The statement further read that “Mr Duterte is alleged to have committed these crimes as part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against the civilian population.”

A day after his arrival at the ICC, Duterte appeared in court for the first time to confirm his identity and for the Court to hear that the suspect understood the crime which he is alleged to have committed, and that he understood the rights he is entitled under the Rome Statute – the Court’s founding treaty.

The Philippine Commission on Human Rights (CHR) welcomed the arrest from the ICC as it underscores that due process is an integral pillar of justice where the voices of the victims can finally be heard.

“A fair and impartial legal process is essential in uncovering the truth and, ultimately, holding perpetrators accountable, should guilt be established,” the CHR stated.

Human rights groups and media organizations have placed the number of victims of extra judicial killings during Duterte’s administration between 20,000 and 30,000.

The Philippine governments’ own Justice Department has so far reviewed 5,000 cases. But only eight policemen have been convicted to date, and only because these were celebrated cases that exposed the impunity and moral depravity of the so-called War on Drugs.

Official police records, on the other hand, would show a significantly lower figure: some 6,000 suspects killed in his war on drugs.

Start of the healing process

For victims of Duterte’s so-called Drug War, his arrest marks a step toward justice and the start of their journey for inner peace and acceptance.

For now, they await the arrest of Duterte’s conspirators who carried out the War in impoverished communities, against petty drug pushers, peddlers, and users whose names were included on a fabricated drug watch list, against his political opponents, and against hapless women and children who were killed in the War as “collateral damage.” A final verdict is expected to take several years, but for the kin and survivors of Duterte’s killing spree, it will be worth the wait.

Duerte’s incarceration at The Hague is already seen as a victory for the global human rights community, as it sends a strong message that ruthless leaders cannot keep their reign of terror with impunity, and that they can be held to account.

Duterte’s arrest also cements the relevance of the ICC in current global politics given the criticisms it has been receiving from US President Donald Trump, who called it “ineffective” and “biased” against the United States and its allies, and the usual attacks coming from Russia and China.

Duterte’s arrest could also inspire similar pursuit of justice for abuses in other Asian countries and an increased pressure on governments to address human rights violations, especially in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Sri Lanka.

While ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan has acknowledged the criticism surrounding the ICC’s effectiveness in enforcing arrest warrants especially on high-profile leaders such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu, he underscores the substantial value that international law holds. Its effectiveness however, hinges upon the international community’s cooperation.

“But international law is not weak as some may think. When we come together, when we build partnerships, the rule of law can prevail,” Khan said.

If convicted, Duterte will be the first Asian leader to be meted a sentence by the ICC. But the trial may last anywhere from 2-8 years.

Jayson Cainglet is the Executive Director of the Samahang Industriya ng Agrikultura (SINAG), a leading Philippine multi-agriculture industry advocacy group. He advocates for local farmers, opposing excessive imports and pushing for government support to lower production costs. Cainglet is vocal on policies affecting food prices and agricultural sustainability. Before his tenure at SINAG, Cainglet facilitated the Agribusiness Action Initiatives (AAI) for the Asia Pacific region. He has also contributed as a freelance writer and researcher, focusing on global trade, corporate governance, economic justice, financing for development, food sovereignty and farmers’ rights.

Factum is an Asia-Pacific focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, Strategic Communications, and Climate Outreach accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Perspective : Duterte Under Arrest appeared first on Newswire.

By Niruni de Mel

Imagine a rural community in Sri Lanka where a once-thriving agricultural initiative suddenly comes to a halt. Farmers who relied on USAID-funded fertilizer support are left struggling, and a crucial supply chain begins to crumble.

This is one example of the tangible impact of USAID’s withdrawal from Sri Lanka – a decision that extends far beyond policy debates and diplomatic maneuvering.

On January 20, 2025, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) officially announced its withdrawal from Sri Lanka and many other underdeveloped and developing countries, a move that has sparked widespread discussion.

While the official narrative cites financial realignment and anti-corruption measures, the decision raises pressing questions about its real motivations, the impact on local communities, and what this means for Sri Lanka’s economic and policy landscape moving forward.

According to official statements, the USAID withdrawal was part of broader U.S. government efforts to reevaluate foreign aid priorities, ensuring alignment with the administration’s goals. Former US President Donald Trump had previously ordered a freeze on USAID disbursements, citing corruption and inefficiency in fund allocation.

Additionally, the move fits into a larger pattern of US disengagement from international agreements, such as the withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, the UN Human Rights Council, and the Paris Climate Agreement.

However, Shakthi De Silva, an independent analyst, suggests that this decision is better understood in the context of the US shift toward offshore balancing. While USAID accounts for only a small fraction of US government spending, it has become an easy target for budget cuts, particularly when coupled with misinformation campaigns designed to appeal to domestic political bases.

De Silva also notes the irony of the situation: while corruption is often cited as a reason for the cut, many organizations reliant on USAID funding – including those engaged in fact-checking, policy formation, and support for marginalized communities – are now at risk of shutting down.

The consequences of USAID’s departure are being felt most acutely by the people who depended on its programs. For example, the closure of MEND Media Empowerment for a Democratic Sri Lanka)’s initiatives under International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX), which had played a critical role in media development and capacity-building efforts.

Without USAID support, many similar organizations now face an uncertain future. Beyond the non-profit sector, vulnerable communities that received humanitarian assistance, especially in the wake of natural disasters, are now left with reduced support.

Farmers, women-led businesses, and educational programs in underserved areas are grappling with funding gaps that threaten their survival.

The 90-Day Dash: The Transition and Its Aftermath

According to Reuters, fewer than 300 staff will remain out of the agency’s global workforce of over 10,000. The Asia bureau, which has been instrumental in projects across Sri Lanka, will be left with only eight employees. This massive downsizing has led to chaos, uncertainty, and the suspension of critical programs.

With all directly hired USAID employees put on leave and thousands of overseas personnel recalled, ongoing projects have ground to a halt. Humanitarian aid shipments are reportedly stuck in ports, with no clear plan for distribution.

Millions of dollars’ worth of assistance – medical supplies, food aid, and disaster relief – risks being wasted due to bureaucratic paralysis and lack of manpower. Contracts with NGOs and local partners remain in limbo, with hundreds of internal contractors already laid off.

J.Brian Atwood, former USAID head, called the mass terminations “outrageous,” warning that the agency, which has saved tens of millions of lives globally, is being effectively dismantled. The situation has been further inflamed by high-profile figures like Elon Musk accusing USAID staff of criminal activity, adding to the climate of uncertainty and distrust.

For Sri Lanka, the sudden withdrawal means a funding vacuum for crucial development projects. Organizations that depended on USAID support for public health, climate resilience, and governance programs now face an uncertain future. As the 90-day period unfolds, the big question remains—what happens next, and who will step in to fill the void left behind?

Sri Lanka’s Next Chapter: What Happens Now?

The immediate challenge for Sri Lanka is filling the funding void left by USAID’s departure. According to Amar Gunatilleke, Vice Executive Chairman of the Marga Institute, Sri Lanka has historically benefited from diverse funding sources. These include the Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Bank, EU, and other bilateral donors such as Japan, Canada, and Australia.

The country also has access to climate finance mechanisms like the Green Climate Fund. However, he cautions that reliance on foreign aid and borrowing is not a sustainable long-term strategy.

Gunatilleke argues that Sri Lanka’s economic future hinges on policy stability and internal revenue generation. He emphasizes the need for the government to widen the tax net without disproportionately burdening lower-income groups, increase direct taxation, and focus on value addition in agriculture and manufacturing.

However, policy discontinuity remains a major obstacle, as successive governments frequently alter economic strategies, undermining long-term development planning.

The American Perspective (And Why It Matters)

From a geopolitical standpoint, the USAID withdrawal is part of a broader trend of U.S. retrenchment from international commitments.

De Silva points out that, beyond Sri Lanka, this pattern includes the US withdrawal from UNESCO, the World Health Organization (WHO), and funding cuts to UN relief agencies. Such moves contribute to shifting global perceptions of the U.S. as an increasingly isolationist power, favoring short-term transactional gains over long-term strategic alliances.

For Sri Lanka, this withdrawal may signal a pivot toward alternative partners, such as China and India, for development assistance. However, the geopolitical strings attached to such engagements could significantly shape the nation’s policy landscape.

Call to Action

The question now is: What next? Policymakers, civil society, and the private sector must collaborate to address the immediate fallout while also working toward long-term economic resilience.

Strengthening Domestic Policy: The Sri Lankan government should prioritize policy continuity and effective fiscal management to reduce dependency on external aid.

Bridging the Funding Gap: Local and international organizations can explore alternative funding streams, including public-private partnerships, impact investments, and crowdfunding models.

Research and Evidence-Based Policy: Amar Gunatilleke, for instance, underscores the importance of interdisciplinary research institutions working together to inform policy development. The government must take the lead in integrating economic, environmental, and social research into national planning efforts.

Citizen Engagement: Sri Lankan citizens and diaspora communities can play a role by supporting initiatives that promote self-sufficiency, advocating for transparent governance, and participating in dialogues on economic policy.

USAID’s withdrawal from Sri Lanka is not just a diplomatic event; it is a moment of reckoning for the country’s development trajectory. Whether this shift will lead to stronger domestic policy reforms or expose further vulnerabilities remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that Sri Lanka must strategically navigate this transition, leveraging existing strengths while addressing critical gaps in governance, economic policy, and research-driven planning.

Niruni de Mel is studying for her Bachelors’ in International Relations and Affairs in Sri Lanka. She currently interns at the Marga Institute, one of the oldest development sector organizations in the country.

Factum is an Asia-Pacific focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, Strategic Communications, and Climate Outreach accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Perspective: From Foreign Aid to Local Solutions – Can Sri Lanka Fill the USAID Gap? appeared first on Newswire.

By Manuja Wijesuriya

2024 is a significant year for global elections, with many countries across different continents holding elections this year. It is said that the 2024 election year was the busiest on record, with nearly half of the global population heading to the polls.

There was significant political activity anticipated this year, particularly with major elections in the United States, where the presidential election was set for November 5, and in India, where general elections occurred from April 19 to June 1.

These elections represent not only a substantial number of voters but also a major shift in how electoral processes are influenced by digital spaces, particularly social media platforms. This article examines how global elections and democracy are being redefined in digital spaces, with a particular focus on the 2024 presidential election in Sri Lanka.

The rise of digital democracy

In 2024, the evolution of digital spaces has fundamentally transformed the democratic process, making it more complex and nuanced. Candidates and political parties are increasingly leveraging social media as a primary tool for campaigning, mobilising supporters, and raising political awareness.

This trend has accelerated due to technological advancements and the ubiquitous integration of social media into everyday life. Social media has reshaped how voters engage with political content, allowing for rapid dissemination of information and fostering a more interactive relationship between politicians and constituents. A notable example is President Anura Kumara Dissanayake of Sri Lanka, who recently surpassed one million followers on Facebook just a few days after his victory, becoming the sixth Sri Lankan politician to reach this milestone. His ability to garner such a following illustrates the critical role social media plays in contemporary political landscapes.

However, this digital engagement is not without its challenges. For instance, Mauritius’s decision to block access to social media just days before a general election, amidst a wiretapping scandal, raises concerns about free expression and the integrity of the electoral process. As the US election approached, online spaces were flooded with misinformation about alleged voter fraud, often driven by Trump supporters and amplified by foreign actors.

Claims range from accusations of non-citizens voting to manipulated videos, all designed to cast doubt on the election’s integrity. Despite officials addressing these rumours, the rapid spread of false information risks undermining public trust in the election process, raising concerns of potential unrest similar to post-2020 election tensions in the United States which undermine the democratic fabric of society.

The shift from traditional media to social media in modern political campaigns

The influence of digital spaces on democracy is intense and versatile, particularly in 2024. The political landscape has shifted dramatically, requiring candidates to establish and maintain their presence on social media platforms. This marks a gradual shift from traditional reliance on electronic and print media for political discourse.

For example, in the Sri Lankan Presidential Election, the shift to social media was evident both in how candidates engaged with voters and how the public responded. Traditionally, the flow of information was dominated by mainstream media, which often required significant resources to access, leaving only the rich and powerful with the means to control the narrative.

In contrast, social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram have democratized the space by offering a more accessible and affordable way for candidates to reach voters, regardless of their financial resources. Candidates used platforms like Google and different social media platforms for targeted ads, appeared on podcasts, and engaged in online discussions to connect with a broader audience.

Similarly, the public also took to social media during the election, flooding platforms like Facebook with memes, posts, and comments—shared not only for entertainment but also for political commentary. This shift has made political participation more inclusive, allowing a wider range of voices to be heard.

It can be argued that in some instances, virtual spaces and social media platforms have surpassed traditional electronic media in terms of public trust, particularly during elections. For example, during the US elections, the growing influence of non-traditional media, such as podcasts, became evident, with platforms like Joe Rogan’s podcast gaining significant traction over traditional outlets like The Washington Post.

Rogan, a popular podcaster, has become a key player in political discourse, attracting candidates like Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump, who sought to connect with his vast audience. Rogan’s interview with Trump, for instance, garnered over 41 million views on YouTube, far exceeding the viewership of Harris’s town hall on CNN.

The public sometimes prefers social media over traditional media, partly because traditional media often has monopolistic control over information and tends to be biased toward certain candidates, allocating more airtime to those they favor. This trend can also be observed in the Sri Lankan Presidential Elections, where certain media outlets were accused of allocating more airtime to specific candidates.

State-run channels like Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation (SLRC) and Independent Television Network (ITN) gave more coverage to former President Ranil Wickremesinghe, while private channels like Hiru TV focused heavily on Sajith Premadasa. This media bias further drove voters to seek alternative sources of information, such as social media and podcasts, where they could engage with a wider range of voices and viewpoints, or the candidate that they prefer the most.

The digital realm offers great potential but is also fraught with challenges, including the spread of misinformation, disinformation, and hate speech, which can erode public trust in electoral processes. For instance, during the 2024 US election, social media platforms, especially X (formerly Twitter), played a significant role in shaping political discourse, with users posting both genuine and misleading content for financial gain.

Despite these challenges, social media also provides powerful tools for combating misinformation. Fact-checking and debunking false narratives have become integral parts of the digital landscape, with civil society organisations and individuals collaborating to correct false claims as they emerge.

A notable example is the Sri Lankan Election Commission’s release of educational videos on how to vote correctly, which were shared on YouTube in collaboration with popular content creators called Vini Productions. Thus, cyberspace acts like a double-edged sword: it can spread harmful misinformation but also offers the means to fight it, improve civic education, and increase political participation.

Evolution of campaign strategies

The transformation of political campaigning is evident in both historical and contemporary contexts. As we analyse past elections and anticipate those in 2024, it is clear that social media platforms have gained considerable legitimacy, shaping the narratives shared during campaigns. While traditional campaign methods, such as posters and rallies, remain prevalent in countries like Sri Lanka, the growing significance of digital campaigning is apparent.

Many presidential candidates in Sri Lanka have actively engaged with voters through various social media platforms, significantly increasing their online advertising expenditures. This marks a slight transition from previous years when physical campaign methods were the primary means of engagement. The National People’s Power (NPP), for instance, utilised live streaming for their physical rallies on platforms like Facebook and YouTube, illustrating the shift towards a more digitally oriented campaign strategy. 

In India, the rise of smartphone usage has also led to a significant shift in campaign strategies. By the end of 2022, approximately two-thirds of the Indian population were using smartphones, with projections indicating that by 2026, India could have one billion smartphone users. This digital proliferation has prompted political parties to utilise social media and messaging apps, such as WhatsApp, for campaign purposes. The 2019 parliamentary election was even characterised as “the WhatsApp election,” reflecting the increasing reliance on digital platforms for political engagement.

Competing for the younger voter base

In 2024, youth engagement has become a focal point in political campaigns, as candidates strive to connect with and mobilise young voters. Sri Lanka’s youth, aged between 15 and 29, make up 23.2% (4.64 million) of the population—almost a quarter of the country. This demographic is emerging as a powerful voting force; according to the Election Commission, of the 17.1 million registered voters, one million are new, highlighting the increasing influence of young voters. Today’s youth are more future-oriented, often seeking transformative change rather than adhering to traditional political systems.

Disillusioned by unemployment, economic instability, and poor living conditions, many young people are considering emigration as a path to a better life. Most in this generation are skeptical of established party politics. While not overtly politically active, they closely monitor Sri Lanka’s political landscape and have proven willing to engage when they see the need, as seen in the recent Aragalaya protests. The significant age gap between most politicians—predominantly in their 50s and 60s—and the younger voter base has further widened the disconnect, urging political leaders to rethink their approach. 

In particular, Gen Z is heavily influenced by technology, with 94% of them online daily, according to Kantar Sri Lanka. They access information primarily through digital platforms, consuming local content across both digital and traditional media—49% watch local TV daily, while 44% rely on social media.

Recognizing this shift, candidates in the 2024 presidential election had increasingly used social media to connect with young voters where they were most engaged. The competition for this demographic is fierce, as seen in both Sri Lankan and global elections. In the United States, the race between candidates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump has highlighted TikTok as a critical battleground for engaging younger voters.

Both campaigns have invested heavily in social media strategies to capture the attention of this vital demographic. Moreover, the role of social media influencers has gained prominence, particularly during election seasons. This reflects a broader trend where candidates increasingly seek to appeal to younger voters through platforms like Instagram and TikTok. 

Former President Ranil Wickremesinghe, for example, conducted a Q&A session titled “#AskRanil,” allowing young voters to submit questions directly across multiple social media channels. These strategies also include Anura Kumara Dissanayake and the NPP organising youth rallies across Sri Lanka. These new approaches show how candidates are using social media to connect with younger audiences and respond to their concerns.

The evolution of platforms like TikTok, once considered primarily a space for entertainment, reflects its transformation into a political medium. Candidates are increasingly using this platform to create engaging content that resonates with younger audiences, illustrating the growing importance of social media in modern electoral politics. This unprecedented shift in how candidates engage with voters signals a broader trend towards integrating digital spaces into political campaigning, reshaping the way elections are conducted.

Challenges to election processes and integrity 

Despite the potential for digital spaces to enhance democratic engagement, significant challenges remain. One major issue is the polarisation of the political landscape. After Sri Lanka’s recent presidential election results, there was a noticeable increase in racist remarks and hate speech against those who did not vote for the winning candidate, Anura Kumara Dissanayake. This hostility was especially directed toward Tamil communities in the Northern and Eastern electorates, where he did not win.

Discussions on social media further intensified this hate speech, making it more widespread. This trend is significant because, unlike past elections where candidates often appealed to nationalist sentiments, this election campaign cycle did not strongly focus on nationalism. However, the hostility in certain areas shows that ethnic harmony remains a challenge in Sri Lanka. Social media fueled these sentiments by rapidly spreading divisive rhetoric, highlighting how digital platforms can amplify societal polarisation, deepening divisions and potentially undermining social cohesion and trust in democratic processes.

The spread of hate speech, misinformation, and disinformation poses significant challenges to the integrity of democratic processes worldwide. The emergence of deepfakes and AI-generated content has further complicated the landscape, with countries like India and the United States grappling with these issues ahead of their elections. In India, for example, the Election Commission had mandated that political parties must remove deepfakes within three hours of being notified, emphasising the urgent need to address the challenges posed by AI-generated content.

Ahead of the National Assembly elections on April 10, 2024, South Korea faced challenges from AI-generated deepfakes. However, the country successfully limited their impact through proactive measures. The government revised the Public Official Election Act to ban election-related deepfakes and established penalties for violators. Collaborations between the public and private sectors focused on developing technological solutions to detect deepfakes, along with initiatives like watermarking AI-generated content.

Monitoring social media content during elections poses significant challenges for governments and electoral bodies, as the rapid spread of misinformation can erode public trust in the electoral process. Unlike traditional media, social media operates in real time and across multiple platforms, complicating regulation.

While digital platforms enhance transparency and engagement, they also threaten the stability of democracy by potentially spreading false information. As digital democracy grows, especially through social media campaigning, it is essential to address these challenges to safeguard democratic integrity and build trust in the system for the future.

Manuja Wijesuriya is a Research Analyst at the Muragala | Centre for Progressive Politics and Policy and an undergraduate of the Department of Geography at the University of Peradeniya, with interests in political geography, ethno-politics, and cyberspace geographies.

Factum is an Asia-Pacific focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, Strategic Communications, and Climate Outreach accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Perspective: How digital spaces are redefining democracy in the 2024 election appeared first on Newswire.

By P. K. Balachandran

India has reached a stage where it sees itself as a power that can pursue its “national interest” in defiance of the top dogs of the world order. Undeniably, India has successes in the economic and technological fields to validate its claim to an extent.

India is wooed by the major powers of the world including the US and Russia. Even rival China wants to cooperate with India in the economic field keeping the border dispute on the backburner. There is a clamour among a growing section of intellectuals in Pakistan that Islamabad should recognise India’s rise and develop economic ties with it, putting the Kashmir dispute in the side track.

Recently, Pakistan made overtly friendly gestures towards India, even if only to make the fussy Indians attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit it was hosting.

India’s relations with China continue to be troubled, but again, recent developments show that there is light at the end of the tunnel, however faint it may be.

Unpleasant Ground Realities

That said, there are unpleasant realities that cannot be ignored. In recent weeks, India’s ties with the US, Canada and Bangladesh have deteriorated in varying degrees – very sharply in the case of Canada and Bangladesh, and to a lesser extent in the case of the US. Relations with Canada have actually haemorrhaged.   

Ironically, the problems with the Canada, US, and Bangladesh are, at least partly, the result of India’s own bid to emulate the existing super powers imagining itself as being in the same league and imposing its will on other countries. India had over-extended its arm due to over confidence, and paid for it.

Canada

The downturn in relations with Canada stemmed from the latter’s harbouring Sikh extremists, terrorists and separatists despite appeals from India to either tame them or extradite them to face trial in India. But Canada would insist that no action could be taken against citizens unless they broke Canadian laws. Canada also insisted that agitating for any cause however obnoxious would be allowed if it is peaceful.

In this context, the murder of Sikh terrorist Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Canadian citizen on Canadian soil in June 2023, proved to be the last straw for Canada. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and the police charged that Indian intelligence agencies had Nijjar killed by using a hired assassin. They further charged that a former Indian policeman Vikash Yadav, in collusion with the Indian High Commissioner in Canada and other Indian mission officials, were complicit. The envoy Kumar Verma and six other officials were asked to leave Canada though India said that they had been recalled for security reasons.

India described the Canadian charge as “preposterous” and levelled the counter charge that Canada had been cultivating anti-Indian Sikh separatists to win the votes of 770,000 Sikhs in Canada.

United States

To India’s discomfiture, the US too joined Canada in charging that its intelligence agency was plotting to kill dissidents abroad. The US said that an American Sikh separatist, Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, had been a target of Indian assassins. The Pannun case had gone to court and an Indian agent allegedly involved in the plot was extradited from the Czech Republic and brought to the US for trial.

The US prosecutor went to the extent of naming the National Security Advisor of India Ajit Doval as a “person of interest” and issued a summons. This prevented Doval from accompanying Prime Minister Narendra Modi on his visit to the US to attend the UN General Assembly session in September.

But India stoutly denied involvement and hinted that Nijjar’s killing could have been the result of Sikh gang warfare in Canada. In the case of Pannun, India said that it could be a plot by the Indian gangster Lawrence Bishnoi, currently in a Gujarat jail in a string of murder and extortion cases.

However, in contrast to the outburst over Canada’s allegations, the Indian response in Pannun’s case was muted. India even despatched a team to the US to discuss the matter, deepening the mystery of the plot.

There have been hints of a deal being worked out to keep Indo-US relations from plummeting further. It would be interesting to see if the US would intervene in the Pannun case in a New York court to get India off the hook. This is because both the US and India stand to lose if their dirty linen is washed in public.

Both India and the US have too much at stake in the relations to allow ties to be hampered. The two have close defence and strategic ties to counter China. The arms trade between India and the US has touched USD 25 billion. Modi had recently cleared a USD 3 billion drone deal. India-US defence and intelligence cooperation is also considerable with the signing of key agreements.

In 2023, US investments in India were valued at approximately USD 49.6 billion and Indian investment in the US amounted to USD 4.6 billion. In comparison, the total bilateral Indo-Canadian trade is peanuts –only USD 8 billion. This is the reason why, India has been soft on the US charges and hard on Canada’s.

Though India and the US both have real constraints in fighting each other, they will keep encountering points of friction as they have divergent domestic and foreign policy interests even as they are “strategic partners” in checking China’s expansionism. 

India is worried about the leeway being given to Indian terrorists and separatists in Canada and the US. New Delhi is duty bound to safeguard India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Moreover, Indian public opinion sees nothing wrong in India’s assassinating terrorists at home or abroad if India can pull it off. It is therefore necessary for Western countries to take India’s concerns and compulsions seriously and with respect.

The US has interests in India which it cannot set aside. It is helping India militarily in the hope that India will, if needed, go to war with China and check its advancement in South Asia. But India baulks at the prospect of a war with China which has an economy five to seven times the size of the Indian economy. China is also armed to the teeth.

With many Indian industries depending on imports of intermediate goods from China, Indian cannot break ties with China. India buys USD 100 billion worth of goods from China annually to keep its industries humming. India is basically interested in a détente on the India-China border and to achieve it, it wants to buy American military equipment. That’s about it.

Sino-Indian Border Deal

Partly due to its friction with the US, India is trying to come to some agreement with China on the disputed parts of the 4,000 km India-China border. And on its part, China wants to wean India away from the US camp.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met on the side lines of the 16th BRICS Summit at Kazan in Russia on October 23. They agreed to have a “complete military disengagement” on the disputed parts of the border. The pact involves allowing militaries from both sides to patrol contested sections. It aims at preventing border clashes and ensuring that the countries can “quickly de-escalate” when there are disputes, according to Indian officials. China said that Beijing would work in the next stage to “properly implement the plan with the Indian side.”

The 2020 border clash in Galwan had killed 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers. Smaller clashes took place in 2021 and 2022, raising fears of bigger clashes between troops in close proximity along disputed stretches.

“The deal in Kazan marks a major step in trying to normalize ties between the two countries,” said Manoj Joshi at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. “Both countries are trying to lower the temperatures, but of course there is still a long distance to go.”

But critic General (Rtd) Prakash Katoch says that still Indian troops can’t patrol 26 out of 65 patrolling points claimed by India.

Critics also point out that while China does not open its market much to Indian goods, India has relaxed visa rules for Chinese technicians. Chinese investment has been allowed in the electronics sector. Chinese companies can now take smaller stakes in joint ventures.  

According to neutral commentators, both India and China have limited incentives and no compulsion to engage in substantial bilateral dialogue. The same holds true for India-Pakistan relations. There is peace on the India-Pakistan Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Kashmir due to a military-to-military agreement.  But the political rhetoric over Kashmir in Pakistan and over Pakistani cross-border terrorism in India, continues unabated. This is because the issues that divide the two countries play a key part in electoral politics.

Bangladesh

India-Bangladesh relations, cited as a great success for over a decade, touched rock bottom in August following the violent overthrow of the Sheikh Hasina regime by a popular movement against corruption and dictatorial rule.

Trouble for India stemmed from the fact that the forces behind the movement saw Hasina as lackey of India. It was thought that she was able to rule with an iron hand and rig election after election with India’s help. The fact that the fleeing Hasina was given shelter in New Delhi seemed to confirm the theory.

India was surprised by the extent of revulsion against Hasina and itself. The government of New Delhi went into a shell. But the Indian media went hammer and tongs against the successor government in Dhaka. The popular movement was seen as the handiwork of Pakistan, China and the US.

Unless the Indian media tones down its vicious anti-Bangladesh rhetoric, chances of an Indo-Bangla rapprochement are dim indeed.

P.K. Balachandran is a freelance journalist based in Colombo writing on South Asian affairs for various news websites and dailies for a number of years. He has reported from Colombo and Chennai for Hindustan Times, New Indian Express and Economist. He has a weekly column in Daily Mirror and Ceylon Today in Sri Lanka.

Factum is an Asia Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Special Perspective: Testing time for India’s foreign policy appeared first on Newswire.

By Shiran Illanperuma

From October 22 to 24, the 16th BRICS summit was held in Kazan, Russia. Alongside the core group members of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, this year saw the formal addition of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. During the summit, another 13 countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Nigeria, Uganda, Cuba, and Bolivia, became partner members.

This year, Sri Lanka joins a growing list of countries from the Global South that have applied to become members of BRICS. Foreign Secretary Aruni Wijewardena led the Sri Lankan delegation to the Kazan summit. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath has written to his BRICS counterparts for support in joining.

The Kazan summit occurs in the context of an increasingly tense global situation, characterised by the ongoing Israeli genocidal campaign in Gaza, the NATO-led proxy war in Ukraine, and the US-led new Cold War on China. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speech at the summit describes a world descending into ‘the abyss of disorder and chaos’. Referencing the Russian novel What is to be Done? (also the title of a key text by Vladmir Lenin), Xi summarised the spirit of BRICS:

“The more tumultuous our times become, the more we must stand firm at the forefront, exhibiting tenacity, demonstrating the audacity to pioneer and displaying the wisdom to adapt. We must work together to build BRICS into a primary channel for strengthening solidarity and cooperation among Global South nations and a vanguard for advancing global governance reform.”

The message is clear. BRICS stands for peaceful development and cooperation, against the political domination and unilateralism that have characterised the US-led post-World War II order.

A world in disorder

Ironically, the acronym BRICS originates from a 2001 report by a Goldman Sachs document that predicted a shift in economic power that would necessitate the G7 to open up to more members from the Global South. However, there is a case to be made for BRICS being the product of a much longer historical cycle of revolutions and national liberation struggles against Western imperialism.

A line can be drawn from the awakening of Russia and China in the early 20th century to the Arab revolt, the Indian independence movement, the wave of African liberation struggles, and the Non-Aligned Movement to the present multipolar zeitgeist. BRICS is merely the latest manifestation of this long arc of history.

Nonetheless, the organisation remains rife with contradictions. India remains a member of the QUAD and a key node of the US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy. Post-Apartheid South Africa has been completely immobilised by neoliberalism. Brazil has blocked Venezuela’s application to join the group.

The UAE is deeply embedded in the US financial and military architecture, being the first Arab country to establish diplomatic ties with Israel. China and Russia remain the militant core of the group and the countries with the most resources and will to power to reshape the global order.

Yet there are objective economic and geopolitical factors that force countries with diverse and sometimes contradictory political projects to converge on a common platform for cooperation. The US has increasingly isolated itself through protectionism, the prosecution of destabilizing hybrid wars, the weaponisation of its control over the global financial system, and its monopoly on printing the world reserve currency.

Meanwhile, the global majority still grapples with the scourge of war, poverty, and underdevelopment. It is this global majority’s demand for peace, productivity-enhancing technology, and financing for investment, that is the material basis for BRICS.

BRICS and the future of Sri Lankan industrialisation

Sri Lanka could very well be a poster child for the disorder and chaos of the international order. In many ways, the country’s internal instabilities are conditioned by external factors. First, imported commodity price inflation following the war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia hit a country already battered by COVID-19 and the collapse of tourism and remittances.

As Israel, with the support of the West, threatens to trigger a regional conflict in West Asia, a prolonged period of commodity price inflation would be just as devastating for the Sri Lankan economy.

Second, Sri Lanka’s external debt default and restructuring process highlight the rigged nature of the global financial architecture and the Bretton Woods Institutions. The lack of a global system for recycling surpluses and providing concessional finance for productive infrastructure and industry is strongly felt by countries like Sri Lanka.

Deflationary policies imposed by the IMF and World Bank have been antithetical to industrialisation and economic growth. Since its first report on the country, the World Bank has sought to divert the attention of local policymakers away from large-scale industry and towards various cul-de-sacs, including peasant colonisation, services, and micro-entrepreneurship. As if any country has been able to develop along these lines.

By contrast, the fledgling New Development Bank creates new possibilities for development financing, including in currencies other than the dollar. The core members of BRICS, including Russia and China, know full well that sovereignty can only be built on a foundation of large-scale industry. Through BRICS, there is an opportunity to combine new financing mechanisms and growing technical expertise from the Global South to jumpstart start industrialisation in Sri Lanka.

BRICS contains a number of industrial initiatives that Sri Lanka could stand to benefit from, including the BRICS Partnership for the New Industrial Revolution (PartNIR) which was introduced in 2018. The Kazan declaration suggests that the PartNIR Advisory Group has created working groups on sectors such as chemicals, mining and metals, and pharmaceuticals. These are all the value-added industries that Sri Lanka should be looking at in a drive towards industrialisation in the 21st century.

Finally, President Xi’s speech in Kazan highlighted China’s willingness to expand collaboration with BRICS member states on green industrial chains. China currently dominates the green energy sector, including in the processing of rare earth minerals and the manufacture of batteries and photovoltaic panels. As a member of BRICS, Sri Lanka could leverage Chinese expertise in this sector to enhance the value addition of domestic resources such as graphene and join the green energy industrial chain.

BRICS is still very much work in progress. Its outcome is not written in stone. In the spirit of Bandung, Sri Lanka should be playing an active role in shaping the outcome of BRICS and taking its rightful place in world history.

See also: Factum Perspective: Are China and Russia Imperialist?

Shiran Illanperuma is a researcher at Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. He holds an MSc in Economic Policy from SOAS University of London.

Factum is an Asia-Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Perspective: Out of the abyss and into BRICS appeared first on Newswire.

By Ramindu Perera

On September 23, Anura Kumara Dissanayake, the 56-year-old leftist leader of the National People Power (NPP) was sworn in as President of Sri Lanka.

The presidential election was a three-cornered contest between former President Ranil Wickremasinghe who stood for the elections as an independent candidate, opposition leader Sajith Premadasa of the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) and Dissanayake’s NPP coalition. Namal Rajapaksa, the son of former president Mahinda Rajapaksa also contested from the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) representing the legacy of the once-powerful Rajapaksa dynasty. 

The results showed a dramatic shift in Sri Lankan politics — Dissanayake, who only polled around 3 percent of the national vote at the previous presidential elections in 2019 emerged as the frontrunner obtaining 42 percent of the total votes. He claimed a comfortable lead of 1.3 million votes over his closest contender Premadasa, while Wickremasinghe lagged, obtaining only 17 percent.

The SLPP which commanded a landslide of 6.9 million votes at the 2019 elections saw a humiliating defeat reduced to a mere 0.3 million votes. Dissanayake’s rise came as a surprise to many observers, as international media became flooded with reports of a “Marxist” becoming the President of Sri Lanka.

Economic crisis and political turmoil 

Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s election comes amidst the worst-ever economic crisis Sri Lanka is facing in its post-independent history.

In 2022, in the context of the financial shock produced by the Covid-19 pandemic, and dwindling foreign income due to the collapse of the tourist industry and the fall of foreign remittances, the country entered a sharp balance of payment crisis. High foreign debt servicing obligations worsened the situation. The economy came to a standstill in early 2022, with electricity cuts and fuel shortages which had a crippling effect on day-to-day life. 

The economic crisis triggered a mass protest movement that drew millions into the streets. The protest wave, popularly known as the “aragalaya” (Sinhala term for “struggle”) was a spontaneous uprising, which demanded the removal of the then President Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. Similar to many other South Asian countries, Sri Lanka’s politics had been largely shaped by powerful political families.

The Rajapaksa family that arose to prominence with the election of Mahinda Rajapaksa in the 2000s advanced an aggressive ethno-nationalist agenda, pitting the majority Sinhala community against the minority Tamil and Muslim counterparts. Gotabhaya Rajapaksa — the younger brother of Mahinda Rajapaksa, spearheaded the 2019 election campaign that mobilized anti-Muslim sentiments, promising to restore the “rightful place of Sinhalese”. 

Gotabhaya Rajapaksa who commanded enormous popularity when he was elected was doomed by the economic crisis and was compelled by mass protests to flee the country in July 2022.

After the resignation, the Parliament, still dominated by Rajapaksa’s SLPP, elected Ranil Wickremasinghe as the new President who negotiated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to obtain a bailout package. The IMF approved a 2.9 billion USD Extended Fund Facility to Sri Lanka in March 2023, which came with a strict conditionality regime requiring the government to impose austerity measures such as an increase in taxes and removal of electricity and fuel subsidies.  

JVP: from guerilla war to Parliament 

The roots of the rise of Dissanayake and the NPP lay in the shifts that occurred in the public consciousness due to the economic crisis and political turmoil that followed. The NPP was formed in 2019 as an initiative by the left-wing political party Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). The NPP cannot be understood without understanding the historic trajectory of the JVP that encompassed various shifts and transformations. 

Founded in the mid-1960s as a militant revolutionary group, and identifying itself as a “Marxist-Leninist” formation, the JVP led two armed insurrections against the government in 1971 and 1987-89. During these uprisings, the party attracted a generation of radicalized youth from Sinhala rural areas.

Both uprisings were crushed and thousands of young people were murdered during counter-insurgency operations. During the 1987-89 period, JVP lost almost all its first-generation leaders, including its founder Rohana Wijeweera. 

In the mid-1990s, under the leadership of Somawansha Amarasinghe (the only politburo member of the old JVP, who survived the 1987-89 state terror), the JVP reorganized and entered into mainstream parliamentary politics.

Anura Kumara Dissanayake belongs to the second generation of the JVP leadership, which was molded during the parliamentary phase of JVP history. Dissanayake was recruited to the student wing of the JVP in the late 1980s and went underground escaping state terror. Once JVP resumed work, he emerged as a student leader, becoming the National Organizer of the JVP-affiliated Socialist Students Union. In 2000, he was elected to the Parliament and has been a Parliamentarian ever since. 

After entering into mainstream politics, JVP has been involved in an uphill struggle to reach out to the broader voter population who were accustomed to voting for the two main parties that governed the country since independence.

After an initial period of trying to appeal to the voters disillusioned with the traditional two-party system, by the 2000s, JVP moved towards adopting a Sinhala nationalist position in the context of escalating ethnic conflict in the country. Advocating a military solution to the secessionist war, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) was waging in Northern Sri Lanka, JVP supported the candidacy of Mahinda Rajapaksa in the 2005 presidential elections. 

Although it brought a temporary electoral boost, the experiment with coalition politics and the alliance with Sinhala nationalism ended up as a disaster for the JVP. Rajapaksa became extremely popular in Sinhala constituencies resulting in diminishing the support base of the JVP. The rural mass base of the JVP defected en masse to Rajapaksa, making the former a marginal force in the electoral landscape (see table below).

Table: Performance of JVP/ NPP in general elections 1994-2020

Making of the NPP

It is under these unfavorable circumstances Anura Kumara Dissanayake was made the JVP leader in 2014. Under his leadership, the party departed from its earlier associations with the Sinhala nationalist rhetoric and adopted “anti-corruption” as a popular appeal to reach towards broader masses.

Furthermore, JVP sought to establish a broader mass movement that could attract diverse sections of society. Accordingly, the NPP was formed in 2019. The new platform brought various civil society activists, trade unions, professional organizations, and public intellectuals together — and presented itself as an alternative to the political establishment dominated by the two traditional mainstream parties. 

As explained before, the 2022 economic crisis and the aragalaya protest movement provided the conditions necessary for the NPP’s growth into a larger movement. The collapse of the SLPP during the economic crisis created a great political vacuum in the country. Recent election results show that the NPP has successfully seized the political “moment” created by the crisis. This success can be attributed to the political strategy followed by the NPP which succeeded in establishing itself as a viable political alternative in the eyes of the public. 

On the one hand, NPP pursued a discursive strategy that is capable of addressing the aspirations of the masses who have come to believe now that the economic collapse is linked to the corrupt behavior of the traditional power elite of the country.

Reflecting a left-wing populist strategy, Dissanayake defined a political frontier between the “corrupt political elite” that has usurped power from the masses and the “people” suffering due to those misdeeds. Calling for an “age of renaissance”, NPP was presented as a “movement of the subaltern masses”, a “people’s movement” fighting against the status quo maintained by the two mainstream parties. 

In fostering this discourse, NPP positioned it as a center-left platform, distancing itself from the neo-liberal politics of President Wickremasinghe and the SJB, and also various smaller ultra-left tendencies.  

While the populist appeal was at the center of the NPP discourse, several other themes featured alongside the central message. Three such themes are worth mentioning. 

First, Dissanayake’s political platform was highly critical of poverty and the worsening economic conditions of the plebian masses. The NPP program vouched to provide immediate economic relief to the poorest of the poor hardly hit by the economic crisis and IMF-dictated austerity measures. Furthermore, it declared to defend education and healthcare as public services, increase investment in public services and social welfare, and strengthen collective bargaining. 

Second, the NPP advanced an appeal against communalist politics. Criticizing the political elite for sowing division among ethnic and religious communities in the post-independence era, Dissanayake urged all people despite ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences to rally around the NPP to defeat the elite establishment. In many public speeches, Dissanayake attacked the Islamophobic rhetoric Rajapaksas employed to capture power in 2019.  

Third, they laid greater importance on matters concerning social inclusivity. For instance, a long time ahead of the elections, the NPP launched a women’s platform, highlighting issues like the underrepresentation of women in politics, unpaid care work, and other gender-related injustices.

This platform led by women organized a series of political rallies all over the country that drew thousands of women, particularly in rural areas. These “women-only” rallies were something unprecedented in Sri Lankan political history. NPP was also the first political party to launch a separate manifesto for individuals with disabilities.

A coalition from “below”

At the organizational level, the disdain towards the political mainstream was firmly maintained by refusing to align with any mainstream political party or known politicians of those parties. Instead, NPP established a grassroots-level network known as “constituency councils” (Kottasha Sabhas) throughout the country and opened the doors of these councils to local activists who might have supported mainstream parties in the past.

Furthermore, an effort was made to organize the professional strata of the country to counter the oppositional claim that the NPP is only a protest party, incapable of becoming a party of government.

Finally, the personal image of Anura Kumara Dissanayake also played a significant role in the election campaign. As an oppositional parliamentarian for decades, Dissanayake had an impressive record of being a fierce critic of various misdeeds of both mainstream parties. 

Interestingly, in the 2024 presidential elections, all three main contenders against Dissanayake were individuals belonging to political families — sons or nephews of former presidents, brought up and educated in elite schools in Colombo, and have had access to all sorts of privileges from childhood.

On the contrary, Dissanayake, a son of a working-class family coming from the rural Anuradhapura district, a product of the free education system in the country, a vocal critic of the corruption of the elite establishment in his entire lifetime, stood in stark contrast to other contestants.

The way ahead 

Dissanayake’s ability to deliver on his promises depends on multiple factors, and he will be facing numerous challenges in the international and domestic realms. The foremost challenge is the debt crisis that has seriously impeded the economic potential of the country.

Debt-restructuring negotiations with bilateral and commercial creditors commenced by the previous Ranil Wickremasinghe government are yet to be concluded. Although obtaining substantial debt relief is vital for the country’s economic revival, to what extent international creditors would be flexible towards this need of Sri Lanka which has little bargaining power due to its bankrupt status remains a worrying concern. 

On the other hand, Dissanayake also faces the challenge of addressing the social and humanitarian crisis the Sri Lankan people are currently experiencing. During his campaign, Dissanayake pledged to continue working with the IMF, but claimed that he would renegotiate the IMF deal to ease the economic burden arising from austerity measures.

How far the IMF would heed this call is a matter beyond the government’s control. Stringent IMF austerity measures are likely to enter into a colliding course with the promise of the NPP to grant immediate economic relief to the people and to direct the country’s economy towards a more developmentalist line aiming to strengthen the productive sector of the economy. 

At the domestic level, apart from the challenges that would come from the reorganizing right-wing opposition, the NPP will have to win over constituencies that did not vote for him in the September elections. Although he performed well in Sinhala majority areas and has improved his vote base among Muslim electorates, Dissanayake could not obtain a significant number of votes in Tamil majority areas in the North.

This underperformance is due to several reasons, including the JVP’s past association with militant Sinhala nationalism, the seeming disconnection between NPP’s idea of “national unity” and political aspirations of the Tamil polity, and also the tendency among sections of the Tamil political elite to collaborate with right-wing parties in the South rather than with the left. 

Delivering his first speech after being elected, Dissanayake declared that he is conscious about the quantity and the “composition” of his mandate and will do his best to reach out to sections that chose not to vote for him in the September elections. Bridging the ethnic divide in Sri Lanka is a serious task that Dissanayake will have to overcome if his promise to bring an age of renaissance is to be true.

Ramindu Lankika Perera is an academic attached to the Department of Legal Studies, the Open University of Sri Lanka. He can be reached at ramindu@ezln@gmail.com.

Factum is an Asia-Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Perspective: 2024 Sri Lankan Elections – The Momentous Rise of the Populist Left appeared first on Newswire.

By Rear Admiral Y. N. Jayarathna (Retd)

The recently held presidential election in Sri Lanka has opened the doors for a new and younger political leadership in the island nation. Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s ascension from a third-party candidacy to President was not a journey of comfort and pleasure, since along the way he was pitted against two traditional family-driven political moguls.

However, the organization and thinking that AKD represented endured all these and today his party are in power. I believe that all young potential political leaders from all parties should work to protect and thrive this newfound freedom by supporting the President in his drive for political reforms.

It goes without saying that this was the change even my generation has been yearning for, even in our fifties! None of the traditional political parties here allowed young energetic political leaders to emerge. The newly created Pohottuwa (the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna), as we learnt soon enough after it won presidential polls in 2019 and parliamentary elections in 2020, was no different, as it was tightly controlled by family interests and agenda.

Unsurprisingly, this trend is even visible in Tamil and Muslim political parties as well, where traditional leaders simply keep on dominating and bargaining for favors at the expense of the younger generation.

What is significant in these so-called minority political parties is that they always lean on ethnicity and follow a strategy of bargaining with traditional parties. They thrive on such strategies but, in my view, have lost a grand opportunity to push forward the cause of national unity and reconciliation.

I believe strongly that in the upcoming general election these elements – that is, the family centric political parties – will all gather around to protect the political and voting culture that is beneficial to them, at the cost of nation’s next level of leadership.

The signs were already there at the recent election, with then President Ranil Wickremesinghe himself declaring that the economy’s recovery depended on him winning. Similarly, within the Opposition, it was visible from the leadership in those parties how centralized the decision-making process was, with no room for Young Turks.

The failures of both the then incumbent and mainstream Opposition to absorb new thinking patterns among voters cost them heavily at the election.

It is not that we lack true political leaders in our parties, rather that the avenues and pathways for them to perform beyond expectations has been limited. I surmise that, in this regard, even Namal Rajapaksa’s decision to contest was bold and courageous, despite the drubbing he was sure to get at the polls.

Rajapaksa endured, and I am sure he is now aware of his actual political base, away from diehard supporters of his family who are now with Ranil Wickremesinghe. He should continue to build on the base he secured and should convince supporters, potential and actual, of his intention to carve a new political trajectory, away from the past.

Regarding other parties, in the SJB, the likes of Harsha de Silva and Eran Wickramaratne were somewhat curtailed by the top-tier leadership in their party. Yet they represent a different way of thinking in our political landscape. I think the same can be said for Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka. Yet in our political culture, my guess is that he may never succeed so long as everyone rejects him on the grounds of thinking differently from the leadership.

A similar fate has befallen minority leaders. I do not think anyone will give an opportunity for a young, budding figure like Arun Siddarthan, as traditional political parties would not want to see any Jaffna based young leadership rise up to challenge them!

These “Colombo Cocktail Circuit” Tamil politicians, who were educated in Colombo schools and domiciled in Colombo, want their vote base intact in Jaffna, even at the cost of national leadership. They will surely not groom the next generation coming up from the grassroot level despite how good these youngsters are. What of the potential for a new younger leadership within the Muslim community. Even here, prospects are dim.

Under these circumstances, I opine that the new young emerging political leadership should stand on their feet. They be bold enough to challenge and to succeed. Politics is a challenging field and anyone who chooses to pursue it will be in for much disappointment. But where is the fine line we must draw between the vagaries of politics in Sri Lanka and the severe constraints that the new political leadership class are facing?

I firmly think this is where the public should come in, with think tanks and media managing things more sensibly and much  more responsibly. Government officials also have a role to play. Be they divisional secretaries of military officials, it is for the common good of Sri Lanka that they all, and we all, need to nurture our next line of political leaders.

For this I believe the senior generation has got lot to do. Unfortunately, this generation has failed by us massively. As an analyst, I can candidly say that I too have failed, because when I point out these issues, my superiors have done everything they can to cut me off, thereby killing the messenger rather than understanding my concerns and working to address them. 

Yet it cannot be denied that political cultures change, some much faster than we normally assume. This phenomenon is applicable to all countries, and not just Sri Lanka. In the 1990s, for instance, the Indian Parliament had more warlords than it does today. Yet now, they all are being replaced by efficient, educated intellectuals. Let us hope President AKD’s ascension will give more room for the next line of leadership. Sri Lanka needs it, urgently.

Rear Admiral Y. N. Jayarathna (Retd) was the Chief of Staff and Chief Hydrographer of the Sri Lanka Navy and Joint Chief Hydrographer to the Sri Lankan Government. On retirement his services have been secured by the United Nations as an International Consultant for Undersea Cables. He is presently engaged in consultancy role on matters maritime on freelance basis. He can be reached at ynjayarathna@hotmail.com.

Factum is an Asia-Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Special Perspective: The Opening of a New Political Leadership and Political Culture in Sri Lanka appeared first on Newswire.

By Flavia Gunarathna

In a series of diplomatic and technological engagements, Sri Lanka seems to be taking strides towards enhancing its digital and maritime infrastructure.

During his official visit to Indonesia, President Ranil Wickremesinghe held discussions with Indonesian officials and Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla and SpaceX. These meetings, occurring amidst the backdrop of the 10th World Water Forum, have generated mixed responses in Sri Lanka, but may well pave a path to the future.

Sri Lanka and Indonesia’s Strategic Engagements in Maritime Technology

During his visit to Indonesia, President Wickremesinghe met with Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, Coordinating Minister of Maritime and Investment Affairs of Indonesia. The meeting, held late last month at the United In Diversity Bali Campus on Kura Kura Bali Island, focused on areas such as the Global Blended Finance Alliance, Sri Lanka’s Tropical Belt Initiative, the Blue Economy, and the burgeoning seaweed industry.

Global Blended Finance Alliance

Blended Finance has the potential of driving sustainable development in developing countries. By blending different capital sources, it aims to address the financing gap and catalyze investments in critical sectors.

Sri Lanka’s Tropical Belt Initiative

During the recent meeting, both Sri Lanka and Indonesia, being tropical belt countries, engaged in discussions centered on leveraging their shared geographical characteristics for mutual benefit.

During COP28 in Dubai, the president introduced the Tropical Belt Initiative. This focuses on harnessing commercial investments in key natural resources found within the tropical belt, including forests, swamps, and mangroves.

President Wickremesinghe emphasized the need to ensure that these investments are economically viable. The initiative, he said, had to attract private sector engagement, contributing to the ambitious objective of mobilizing trillions of dollars.

The Blue Economy

The Blue Economy, in a nutshell the sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods, and jobs while preserving the health of ocean ecosystems, was another focal point.

Sri Lanka has historically shared an intimate bond with the ocean, yet the full potential of the country’s Blue Economy remains untapped. The Sri Lankan delegation brought attention to these points, against the backdrop of the 10th World Water Day summit.

However, such rhetoric has been brandished before, particularly considering the president’s own initiatives on climate change and climate change diplomacy. It remains to be seen whether these initiatives deliver results, something that may take years.

Seaweed Industry

Both parties explored avenues to develop the seaweed industry, which holds significant promise for economic diversification and environmental sustainability.

Seaweed farming is becoming an essential component of the global food system, offering a multitude of benefits such as sustainable coastal livelihoods, economic diversification, food production, export revenue, climate change mitigation and adaptation, pollution control, and organic fertilizer production.

In the 1930s, Sri Lanka had a thriving seaweed market. Today, however, the industry is limited to small-scale operations with little value addition. Experts believe that expanding seaweed farming in Sri Lanka could significantly bolster the blue economy.

Collaborative Research and Task Force Initiatives

A notable outcome of the meeting was the consensus on establishing a collaborative research program focused on mangrove cultivation. Mangroves play a crucial role in coastal protection, biodiversity conservation, and carbon sequestration. They are an effective counter to the growing effects of climate change.

To this end, the formation of a bilateral task force to coordinate these initiatives was agreed upon, reflecting a commitment to structured and sustained collaboration.

This task force will operate within the framework of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), where Sri Lanka currently holds the chairmanship, thus providing a strategic platform for advancing regional cooperation.

High-Level Engagements: Meeting with Elon Musk

During the same visit, somewhat controversially, President Wickremesinghe engaged in a high-profile meeting with Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla and SpaceX. This meeting brought forth discussions on the implementation of Starlink services in Sri Lanka.

Starlink aims to provide high-speed internet access globally. The system operates by deploying a network of low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, reducing latency and enhancing internet speeds compared to traditional satellite internet services.

Each satellite weighs around 573 pounds and features a flat design, with up to 60 satellites launched per Falcon 9 rocket. This satellite network aims to provide global coverage, addressing connectivity challenges in many developing nations.

Elon Musk’s visit to Indonesia, coinciding with the planned launch of Starlink Internet service in the country, underscores Musk’s strategic visions for Southeast Asia.

The region is more or less characterized by diverse geographic and economic conditions, and it stands to benefit significantly from the enhanced connectivity offered by Starlink. By extending its services to Sri Lanka, SpaceX can further its mission of global internet coverage, going beyond Southeast to South Asia.

That said, whatever benefits may accrue to Musk from his expansion into South Asia, there remain questions as to how viable Starlink may be in countries like Sri Lanka. Estimates put installation costs at more than USD 600.

This is a massive amount for a Sri Lankan, even a middle-class Sri Lankan. Musk’s promise is to expand internet connectivity to rural areas. Given the costs of installation, one wonders whether rural Sri Lanka can afford such a venture.

State financing is a must, although again, with a crisis in the offing, one can ask whether the government has the foreign exchange to meet such costs.

Whatever may bode for Starlink in Sri Lanka, the meeting between Wickremesinghe and Musk could pave the way for a forward-looking partnership aimed at transforming Sri Lanka’s digital landscape. The integration of Starlink satellite internet service promises to enhance connectivity and attract investments. 

Sri Lanka can well benefit from these engagements. Yet optimism on that front must necessarily be tempered by a sober acknowledgement of ground realities. If it can achieve a balance here, the sky can literally turn into the limit.

Flavia Gunarathna is an undergraduate at the Ragama Medical Faculty who is interested in international relations and global politics.

Factum is an Asia-Pacific focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, Strategic Communications, and Climate Outreach accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Perspective: Forging Digital and Maritime Futures appeared first on Newswire.

By Aavin Abeydeera

On June 1, the world’s largest democratic exercise came to a close. India’s general elections ran for seven weeks through six weeks from the April 19 to June 1, with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led NDA coalition once more coming on top.

However, this time around, Prime Minister Modi’s government will not be the juggernaut it once was. It faces new obstacles, both political and social, in his way.

The Main Parties in the Running

The politics of India became increasingly bipolar in the run-up to the 2024 Indian general elections with two major alliances emerging: the incumbent NDA (National Democratic Alliance) and the opposition INDIA (Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance).

Of these alliances, the BJP leads the NDA, while on the other side of the aisle, the INC leads the INDIA coalition. 

In the run-up to the elections, Modi was adamant that his campaign would secure a 400-seat majority for his tentpole coalition. However, as the polls have shown, that is no longer the case, with his own BJP securing just around 292 seats in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of India’s bicameral legislature.

While the numbers show that this new government will still very much be led by Modi’s BJP-led coalition, it will not be as easy as it was for him to enact legislative reforms with the same carte blanche and freedom as he did over the last 10 years.

The INDIA alliance has gained in polling numbers, specifically 234 seats, with the INC and the Samajwadi Party boosting its seats from previous election years.

The Campaign and its Verdict

This has been by no means an easy campaign for either coalition. The election this time around has been not only an exercise in electing India’s legislature, but also a referendum of Modi’s rule over the past decade.

The BJP’s election campaign’s focal point has of course, been PM Modi, and this has not necessarily worked in the BJP’s favor. His election campaign consisted mainly of Islamophobic and Hindutva rhetoric, accusing the INC of attempting to lead India away from its Hindu-centric axis of power.

This rhetoric is not just talk either. Modi’s government has repeatedly been criticized, and heavily so, for using the country’s Muslim minority as a scapegoat in a bid to garner support of the significant right-leaning Hindu voter base of the country.

This hardline stance of Hindu-first politics has also lent itself to the tacit approval of hate crimes against minorities in India. That has in the past worked for the BJP, such as in 2019, when it broached the 300-seat mark without any assistance from its allied parties.

This is no longer the case, as increasing numbers of young voters, especially under the age of 35, have been disillusioned by the BJP’s hardliner antics, such as the construction (and consecration) of a controversial Hindu temple by the BJP on lands which formerly housed a mosque.

Ironically, the BJP lost its seat in Ayodhya, the constituency in which the Ram Mandhir fiasco happened in the first place.

It is not only the disillusionment with Hindutva rhetoric that has pushed young voters away from the BJP ballot, but also the emerging unemployment crisis in India. According to one poll from the World Bank, India’s unemployment stood at 23.2%, with a significant percentage of those unemployed being youth. The INC has attempted to capitalize on this flashpoint issue, to varying degrees of success.

In keeping with finding ground amidst the BJP government’s blunders, the INDIA coalition has been making steady inroads into throwing wrenches into the BJP-led Lok Sabha machine. With 99 seats won by the INC alone, the BJP will run into considerable trouble with passing their more controversial laws, most of which serve to strengthen Modi’s autocratic regime.

However, the BJP’s slight retreat has not been uniform across all regions of India. In Uttar Pradesh, the most populous state in the country, the Samajwadi Party of the INDIA alliance took 37 seats, while the BJP secured only 33, nearly half the 62 it obtained in 2019.

Such has been the case in bellwether states such as Maharashtra and West Bengal as well, with the INDIA coalition far outpacing the NDA. However, long-standing bastions of left-leaning secularism such as Kerala have been successfully infiltrated by the NDA, in large part thanks to its use of Islamophobic sentiment amongst Kerala’s sizable Christian minority. 

What the future holds for India and the BJP 

Nevertheless, for all its incendiary strategies, the BJP does come off the back of certainly the most successful period of rule in India’s history. Its economy and power projection has skyrocketed, and India’s domestic economy has boomed thanks to Modi’s aggressive push towards commerce and education-friendly policies at all levels.

In the meantime, Modi’s hegemonic rule over India has overseen India’s transition from a regional powerhouse to a rising global power on its own terms. On the home front, India’s poor has benefitted from robust overhauls in welfare and infrastructure development programs, boosting India’s trajectory towards prosperity for all its citizenry. To be sure, the BJP’s talk has not been without walk.

All said, this election has been interesting to say the least. While it will mean business as usual for Modi and his government, it will come as a shock that India’s secular spirit has decided to fire back against the increasingly powerful Hindutva movement in the voting booths, and the world at large will have to take notice.

Modi’s rule is no longer set in stone, and those who oppose his anti-constitutional, anti-secular, aggressive vision of India are no longer silent.

What this means for South Asia, no one knows for certain. But for Modi, as well as India, the paradigm has begun to shift, and Hindutva rule, like all authoritarian-populist regimes, seem to be coming to an end. Whether that day will arise sooner or later for the world’s largest democracy is anyone’s guess.

Aavin Abeydeera is an undergraduate at the Faculty of Law of the University of Colombo. A graduate of the BCIS, his interests range from geopolitics, economics, and foreign policy to culture and sports. He can be reached at aavinabeydeera@gmail.com.

Factum is an Asia-Pacific focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, Strategic Communications, and Climate Outreach accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Special Perspective : India Goes to the Polls appeared first on Newswire.

By Sanja de Silva Jayatilleka

New Institutions in the Economic Transformation Bill

The recent gazette on Economic Transformation, Part II of May 10, 2024, includes several brand-new “incorporated” institutions with unprecedented power and new lines of authority, as well as an ultra-powerful roaming ambassadorship, to promote investment in Sri Lanka.

Significantly, they all seem to come under the direct control of the President, through his authority to hire and fire most of their members including the Chairpersons.

They replace or have authority over the existing institutions which are currently vested with these responsibilities, now proposed to be transferred to the new entities.

They are authorized to have their own funds and recruit staff and some even to establish branches overseas and have representatives and staff in other countries.

They are to have authority over some elected bodies and other government departments, to request and obtain information from them, which they are legally obliged to provide. Two of the new institutions have secrecy clauses which prevent their staff from divulging information except in exceptional circumstances such as under the right to information act.

While this entire new structure may have been conceived of with the hope of fast-tracking investment decisions, it is yet unclear if this arrangement complies with the necessary principles and controls such as the separation of powers and other checks and balances to prevent financial misdemeanors, in a country that is now well-known for corruption and outright scams by the ruling elite. As such this new structure needs time to be examined by those qualified to do so before being written into law.

Hotly Debated

The Bill needs much closer scrutiny since it is sought to be included in our corpus of laws, and therefore assumes a greater significance not usually accorded to policy measures.

For one, it has been observed that these changes to the structure and the architecture of economic management proposed in the Bill, are those driven by an unelected President with mere months to finish his term, or rather, the term of his predecessor.

The Parliament is being urged to delay this Bill until a President is elected in a few months to implement necessary changes for which a mandate from the people has been received and with it their support, rather than their mistrust and hostility.

Opposition parties have expressed concern over the powers exercised by the President over these institutions, and the rush to pass it. They have expressed their concern that the Bill in its entirety seems like an attempt to include into the country’s legislation, the conditionalities which were the results of the current Cabinet’s negotiations with the IMF.

This is a valid concern since we can surmise that a different administration may well have been able to secure a different, more favourable agreement. However, incorporating this Bill into law will force a new administration to abide by the maximum this interim President was able to secure for the country, leaving little room for adjustments which an elected President with his own Cabinet may think more beneficial for the people who conferred a mandate on them.

On a recent TV program where experts discussed this draft legislation, a lawyer argued that the detailed nature of this Bill, which inter alia includes various economic percentages to be achieved within a certain time frame, if incorporated into law, restricts the people’s sovereign right to decide the country’s economic policies from time to time through elections. Whether it is wise to do so every five years is irrelevant to this question of their fundamental right, enshrined in the Constitution. An administration with a different economic program or ideology, if elected by the people having been convinced of the efficacy of its proposals, should be able to implement what the people have chosen, he suggested.

On this basis, the current Bill, presented by an interim President without having obtained a mandate from the people even to enter Parliament, should not be rushed through into legislation. The economic crisis cannot be a reason to throw caution to the wind, when the impact of such deep-going changes affects a society facing increasing poverty.

As for the new institutions, the President’s powers to appoint a disproportionate number of members as well Chairpersons to the Boards, is a reason for some anxiety for the citizens.

The last time the present President, at the time the Prime Minister was authorized to appoint an empowered head of an institution, the Governor of the Central Bank, the person so appointed participated with members of the President’s party to engage in a massive fraud famously known as the Bond Scam, and is currently evading an international arrest warrant and repatriation to Sri Lanka to face charges.

It is therefore imperative to have adequate checks and balances to prevent an excess of concentration of power in anyone’s hand, despite what appears to be an imperative requirement of the economic crisis. The crisis was in considerable measure a result of corruption of and facilitated by politicians and therefore demands that proper systems with adequate controls are in place. 

The Institutions

The President’s influence over the new institutions embedded in the Economic Transformation Bill are as follows:

1.Economic Commission of Sri Lanka (EC), described as a body corporate:

6 members appointed by the President, the heads of 2 new institutions proposed in this Bill (also appointed by the President).

The President shall appoint the Chairperson of the EC.

2. Invest Sri Lanka, described as a body corporate: 

Governed by a board with 3 to 5 members appointed by the EC.

Chairperson appointed by the EC.

3. Investment Zones Sri Lanka, described as a body corporate:

7-member board with 4 persons appointed by the Minister in charge (Ministry unspecified, therefore could be the President as Minister).

Minister in charge shall appoint the Chairperson.

4. Office of International Trade (OIT), described as a body corporate

Chairperson of the board and CEO appointed by the President, will also be the Ambassador for International Trade.

5 other members appointed by the President with the concurrence of the Constitutional Council.

Employees under secrecy clause.

5. Ambassador for International Trade: 

Appointed by the President.

Shall be the chief negotiator for international trade negotiations for the purpose of conducting Sri Lanka’s international trade relations, both bilateral and multilateral.

Shall coordinate international trade matters and negotiations concerning the World Trade Organization (WTO), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), any country or country groupings in relation to international trade matters and negotiations, the Commonwealth and other international trade negotiations.

This role with enormous power seems to mirror and expand the role that Ambassador Milinda Moragoda played in India, where he was given Cabinet rank (for the first time in Sri Lanka) since which time he has negotiated the trade relationship with India, with its expanded role in Sri Lanka’s economy. This model seems to have been exponentially elasticized to cover the global arena as a separate institution where the designated Ambassador will take the lead in both bilateral and multilateral negotiations on behalf of Sri Lanka.

6. National Productivity Commission, described as a body corporate:

5 members appointed by the President.

President appoints the Chairperson.

Employees under secrecy clause.

7. Sri Lanka Institute for Economics and International Trade, described as a body corporate:

Minister appoints the Chairman. (No provision preventing President from being this Minister).

Members of the board include the Ambassador for International Trade (appointed by the President).

May appoint team of instructors from universities and private Think-Tanks.

The entire structure of future investment decisions in Sri Lanka, including the demarcation of economic zones, all trade negotiations, bilateral and multinational are now contained within this new structure. Since this arrangement covers the entire island and not just special economic zones, it does seem to concentrate an excess of power within it.

It has been argued that this sort of structure has succeeded in generating recovery and economic growth in other countries such as Bangladesh. However, given the massively controversial nature of some of the foreign direct investment being negotiated by this government currently, with geopolitical security and sovereignty implications, the people’s concerns should be addressed.

Critics point out that with the elections round the corner, a popularly elected President is far better suited to design, deliberate, and implement the required changes.

Sanja de Silva Jayatilleka is the author of “Mission Impossible – Geneva” (Vijitha Yapa, Colombo, 2017).

Factum is an Asia-Pacific focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, Strategic Communications, and Climate Outreach accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Perspective: All the President’s Men appeared first on Newswire.

By Nilanthan Niruthan

The unexpected and tragic death of Ebrahim Raisi reveals the true brutality of geopolitics. While basic compassion dictates that we mourn the loss of human life first, almost all the media coverage on his death has focused instead on the political ramifications of the tragedy.

Although unfortunate, this is also inevitable. Iran is currently a hotspot of tension and an event like this forces us to look past the human tragedy and seek answers for the larger questions which pop up.

According to the Iranian Constitution, elections which were due next year will now have to be conducted within 50 days, and State media reported shortly after Raisi’s demise that they will take place on the June 28.

For a basic overview, three major points need to be assessed – (i) the local ramifications, (ii) the regional ramifications and (iii) the international ramifications.

It is safe to assume that the biggest impact will be on the local level. The actual executive power in Iran lies with the Supreme Leader, not the President. However, Raisi was deeply trusted by the establishment, and some had even speculated in the past that he would take over as Supreme Leader from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei someday.

Locally, the major consequence so far is a potential succession crisis, which already seems to be brewing. Some want Khamenei’s son Mojtaba to become the new President, while others argue that it would be viewed as nepotism.

If this crisis deepens, the power vacuum in itself would lead to additional complications. One must not forget either, that the Foreign Minister of Iran also passed away in the tragic accident, which creates two succession crises in the country, not just one.

With that being said, however, it could be argued that the regional and international equations will not change as much as one might fear. Iran typically acts on ideological grounds and does not have a reputation for policy oscillations based on the fickle whims of its leaders. As such, its mode of engagement is unlikely to change even with a new President and Foreign Minister.

The Iran-Saudi power dynamic for instance, is much bigger than a presidential post. As the de fact power houses of the Shia and Sunni worlds respectively, they have entrenched positions on most key issues. The Saudis were among the first who offered to aid in search and rescue efforts in the initial stages of the crash, when the President’s fate was still unclear.

On May 25, Iran’s Interim President Mohammad Mokhber and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, reaffirmed their commitment to expand bilateral ties between the two nations. As long as both Saudi Arabian and Iranian leaders are mutually committed to heal their fractured ties, a power vacuum is unlikely to change things. 

Nor is their dynamic with Israel likely to change, especially given the escalation of military tensions last month. While it still seems unlikely that an all-out military conflict will break out between the two (things have cooled off since the initial exchange), the equation itself does not change.

Israel is still firm in its conviction that Iran trains proxy actors to kill Israelis and that Iran even played a significant role in the October 7 attacks. Iran is firm in its conviction that Israel is a genocidal State and Tehran has publicly rejected a 2 State solution, denying Israel’s right to exist.

Another key relationship – the Syrian connection – is not likely to change either. Ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the friendship between Syria and Iran has been a significant one. This relationship was further strengthened amidst the chaos of the Syrian Civil War, which erupted in 2011.

Tehran was one of the firmest backers of President Assad at a time when he desperately needed allies, providing political, military, and economic support to the Syrian government. Considering the strategic and demographic interests of Iran in the region, Syria will continue to be a strong ally for the foreseeable future, with or without Raisi.

Internationally, the ripple effect is likely to be even more subdued. The USA expressed its condolences and little else, as expected. Washington and Tehran have not had formal diplomatic connections since 1980, with renewed tensions over Iran’s nuclear aspirations and opposition to Israel.

While President Biden has certainly been far more receptive of a nuclear deal with Iran than President Trump, there is still a sense in Washington that Iran needs to be treated as suspiciously as possible. And if Iran does militarize its civilian nuclear resources, one can be sure that the US will be among the first to mobilize against such a move.

Iran’s stable friendship with the two other geopolitical giants of the world – Russia and China – will remain steady in all likelihood. Both nations were quick to express their sadness over the loss of Raisi and to assure Iran that their ties with Tehran will remain strong. Amidst talk of an unofficial alliance between Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing, the current diplomatic trajectory of the three nations will, in all likelihood, remain the same.

Lastly, the budding giant of world politics – India – was also among the first to affirm solidary with Iran during this time of tragedy.

India is one of the few nations in the world to have very friendly relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran, given that India has large populations of both Sunni and Shia Muslims. Prime Minister Narendra Modi publicly expressed his sadness on social media (he has one of the largest X accounts in the world for a political leader) over the loss of President Raisi.

When one looks at all these factors, it is difficult to conclude that the tragic death of the President will have any lasting impact on a regional or international scale. The repercussions are likely to be localized around Iranian domestic politics. However, this does remind us that at a time like this, mourning the loss of human lives is our foremost task, not cold and rational analysis.

Nilanthan Niruthan is currently the Director of the Centre for Law And Security Studies (CLASS). He is also a visiting lecturer at the National Defense College, the highest seat of military learning in Sri Lanka.

Factum is an Asia-Pacific focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, Strategic Communications, and Climate Outreach accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Perspective: What Raisi’s Death Means appeared first on Newswire.

By Britney Martil

A New Economic Paradigm: African Powers on the Rise

The emergence of new economic powerhouses within Africa has been a defining phenomenon of recent times. These emerging African powers are playing an increasingly pivotal role in shaping the continent’s economic landscape, challenging established norms, and spearheading transformative development. Emerging powers like Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, and Ethiopia are driving this change in Africa’s trajectory, along with other major players like Egypt. These nations are not only embracing their roles as regional leaders but are also extending their influence on the global stage. This paradigm shift calls into question prevailing narratives, which have traditionally positioned Western powers at the forefront of development efforts.

A key hallmark of Africa’s emerging powers is their proactive engagement in trade and economic partnerships. These countries are lessening their historical reliance on Western markets by broadening their trade partnerships. This has created new opportunities for economic development, enabling African nations to investigate collaborations with other developing nations in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. For decades, many African economies were heavily reliant on a limited number of Western markets for their exports. This dependence on a few trading partners not only left these nations vulnerable to shifts in global demand and economic fluctuations but also hindered their capacity to negotiate favorable trade terms. But the emergence of African emerging nations has signaled a change from the established quo. African countries are now actively expanding their economic engages in an effort to increase the breadth of their export markets beyond the established Western markets. By doing so, they are not only minimizing their susceptibility to economic shocks from any single market but also unlocking the potential for new economic opportunities. This strategic diversification is a response to the realization that a balanced trade portfolio is a safeguard against external vulnerabilities.

The expenditures made in infrastructure are not limited to isolated initiatives; rather, they are a component of overall plans aimed at connecting different parts of these countries and promoting greater integration. Emerging African nations are bridging the urban-rural divide and unlocking the economic potential of previously underdeveloped regions through improving internal connections. This fair allocation of infrastructure eliminates inequities while also utilizing the nation’s pooled human capital. These infrastructure initiatives also aim to promote regional connectivity and collaboration. For instance, improved road and rail networks make it easier to transport commodities across borders, encouraging cooperation and trade among continents. Economic corridors that link several nations are emerging, boosting trade and fostering a feeling of common destiny among states while utilizing the distinctive assets and advantages of each.

To advance past conventional developmental stages, emergent African powers are embracing technological innovation. With the help of developments in information technology as well as in telecommunications, these countries are adopting digitalization to simplify governance, offer necessary services, and foster entrepreneurship. This approach not only enhances efficiency and effectiveness but also propels Africa onto the global stage as a serious contender in the digital economy. Traditional approaches to development often involve adopting a linear path that takes into account different stages of industrialization and economic expansion. African emerging nations are, however, upending this paradigm by pursuing a leapfrogging approach. Leapfrogging is the practice of some nations adopting the most recent technologies without first passing through certain developmental stages. They may be able to accelerate development and get around obstacles that more developed economies encounter by doing this. African nations are harnessing this strategic imperative by leveraging their latecomer advantage. Rather than being burdened by outdated infrastructure, they can embrace cutting-edge technologies, positioning themselves at the forefront of innovation and development.

The Impact of Emerging African Powers on Asian Regions: A New Paradigm of Cooperation

The emergence of African powers as influential players on the global stage is not only transforming their continent but also sending ripples of impact across Asian regions. A new era of collaboration, creativity, and economic prosperity is being ushered in by this recently discovered synergy between Africa and Asia. As African emerging powers forge strategic partnerships with Asian countries, the dynamics of trade, investment, and development are being redefined, creating a mutually beneficial landscape that holds advantageous promise for both regions.

African developing powers have focused their attention on the vibrant economies of Asia as they seek diverse economic engagements. This outreach is igniting a novel paradigm of collaboration that transcends conventional barriers. African countries are attempting to take advantage of Asia’s technological strength, market access, and investment possibilities, from China and India to Turkey and Indonesia. The end result is a complex web of intercontinental partnerships that take advantage of the benefits of each region.

• Trade and Investment Dynamics

The environment for trade and investment is being redefined by the growing economic links between Asian regions and emerging African nations. African economies find receptive clients for their commodities and value-added products as they broaden their exports and link into Asia’s thriving marketplaces. As African economies diversify their export markets, countries like Nigeria are establishing trade links with Asian giants like China and India. In return, Asian nations recognize Africa’s vast natural resources and are investing in sectors such as renewable energy and infrastructure development. An illustrative example is Kenya’s collaboration with Japan in developing geothermal energy projects, leading to sustainable energy solutions and mutual economic gains.

• Reciprocal Learning and Progress

A mutual exchange of expertise and development plans characterizes the relationship between developing African powers and Asian countries. For instance, Rwanda and Singapore’s cooperation in urban planning and governance has aided in the development of sustainable and effective cities. A mutual exchange of expertise and development plans characterizes the relationship between developing African powers and Asian countries. For instance, Rwanda and Singapore’s cooperation in urban planning and governance has aided in the development of sustainable and effective cities. 

• Technological Leapfrogging and Innovation Exchange

Asian technology advances are being used by growing African nations to further their own progress. Asian countries’ proficiency in sectors like fintech and e-commerce is aiding African nations in bypassing conventional stages of growth.  Utilizing mobile banking and digital payment systems, Nigeria’s relationship with India’s IT industry has boosted the latter’s digital economy and enabled financial inclusion and economic development.

Conclusion 

The ascent of Africa’s developing powers has sparked a dramatic transformation on the continent and in Asia, ushering in a period filled with vigorous cooperation and reciprocal development. The outreach of African nations towards Asian economies has resulted in a paradigm shift that encompasses trade, investment, technology, and development strategies. The widening horizons of African powers’ interaction with Asia signify a break from traditional alliances, where a variety of countries, including Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Rwanda, cooperate with Asian superpowers like South Korea, China, India, and Japan. Beyond trade statistics, these partnerships generate a deeper comprehension of shared developmental issues and objectives.

The emergence of Africa’s influential players has given rise to a transformative era of cooperation, sparking cross-continental collaborations that redefine economic, technological, and developmental landscapes. The symbiotic link between Africa and Asia has the ability to produce a future of reciprocal advancement and global relevance as these dynamics continue to change.

Britney Martil is a law student at the Kotelawala Defence University. With a passion for justice and equality, she is determined and dedicated to fighting against all forms of injustice.

Factum is an Asia Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation, and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Perspective: The Rise of Emerging African Powers appeared first on Newswire.

By Uditha Devapriya

During a visit to Sri Lanka on December 14, 2015, then US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Designate Thomas Shannon announced the launch of the first US-Sri Lanka Partnership Dialogue. The Dialogue, held in February the following year at Washington, sought to enhance cooperation between the two countries in several key areas, including governance, development cooperation, people-to-people ties, economic cooperation, and security cooperation.

At the Dialogue, much was made of the common links between the US and Sri Lanka, including their contribution to the promotion of “democratic governance.” The initiative had been the brainchild of a government perceived as more pro-West and pro-US than its predecessor. While such geopolitical considerations had a significant say in the Dialogue, however, they also highlighted the potential and the limitations of US attempts at cementing ties with Sri Lanka.

Ostensibly, the Dialogue sought greater engagement with Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, as with all such initiatives, it ended up framing and promoting such engagement through the prism of certain key geopolitical issues, including though not limited to US-China tensions in the Indo-Pacific. This was reiterated by then US Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power, who stated that the US would like to calibrate its relationship with a Sri Lankan military that was “strong” and that reinforced “shared regional security interests.” These interests obviously included Washington’s concerns about China’s activities in the Indian Ocean, concerns shared by New Delhi.

There is of course nothing wrong or objectionable in this. Countries pursue their interests and they view their relations with other countries through the prism of those interests. The US, like India and China, has long viewed Sri Lanka as a strategic outpost in a strategic ocean, an ocean that has for all intents and purposes become the most contested maritime sphere in the world. The US, however, has got a bad press over the last three or four decades. Much of that bad press has, for the lack of a better way of putting it, been deserved: its adventures or misadventures in other regions, and its promotion of democracy with whatever means, has not been to the liking of countries which view any form of interventionism with concern, if not suspicion.

How, then, can the US and Sri Lanka recalibrate their ties with each other? Before strategizing the shift in bilateral ties that this calls for, it must be noted that such a task will not be easy. The US’s reputation in South Asia, even in India, is not what it used to be. Though India has become its de facto partner in the region, Delhi is showing signs of wanting to gain a stronger hand in its relations with Washington. Small states in South Asia are, by virtue of their troubled ties with Delhi and their historically friendlier ties with China, have not taken too kindly to getting closer to the US. The Nepali government’s decision to deny entry to the head of the CIA, on the grounds that the latter’s presence in the country “was not conducive”, is one of several recent examples.

On the other hand, the US cannot be expected to view Sri Lanka through any other prism: it will continue to make bilateral ties contingent on its motives and interests within the Indian Ocean and the wider Indo-Pacific. In that respect, rumors that the head of the CIA made a secret visit to the country, rumors that have not been officially denied yet, have supplemented vague and intriguing remarks by US officials that have actually visited the island: to take one example, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the US Department of Defense Jedidiah P. Royal’s statement that he had not visited Sri Lanka “to discuss a camp in Trincomalee.” Such remarks are really attempts by US officials to allay domestic fears about the ownership of the island’s strategic regions.

One strong point which neither Washington nor Colombo has explored, which has the potential of improving bilateral ties without necessarily bringing in security, would be cultural interactions. For some strange reason, though, while people-to-people ties and cultural cooperation was brought up and flagged at the first US-Sri Lanka Partnership Dialogue, the press releases and joint statements did not highlight such areas: they were, and continue to be, more concerned with military cooperation, trade prospects, and security concerns. While the latter areas do constitute the cornerstone of US ties with any country, and not just Sri Lanka, it is intriguing why Washington has not seen it fit to use cultural diplomacy to engage more constructively with the island.

Sri Lanka and the US celebrated 75 years of bilateral relations this year. However, Sri Lanka’s ties with the US go back much further, by at least 250 years: the first recorded American encounter with the country comes up in 1788, eight years before British colonization of the Maritime Provinces. These initial encounters were based on trade, but they eventually evolved into more concrete and official engagements. In 1850, John Black became the first US emissary to the country in his capacity as US Commercial Agent in Galle. For decades his graveyard was believed to be situated somewhere at the Galle Fort. In September 2016, officials from the US Embassy managed to locate the site, an event of much significance for both countries, but one which hardly made headlines.

Apart from the economic and diplomatic connection, there is also the religious and cultural element. Yet, here too, Washington’s record at cementing ties with the island, indeed the region, has been less than felicitous: as Chandani Kirinde has pointed out in a Factum Perspective, while the CIA and the US intelligence apparatus sought to undermine Communism across Asia through a deft, strategic use of Buddhism, such efforts never paid off. Still, the US and Sri Lanka have had longstanding ties on the cultural and religious front, including Henry Steel Olcott’s involvement in the Buddhist Revival of the late 19th century, Anagarika Dharmapala’s links with Mary Foster, and Miranda de Souza Canavarro’s contribution to Buddhist and women’s education in Sri Lanka.

Despite all this, it must be acknowledged that the US faces a huge credibility gap in the country and the region. It has received and continues to receive a bad press over allegations of meddling in other countries’ affairs, allegations that its actions have done little to counter. Perhaps, instead of seeking deeper ties with Sri Lanka, it will have to address these gaps, to assure the island and its people that it does not view them through the lens of its strategy for the Indo-Pacific only. But then it is doubtful whether Washington will ever opt for a different policy here.

Uditha Devapriya is the Chief Analyst – International Relations at Factum and can be reached at uditha@factum.lk.

Factum is an Asia-Pacific focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Perspective: Rethinking US-Sri Lanka ties appeared first on Newswire.

By Deneth Rajapaksha

Anti-terrorism laws are designed to defend citizens from terrorist activities and to uphold national security. Unfortunately, in certain cases and certain countries, such laws have been applied to stifle political dissent, crush political opposition, and violate fundamental rights.

Since there has never been a universally accepted definition of terrorism, different governments believe themselves to possess the authority to define it in their own terms. These definitions are typically driven by political factors and the need to maintain power in the face of burgeoning political resistance. This article will analyze how anti-terrorism laws have been misused in India, the US, Türkiye, and Egypt to persecute innocents and curtail free speech.

The Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) in India seeks to prevent illegal actions that endanger the nation’s sovereignty. Yet, in recent years, the government has used this law to target individuals who oppose its policies, including political rivals, human rights advocates, attorneys, and journalists. Suspects may be held without charge for up to 180 days under Section 43D of the UAPA. In addition, the UAPA gives the government the authority to designate any group as a “terrorist organization” if it has reason to suspect the group of engaging in terrorist activities.

In 2007, the government detained Dr Binayak Sen under the UAPA on the grounds of having aided Maoist militants in Chhattisgarh. A physician and human rights advocate, Dr Sen was born in West Bengal in 1954. He received his medical training at Christian Medical College in Vellore, Tamil Nadu, and practiced medicine in Chhattisgarh. Despite being held captive for more than two years, it was believed that accusations against him had been politically motivated. In 2011, following a protracted legal battle, he was found not guilty of all charges.

In a similar vein, the Patriot Act has been utilized in the US to support unsanctioned wiretapping and citizen spying. Section 215 of the Patriot Act permits the gathering of “tangible things” like business documents and other items without any court review. In order to improve the nation’s capacity to combat terrorism, the George Bush II administration passed the Patriot Act in 2001. Several parts of this statute have been criticized for intruding on fundamental rights.

Consider Brandon Mayfield, unjustly accused of taking part in the Madrid train bombings. Born in Kansas in 1966, Mayfield was a lawyer who converted to Islam. He studied at Washburn University and spent four years in the US Army as a Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) Corps officer. He continued to practice in Oregon after leaving the army, until his arrest in 2004. 

Mayfield was detained for two weeks under the terms of the Patriot Act after being wrongly named as a suspect in the Madrid train bombings. Mayfield’s home was secretly searched by the FBI under provisions of the Patriot Act, and his possessions were taken without a warrant. Mayfield was later released from custody and he received compensation from the government, after it was discovered that the evidence against him had been faulty.

The US Congress also passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, granting the President broad powers to use military force against individuals suspected of being behind or complicit in the attacks. Since its adoption, the AUMF has been utilized by US governments to defend military operations around the globe.

Human rights organizations have condemned the US government for carrying out strikes outside of areas of active conflict, and for interpreting the AUMF broadly to justify these strikes. There is enough and more evidence to show that innocent individuals have been killed in these operations. In-depth investigation done by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (BIJ), on the effects of drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, has reported many civilian deaths.

For instance, a drone attack in Pakistan in 2010 resulted in the deaths of at least 40 people who had been present at a jirga (a tribal council meeting), including tribal elders opposed to the Taliban. At first, the US government stated that these people had been militants. However, later investigations by the media and by human rights organizations proved otherwise.

The Anti-Terror Law (TMY) in Türkiye has been used to target Kurdish people and opposition organizations. Under this law, suspects may be held without charge for up to 14 days and without a decision for up to six years.

Turkish politician Selahattin Demirtas served as co-leader of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). He was raised in Türkiye and studied law at Ankara University. He won a seat in the Turkish Parliament in 2007. He was detained in 2016 under Türkiye’s Anti-Terror Law on suspicion of aiding the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Before being freed pending trial, he spent more than two years in pretrial detention. The case was condemned as an illustration of how the Turkish government used anti-terrorism laws to suppress political opposition.

At the same time, thousands of individuals have been detained in Egypt without being charged or put on trial. Particularly revealing is the case of Mahmoud Hussein, an Egyptian journalist jailed in 2016 in accordance with the country’s anti-terrorism laws. Hussein was charged with “incitement against state institutions and broadcasting false news with the aim of spreading chaos”, accusations critics of the verdict say had been politically motivated. He was released in 2021.

Counter-terrorism strategies today appear to be a game of waiting for a terrorist attack and then enforcing arbitrary, at times inhumane preventive measures. This effectively pre-empts the need to understand terrorism as an ideological problem which originates in people. Or, in other words, that terrorists and victims are people. Thus, prevention should include eliminating radicalization from the minds of people and then only should it expand into strategic preparedness. Without following this approach, numerous governments and states have abused anti-terrorism legislation to advance their own political agendas, while using innocent people as decoys and guinea pigs.

Nations should unite behind a definition of terrorism backed by universal, global consensus. They should actively ensure that such a definition affirms the rule of law, the protection of human rights, and criminal justice. If anti-terrorism laws are abused, it would simply compel radicalization, leading to the very problem such laws purport to resolve. It is thus imperative that anti-terrorism legislation not be misused to silence political dissent, or to restrict free speech.

Deneth Rajapaksha is an undergraduate in the Department of Police at Hannam University, South Korea. His research interests include intelligence, counter-terrorism, narcotics, organized crime, and other conflict-related areas.

Factum is an Asia-Pacific focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Perspective: Abuses of anti-terrorism legislation – Four case studies appeared first on Newswire.

By Jagath Liyanarachchi

The “Anti-Terrorism Bill” has been gazetted on 22 March 2023 to repeal the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act No. 48 of 1979  and to replace it with a new legal framework to prevent terrorism. Given below is a brief description of the Bill:

History of anti-terrorism laws

In Sri Lanka, the initial legal provisions regarding terrorism were extracted from Public Security Ordinance No. 25 of 1947  which is not an anti-terrorist law but a legal framework that provides temporary additional powers to the executive to deal with situations like a national disaster or calamity.

Although it is not an anti-terrorist law, the state of emergency has been instrumental to prevent the activities identified by the government as acts of terrorism and also to arrest the persons related to those acts. Emergency regulations were used to ban those organizations. In 1971, police and security forces were offered additional powers to suppress the insurgency by declaring an emergency under the Public Security Ordinance.

In 1978, when the rebel activities in the Northern Province escalated, the Parliament passed the Prohibition Act No. 16 of 1978 to ban Tamil Lanka Liberation Tigers and other similar organizations. It can be termed the first anti-terrorism law passed in the history of Sri Lanka.

Later in July 1979, Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act No. 48 of 1979 was passed, repealing the previously mentioned Act. This Temporary Provisions Act remains in force to date although it was enacted for a period of three years. An amendment was brought to the Act in 1982 and made it permanent.

Criticism against the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act

The main objections to this bill are:

• Since the offences under the act can be interpreted very broadly, the security forces may use this act to oppress the citizens even in situations that can be controlled under the general law.
• The existing provisions on the control of the press severely restrict the freedom of speech.
• A confession made to an Assistant Superintendent of Police or a superior police officer can be used as evidence against an accused.
• The Minister in charge of Defense has the authority to issue orders to detain the arrested person for up to 18 months and it cannot be questioned in a court of law.
• Absence of power to grant bail until completion of cases. Because of this, many people who have not been prosecuted are still in remand custody.
• Later, through an amendment enacted in the year 2022, the legal provisions were relaxed to grant bail after one year.

Discussion about a new anti-terror law

Observations of the LLRC Commission appointed during President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government pointed out the shortcomings of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Also, the resolution adopted at the UN Human Rights Council held in Geneva in September 2015 emphasized the need for a new Act. The need for a new law was emphasized in the National Action Plan for the Protection of Human Rights in Sri Lanka during the period from 2017 to 2021.

Later, on September 14, 2018, the government published a draft in the gazette titled “Anti-Terrorism Bill” to replace the Prevention of Terrorism Act with a new law. It was tabled in the Parliament and the first reading was scheduled on October 9, 2018. Seven parties referred the bill to the Supreme Court to examine the constitutionality of the draft bill. The Supreme Court examined the petitions numbered from 41/2018 to 47/2018 and informed the parliament that four sections of the bill were against the constitution. They needed a two-thirds majority vote in the parliament and approval in a referendum to pass it. Also, the Supreme Court recommended alternative provisions related to those clauses in the judgment. Accordingly, the bill was held by the then government.

Key Features of the New Bill

Attention should be paid to the main elements of the draft when analyzing the new draft legally. Accordingly, the objectives of the draft, the relevance of the Act, the offence related to terrorism, the investigation process, arrest and detention, prosecution, powers and functions of officers under the Act, the special anti-terrorist office of the police, special investigative powers, the Attorney General’s power to postpone criminal cases, the issuance of prohibitory orders by the President, and the appointment of a review board are the elements that must be considered.

Purpose of the Act

Protecting the Sri Lankan people from terrorist acts carried out inside and outside Sri Lanka, preventing the use of Sri Lankan territory and people for terrorist activities, investigating terrorist activities, arresting and prosecuting terrorists, as well as the repeal of the No. 48 of 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act is mentioned as the objectives of the new Act, as stated at the very beginning of the Bill.

Also, as stated in the preamble of the bill, terrorism is a threat to the sovereignty of Sri Lanka. Therefore, it is the government’s responsibility to prevent terrorism for the benefit of the Sri Lankan and international community. Since the government is bound by international agreements for preventing terrorism, the Government of Sri Lanka is concerned about a fair and just criminal justice system against terrorism.

The crime of terrorism

The most crucial point in this bill is the way the crime of terrorism is defined inclusive of the following:

• Murder
• Causing serious injury
• Hostage-taking
• Kidnapping or abduction
• Causing serious damage to public/ private transport systems and the environment
• Interruption of essential services
• Looting of government or private property
• Causing serious damage to an electronic system, computer system or network or website vested in Sri Lanka
• Destruction of religious or cultural property
• Damage to a telecommunications system
• Being a participant in an event in which the above-mentioned tasks performed
• Collection of firearms, and explosives without permission

If any of these actions are performed with the following purposes, according to section 3 of the bill, it is a terrorist act. The Act has provisions for punishment up to the death penalty for these offences.

(a) Intention to intimidate the public or any section of the public

(b) Falsely or unlawfully coercing the Government of Sri Lanka or any other government or international organization to do or refrain from doing any act;

(c) Unlawfully preventing the performance of any such government;

(d) Violating the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Sri Lanka or any other sovereign country, or

(e) Promote war or discrimination, enmity or violence with the aim of inciting national, ethnic or religious hatred

Thus, it is clear that the crime of terrorism is defined very broadly. Especially, obstructing the provision of essential services or being a member of such a process is considered committing the crime of terrorism, according to the Act. Therefore, there is a high probability that trade union actions related to a service designated as an essential service will also be alleged as committing the crime of terrorism.

Also, the act provides police with the discretion to define ordinary crimes in the Penal Code as terrorist offences.

Article 6 of the bill states that being a member of a banned terrorist organization and engaging in such an organization is also an offence. The President has the power to name an organization as a prohibited organization (Section 82).

Also, according to Article 10 of the draft, encouraging terrorism is an offence. Also, publishing a statement in the media that encourages committing an offence related to terrorism is an offence. As described in that section, and section 10(5), if a person proves in a high court that he has not consented to the act, these charges cannot be raised against him. This shifts the burden of proof in the case. It is a provision against the presumption of innocence.

According to section 11 of the draft, publishing terrorist statements is also an offence. If a person proves in a high court that he has not given permission to publish those statements or that his views on terrorism are not included, he will not be found guilty under this offence. This provision is also against the presumption of innocence. Also, section 15 of the draft indicates that hiding information from the police is a terrorist act.

A police officer, armed forces officer or coast guard officer has the power to arrest without a warrant for offences under the Act (Section 19). According to the provisions of the current Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, the arrest in connection with a terrorist act must be made by a Sub-Inspector or a higher officer on a written order of a Senior Superintendent of Police.

Special features of the proposed Act regarding investigative procedures

The proposed law also establishes a special unit in the Sri Lanka Police called the “Specialized Anti-Terrorism Agency” for the investigation of terrorism. In addition to officers who have received traditional police training, the unit will consist of experts in various disciplines such as legal affairs, information technology, and forensic medicine. Also, provisions have been made to get direct support from various government agencies for investigative work. A provision has been included to limit the magistrate’s discretion to issue the necessary orders for investigational purposes and such orders should be issued upon the request of a Superintendent of Police.

Provisions for the security of the arrested persons

Provisions have been made to produce the persons arrested concerning an act of terrorism before a magistrate within 48 hours. The need to undergo a medical examination, the need to notify the relatives about the arrest, as well as the need to notify the Sri Lanka Human Rights Commission within 72 hours are provided. These provisions create a potential to mitigate misuse of the Act.

It also emphasizes the rights of suspects as well as the responsibilities of investigators by limiting the period of detention without prosecution to a maximum of one year. Accordingly, accountability of the government regarding the arrested persons has been enhanced compared to the existing law.

Detaining on detention orders

A Deputy Inspector General has the power to issue detention orders for up to three months at the request of a police station and a magistrate has the power to extend detention orders after three months. A person can be detained on detention orders for a maximum of 12 months. According to the existing law, the President has the power to issue detention orders for a maximum period of 18 months. Accordingly, this draft proposes to transfer the power of issuing detention orders from the Minister of Defense to a Deputy Inspector General of Police.

Suspension or postponement of prosecution

Section 71 of the Act confers special powers on the Attorney General to suspend or postpone the prosecution of persons involved in any terrorist act.

Powers to ban public places

According to section 62 of the bill, an officer not less than a Superintendent of Police can issue orders such as preventing people from entering a certain area, evacuating people from that area, preventing movement on a road, preventing transportation, etc. to avoid danger or damage. This provision is equivalent to the imposition of a police curfew.

Powers of the President to Prohibit Organizations

Article 82 of the bill provides the President the power to ban certain organizations and their activities. Article 84 provides the power to the President to impose a curfew for a part of Sri Lanka or the whole country. Article 85 provides that the President has the power to designate certain restricted areas.

Powers of the President to issue orders and directives

The powers to issue orders to implement the provisions of the Act are stated in Section 98 of the draft and these orders must be published in the Gazette and must be approved by the Parliament within a period of one month.

Also, Section 99 of the bill states that the officers have the power to issue directives regarding the way to act.

Act supersedes other laws

Section 101 states that if there is a conflict between the provisions of this Act and the provisions of another law, the provisions of this Act shall prevail over the other acts.

Provisions regarding the prevention of terrorist acts

Responsibilities have been assigned to the police officers and the armed forces as well as the Coast Guard to prevent acts of terrorism. The Minister has been given powers to impose prohibitions such as banning organizations and their bank accounts and banning fund-raising, etc., against the organizations which act in a manner that threatens the security of Sri Lanka or any other country. Also, the minister has been given the power to impose certain restrictions on tasks related to the above motives. The President has been given the power to impose a curfew, prohibit places, confiscate property, and take other preventive measures.

The conclusion

The main problem with this draft is the too-broad definition of a terrorist offense. According to the provisions of this draft, there is a high risk of taking action against the trade union activists, journalists, as well as social activists who act against the existing government considering them terrorists. Also, the powers to arrest in connection with terrorist activities have been assigned to the police, the armed forces and the coast guard department. A Superintendent of Police has been assigned the power to issue detention orders. Police officers have been given more discretion and powers concerning investigations, exceeding the discretion of the magistrate in terms of issuing orders related to investigations. The President has the power to enact laws and ban places and also to ban organizations.

It should be acknowledged that this draft has made certain provisions to safeguard the rights of the arrested persons and those provisions are more constructive than the existing law. Particularly, the draft has proposed progressive amendments regarding the provisions to use confessions as evidence against the accused under the existing law.

But as a whole, provisions more dangerous than the provisions in the existing law have been included in this bill.

Jagath Liyanarachchi is an Attorney-at-Law who can be reached at jagathliyanarachchi@gmail.com.

Factum is an Asia Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Special Perspective: The Anti-Terrorism Bill appeared first on Newswire.

By Chandani Kirinde

The emphasis of the United Front (UF) government of Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike, which took office in May 1970, was to forge a new foreign policy that would move away from the pro-West policies of the UNP government, replacing them with a policy of non-alignment.

While, theoretically, the focus was on non-alignment, in practice there was an active move to forge relations with Communist countries, given that the constituent partners in Mrs Bandaranaike’s government were Marxist parties and that a shift to the Left was inevitable.

It was hence with gusto that the United Front government moved to establish diplomatic relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), or East Germany, within months of its coming to power.

In A History of Sri Lanka, Professor K. M. de Silva writes that with the election of the United Front, which comprised the SLFP, the LSSP, and the Communist Party (Moscow Wing),

“… [t]here was a new emphasis in the island’s foreign policy, a distinct tilt to the left. In rapid succession, North Korea and the German Democratic Republic were given diplomatic recognition.”

Sri Lanka established diplomatic ties with the DPRK on 15 July 1970. These ties were cut short after the 1971 JVP insurrection. Less than a year after the DPRK opened its Embassy doors in Colombo, the Ambassador, along with all Embassy staff, were ordered to leave the country. The reason was the alleged assistance from North Korea to the JVP to overthrow the government.

In a statement issued on 17 April 1971, the UF government noted that it had

“… decided in its own interest that all Korean staff and their families in the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Ceylon should leave immediately.”

The statement added that the decision was

“… conveyed to the Ambassador of the DPRK by the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs at 10 a.m. on April 13 and the Ambassador was requested to wind up the affairs of the mission and arrange for the departure of all Korean personnel in the mission by Aeroflot leaving at 7.30 p.m. on April 16.”

No reason was given for the decision, but the move prompted speculation of North Korean collusion with the JVP. Of course, no hard evidence was placed before the public to support such a claim. Even the Criminal Justice Commission, which the government had established to prosecute the leaders of the April insurgency, found no active involvement of a foreign power in the uprising.

Professor Gamini Samaranayake, in his doctoral thesis “Political Violence in the Third World – A case study of Sri Lanka (1971 -1987)”, points out that

“[d]uring the 1971 insurrection, the Sri Lankan government ordered the North Korean government to withdraw its diplomatic representatives and temporarily terminated foreign relations. Despite the measures taken by the Sri Lankan government, there is no valid evidence that the JVP maintained contacts with the North Koreans.”

Professor Samaranayake adds that the official explanation given by the then Prime Minister was that the North Koreans had indulged in overenthusiastic and indiscreet propaganda which had not been curbed, despite the Sri Lankan government’s repeated cautioning against it.

The propaganda in question were full-page advertisements in Sri Lankan newspapers featuring the revolutionary thoughts of Kim Il Sung, as well as the distribution of literature on guerrilla warfare. Professor Samaranayake writes that “the exact nature and extent of the North Korean involvement could not have exceeded the mere boundaries of propaganda.”

However, there is no final word on whether the DPRK funded, armed, or trained JVP personnel involved in the uprising. Speculation, in any case, continues. An academic paper written in 2017 by Benjamin Young and published by the Korea Economic Institute of America, on “A Revolutionary State: North Korea’s Support of Non-State Actors, Past Policies and Future Issues”, contends that the North Korean Embassy in Colombo supplied the rebels with money, arms, and explosives and that it was this which led to the expulsion of diplomatic personnel from Colombo.

An attempt by the writer to trace archival material from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the subject proved futile. A senior official who served during the period in the Prime Minister’s office said there was a “pervasive suspicion” that the North Koreans had a hand in the 1971 insurrection and that they were asked to leave based on this.

Mrs Bandaranaike herself hinted at North Korean involvement. In a radio talk on 25 April 1971, she stated that in the “case of one Embassy”, which she did not name, “certain activities carried out by them was giving strength and support to the terrorists who had been preparing themselves for their nefarious tasks”, and that since the diplomatic staff did not desist from such activities, she had to ask the Ambassador to close the Embassy and get out of the country.

There is no doubt that naming the DPRK as an active supporter of the JVP would have been an embarrassment to Mrs Bandaranaike’s government, given the haste with which the United Front had moved to established diplomatic ties with it soon after taking power.

Nevertheless, the expulsion of the Embassy staff did not mean the end of diplomatic relations between Sri Lanka and the DPRK. As the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs, which issued the communique announcing the expulsion in 1971, noted, the decision “was only for the removal of the North Korean personnel within the Mission, and did not imply the disruption of diplomatic relations between the two countries, which will remain for the present.”

Both countries continue to maintain missions with each other. Today, the Sri Lankan Embassy in Beijing, China, is accredited to North Korea, while the North Korean Embassy in New Delhi, India, is accredited to Sri Lanka. However, relations have remained in limbo since 1971.

Chandani Kirinde is a senior political and history columnist and a long-serving parliamentary correspondent in Sri Lanka. She can be reached via chandani.kirinde2016@gmail.com.

Factum is an Asia Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

The post Factum Special Perspective: The troubled history of Sri Lanka – DPRK relations appeared first on Newswire.

By Deshani Samaragunarathna

ألا هو لا دان (Ala ho la dan)

Look who we are, we are the dreamers – We make it happen ’cause we believe it

Look who we are, we are the dreamers – We make it happen ’cause we can see it

Here’s to the ones that keep the passion – Respect, oh, yeah

Here’s to the ones that can imagine – Respect, oh, yeah

“Ala ho la dan” is a cheerful expression which sailors used to sing before starting their journey on the seas of the Arabian Gulf. The lyrics above, which foreground this expression, are from the song “Dreamers”, included in the official FIFA World Cup Anthem for 2022.

The inclusion of these lyrics at such a high-profile event is a tribute to the Arab world’s new approach to public diplomacy. The 2022 FIFA World Cup was more than an exciting event for Qatar and the Arab world. It was a significant milestone in terms of many things, including the economic, environmental, knowledge, and infrastructure development for the entire region.

Sheikha Al Mayassa Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, the sister of Qatar’s ruling Emir and Chairperson of Qatar Museums, reflected in her takeaway message at the Qatar Economic Forum on “The Role of Sport in the Game of Life.”  She stated that the creative and cultural industries were important drivers of economic growth. M7, Qatar’s epicentre for design, fashion, and technology entrepreneurship, is one notable example of this.

Such examples serve to reinforce the importance of culture is an effective tool for international cooperation, mediation, economic diversification, education, innovation, and human well-being. For centuries, creative economies have woven cultures together.

The Middle East has always had a rich abundance of natural resources, although the resources coveted and valued by the region have shifted over time. The Arab region’s hard power is entirely based on the proceeds from the global sale of its vast natural gas reserves. 

Yet, despite their possession of hard power, the representation of and mainstream discourses on the people of the Middle East were, until not too long ago, negative. Indeed, in the early 2000s it was nearly impossible to think of the Arab world as a viable tourist destination.

However, with transformative leadership, such as Dubai’s ruler Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum and Qatar’s late king Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, the region has succeeded beyond expectations in cementing and projecting its modern influence. The initiatives that these leaders spearheaded have pushed Gulf states to become heavily engaged in brand building, forging an identity that the world has come to accept them for.

Today a significant portion of television production, recording, and filming, not to mention financing, takes place in the Gulf cities of Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Doha. Between the Doha based Al-Jazeera and the Saudi owned and Dubai based Al-Arabiya rages a media war for the hearts and minds of the Arab public. 

With its infrastructure and cultural attractions, Dubai today attracts more tourists than any other Arab state and is the seventh most visited city in the world. Despite a stagnant travel market, the Middle East aviation market’s recovery grew throughout 2022, and is expected to take off over the next decade, with the region’s share of the global fleet set to grow.

According to Oliver Wyman’s “Global Fleet and MRO Market Forecast 2023-2033”, the Middle East remains one of the world’s fastest-growing aviation markets, with the regional fleet expected to expand 5.1 percent annually over the next decade.

In that sense, Gulf cities today have turned themselves into globally recognized brands. World diplomatic, business, and media leaders continuously make visits to these cities, enticed by their commercial, political, and media clout. This in turn attracts other players and stakeholders. For instance, today Abu Dhabi has become a de facto political hub in the region, having witnessed visits by most foreign ministers of regional and global powers.

On the other hand, Qatar has been uniquely successful in turning hard power into actual influence in the world of football in particular and of sport in general. Qatar’s version of public diplomacy is one of the tools the government uses to manage its distinctive image.

Qatar’s public diplomacy website, Katara Public Diplomacy, states that its vision is meant to invoke “a peaceful, prosperous, and sustainable future for peoples of the world.” This comes after Saudi Arabia’s successful bid to take over the 2029 Winter Olympics, as part of its USD 500 billion new desert city project Neom, and its USD 2 billion investment in a private, elite golf tournament.

On the other hand, one could argue that the Middle East’s soft power stems solely from its oil wealth. Türkiye, however, is a good example to refute this claim.

Since 2018, the Turkish currency and debt crisis has had a huge effect on Türkiye’s financial and economic crisis. However, by expanding its diplomatic networks and public diplomacy apparatus in the pursuit of soft power, Türkiye has been able to improve its global reputation. Indeed, the country’s soft power plays an important role in advancing its foreign policy goals, with growing tourism, a burgeoning entertainment industry, and the vast reach of its culinary diplomacy. 

The most recent example is the devastating earthquake that struck Türkiye and Syria earlier this year in February. Through social media, people all over the world supported the fundraising campaign, from tweets to TikTok and Instagram posts. With this, Türkiye scored heavily in aid diplomacy.

Given all that, it’s clear the Middle East is of major geostrategic importance. In this competitive, at times chaotic environment, several regional forces have settled on a different strategy: soft power. It is obvious that such forces have discovered in soft power an efficient tool that can accomplish what tanks and oil have failed to do.

Deshani Dewmini Samaragunarathna is a final year undergraduate at the Faculty of Defense and Strategic Studies of the General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University. She represented Sri Lanka at the Global UGRAD program and completed a semester at the University of Alabama in the US. Geopolitics, Sri Lankan history, and soft power diplomacy are among her research interests.

Factum is an Asia-Pacific focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.

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