SLPP MP Namal Rajapaksa has written to Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa urging him to convene a meeting of all political parties that value democracy to discuss the Government’s proposed move to extend the retirement age of Supreme Court judges.

In his letter dated July 7, Rajapaksa claimed the Government is attempting to extend the tenure of superior court judges without any acceptable or justifiable reason, warning that such a move could undermine the rule of law and negatively impact Sri Lanka’s democratic process.

He noted that the proposal has already drawn criticism and opposition from the Bar Association of Sri Lanka, the Commonwealth Lawyers Association and LAWASIA.

Rajapaksa said that, given the concerns raised by these legal bodies, all political parties committed to upholding democracy and the rule of law should unite in opposing the proposal.

He requested Premadasa, in his capacity as Opposition Leader, to convene a discussion involving all democratic political parties on the issue.

Rajapaksa also suggested inviting leaders of all political parties that have been represented in Parliament, as well as other political leaders considered appropriate, to participate in the proposed meeting. (Newswire)

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The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has voiced deep concern over reports that the NPP Government is considering a constitutional amendment to extend the retirement age of superior court judges, a move that would allow Chief Justice Preethi Padman Surasena to remain in office for two additional years.

In a statement, CPA said such a measure would undermine judicial independence and constitutional integrity, noting that security of tenure is a cornerstone of impartiality in Sri Lanka’s legal tradition. 

The organisation warned that tailoring constitutional provisions to benefit incumbents risks politicising the judiciary and eroding public confidence.

CPA also criticised the use of executive and parliamentary majority powers to advance narrow objectives, calling it a distortion of amendment procedures and inconsistent with Commonwealth principles on judicial independence.

Highlighting Sri Lanka’s historical reliance on the courts as guardians of the rule of law, CPA urged the government to desist from pursuing the amendment and called on Parliament, the legal community, civil society, and the public to oppose any move that threatens the integrity of the constitutional order.

“The preservation of judicial independence and constitutional government is not a matter of political convenience, but a foundational obligation owed to the people of Sri Lanka and to future generations, and we cannot allow it to be harmed by the ineptitude and ignorance, if not the arrogance and ill will, of those in power,” CPA added. 

Full statement: 

The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) is deeply concerned by recent reports concerning purported proposals by the NPP Government to amend the Constitution, which raise profound questions about the integrity of Sri Lanka’s constitutional order, including the independence of the judiciary and the proper use of constitutional amendment powers.

In a report by its News Editor (Sinhala version published on 10 June 2026, followed by an English version on 11 June), entitled “The Recurring Drama of Constitutional Amendments for Personal Gain,” the Anidda newspaper states:

“President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government is reportedly planning to introduce a constitutional amendment to extend the retirement age of superior court judges. This amendment is expected to allow the current Chief Justice Preethi Padman Surasena to remain in office for another two years. If passed, it would become the 22nd Amendment to the 1978 Constitution. The proposal has already drawn strong opposition from lawyers concerned about judicial independence and constitutional traditions.”

CPA notes that the Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL) has already rightly decried this move in strong and unambiguous terms. We share and endorse these concerns.

A constitutional amendment that alters a core institutional feature of the judiciary, particularly one designed to affect tenure, is not a neutral or technical adjustment. Security of tenure is a central pillar of judicial independence in our common law tradition, originating in principles established in key cases such as the Case of Prohibitions del Roy (1607), Dr Bonham’s Case (1610), Case of Proclamations (1611), Bushell’s Case (1670), and Entick v Carrington (1765), and subsequently enshrined in statute and constitutional instruments, including in Sri Lanka since the Charter of Justice (1801). In numerous cases, including Attorney General v Silva (1953), Liyanage v The Queen (1967), Joseph Perera v Attorney General (1992), Premachandra v Jayawickrema (1994), Chandrasoma v Senathirajah (1997), and various special determinations on constitutional amendment bills, our courts have consistently reaffirmed the main principle of judicial independence and impartiality, and its several supplementary principles, such as security of tenure.       

These constitutional principles, which work not merely to restrain the dismissal of judges who displease the executive but also to extensions in office of judges who do the bidding of the executive, ensure that judges are insulated from political pressure and can decide cases impartially, without fear of reward or sanction. When the tenure of a sitting Chief Justice is extended through a constitutional amendment tailored to benefit specific individuals in office or their policy for the time being (in this case the incumbent President and Chief Justice), it inevitably gives rise to the perception – and risk – of executive influence over the judiciary. It suggests that continuance in office may depend on political favour rather than constitutional principle, thereby undermining public confidence in judicial impartiality.

Moreover, such an amendment would fundamentally alter the established understanding that constitutional provisions governing judicial tenure are general, prospective, and impersonal. Departing from this norm to enact a measure that benefits an incumbent office-holder transforms a constitutional mechanism into an instrument of personalisation. This damages not only the independence of the individual office but also the integrity of the institution as a whole.

CPA is also deeply concerned by the use of the executive presidency and its parliamentary majority to effect such a change. While the Constitution provides procedures for amendment, these procedures are not intended to be used as tools for advancing narrow or personalised objectives. Constitutional amendment powers are entrusted to the political branches for the purpose of responding to genuine institutional or societal needs, and must be exercised in good faith and in accordance with the spirit of constitutionalism. The use of these powers to secure the extension of tenure of a particular office-holder constitutes an illegitimate use of constitutional authority. It represents a distortion of the amendment process, undermining its normative legitimacy and eroding constitutional culture.

Such a measure would also be wholly inconsistent with Commonwealth principles on judicial independence, to which Sri Lanka, as a founding member of the modern Commonwealth in 1949, has repeatedly committed itself. Foundational Commonwealth instruments – including the Latimer House Principles (2003) – affirm that judicial appointments, tenure, and removal must be governed by transparent, principled processes that safeguard independence and avoid both actual and perceived political interference. The Latimer House Principles emphasise that security of tenure must be preserved and that any changes to judicial conditions of service must not be made in a way that compromises judicial independence or benefits particular individuals. These principles are widely affirmed in case law from across the Commonwealth and across time, including McCawley v The King (1920), Hinds v The Queen (1977), Valente v The Queen (1985), Re The Remuneration of Judges (1997), and Mackin v New Brunswick (2002).

The reported proposal would also damage the institutional fabric of the Supreme Court, the oldest continuously functioning branch of the Sri Lankan state, whose origins date back to the aforementioned Charter of Justice (1801), and continued without interruption in subsequent imperial as well as post-colonial constitutional instruments. Over more than two centuries, as a result, the Sri Lankan people have become accustomed to seeing the courts as their principal institutional guardian of the rule of law and constitutional government. Measures that introduce uncertainty, politicisation, or personalised considerations into the tenure of its leadership risk undermining its authority, legitimacy, and historical continuity.

Both the process and the substance of the reported amendment are deeply violative of the republican values on which the 1978 Constitution is based. The republican principle underpinning our constitutional order requires public power to be exercised in trust for the common good of the people of Sri Lanka, in accordance with law, and without arbitrariness or personalisation. It demands institutional integrity, the separation of powers in terms established by Article 3 and 4, and checks against the concentration or abuse of authority. 

Executive-driven manipulation of constitutional amendment procedures, particularly for the purpose of influencing the tenure of the head of the judiciary, is fundamentally inconsistent with these values. Equally, any interference – direct or indirect – with judicial independence strikes at the heart of the republican ideal of a government of laws, not of persons.

Indeed, the effects of a constitutional amendment in terms currently contemplated could have wider and unintended ramifications beyond the judiciary. In a recent essay for the Jaffna Monitor, Professor G.L. Peiris has argued that the stability and independence of the public service as well as the principle of equality and non-discrimination may be adversely affected by this proposed change.  

It was precisely because Sri Lankans were fed up with the unconstitutional and self-aggrandising behaviour of past Presidents and Governments that Anura Kumara Dissanayake and the NPP were elected to implement the Aragalaya’s call for “system change” and restore good governance in 2024. To witness this Government also – so soon and so effortlessly – going down the path-dependent patterns of previous governments is therefore a particularly appalling example of hypocrisy.

In the light of these extremely serious concerns, CPA calls upon the Government to immediately desist from pursuing any constitutional amendment aimed at extending the term of office of the incumbent Chief Justice. We urge the Government to reaffirm its commitment to judicial independence and impartiality, constitutional propriety, and the rule of law. We also call upon all Members of Parliament, the legal community, civil society, the media, and the public at large to remain vigilant and to oppose any measures that threaten the integrity of Sri Lanka’s constitutional order. The preservation of judicial independence and constitutional government is not a matter of political convenience, but a foundational obligation owed to the people of Sri Lanka and to future generations, and we cannot allow it to be harmed by the ineptitude and ignorance, if not the arrogance and ill will, of those in power. (Newswire)

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Minister of Justice Harsha Nanayakkara told Parliament today (11) that official Cabinet approval has not been obtained to extend the retirement age of judges in the judicial system, including the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.

Responding to several questions raised by Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa under Standing Order 27(2), the Minister said that apart from judges, other professionals too have requested an increase in the retirement age.

He noted that the government is considering these requests reasonably, pointing out that while some are fair, others are political.

However, Nanayakkara stressed that no official decision has yet been taken on the matter. (Newswire)

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The Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL) has expressed grave concern over reports that the Government is considering a constitutional amendment to increase the retirement age of judges of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.

In a letter addressed to President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, the BASL said the retirement ages of 63 years for Appeal Court judges and 65 years for Supreme Court judges, in place since the 1978 Constitution, should not be changed arbitrarily. 

The Association warned that such a move would erode public confidence in the integrity of the legal system and raise questions about the Government’s commitment to judicial independence.

The BASL noted that the cadre of judges in both apex courts had already been expanded under the 20th Amendment in 2020, reducing any practical need to extend retirement ages. 

It cautioned that altering the ages now would be seen as interference with the judiciary and set a dangerous precedent for future governments to introduce ad hoc constitutional changes.

“The independence of the Judiciary and the public confidence reposed in it are indispensable pillars of the Rule of Law and the democratic framework of our Republic,” the BASL said, stressing that the judiciary must remain wholly independent and free from even the perception of influence or impropriety.

The Association urged the President not to proceed with any such amendment, stressing the importance of preserving the independence, integrity, dignity, and public trust in the judiciary. (Newswire)

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