By Vinod Moonesinghe
Sri Lanka has, for 75 years, faced many internal and external threats, ranging from civil unrest, through insurgencies and military coup attempts, to overt acts of war or more subtle economic sabotage or sanctions by foreign powers. It has met them with varying degrees of success, from defeating the 1971 Insurgency to the abject failure of the confrontation with India in 1987, from near-defeat in Eelam War III to complete victory in Eelam War IV.
The country needs to learn from its own recent history, as well as from the experiences of other countries, in order to continue effectively to cope with these perils. It has to do so, optimizing its limited resources, bearing in mind its relative poverty.
Diplomacy, Deterrence, and Deception
Sri Lanka needs a defense strategy aimed primarily at avoiding conflict, in which diplomacy, deterrence and deception play key roles. Historically, it employed as its first safeguard diplomacy, neglecting which led to failures such as India’s intervention in the 1980s.
It must return to nonalignment, urging a non-nuclear “Zone of Peace” in the Indian Ocean, not however precluding multilateral defense cooperation, building links which give it both strength and independence, and becoming a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) rather than a mere “dialogue partner.”
This strategy also requires making an invasion or other interference too costly for an aggressor. Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Ukraine indicated that a smaller state defending itself can inflict heavy casualties on a larger. Hence, like Cuba since the collapse of the USSR, Sri Lanka should be able to deter an aggressor by increasing the costs of any conflict unbearably. This applies equally to internal threats, reducing the chances of an insurrection or a coup succeeding.
The country’s lack of resources makes the use of deception essential to a strategy of deterrence, overstating the country’s military abilities and resources, concealing weaknesses and emphasizing strengths.
Deficiencies
A policy of deterrence requires a comprehensive and integrated defense system that includes a range of capabilities, able to respond to a wide range of threats and challenges. Sri Lanka has a large military, which former Agriculture Minister Mahindananda Aluthgamage estimates at 247,000 service personnel. It is geared to a relatively low-key guerrilla or conventional warfare of the type seen in the three-decade civil conflict. It lacks the capabilities and high-technology equipment required for modern war, and hence capacity to respond to an outside threat.
The severe imbalance of the forces, which are overheavy in human resources, and (astonishingly for an island nation) weighted towards land rather than sea and air, indicate that they focus on internal rather than external threats. This strategic orientation becomes clear on viewing the “Rectagon”, the new Army headquarters, which brings together the defensive heart of the nation in a single vulnerable spot, whereas facing an external attack it would need dispersal across the countryside.
At the same time, the high-technology equipment and training required for modern warfare is lacking. Even the Army’s anti-aircraft regiments have been replaced by the SLAF Air Defence Wing, whereas most modern armies have mobile AA batteries deployed with their troops. This should be reversed, with equipment beefed up and SLN and SLAF soldiers, in excess of base defense or commando duty, retrained as sailors or technological support personnel for enlarged air/sea fleets. Excess army personnel should also be retrained and transferred to the junior services.
Decolonization and democracy
The size of the armed forces has escalated the role of their upper echelons in government, a risky trend that could result in coups d’etat. A balance must be sought between the needs of national security and safeguarding the state from military intrusion. Incidents such as the 1973 Pinochet coup against Allende in Chile, the 1974 “silent coup” against Harold Wilson in Britain, and Sri Lanka’s own 1961 failed coup attempt, give warning of the dangers from the military to governments.
Sri Lanka’s armed forces descend directly from colonial tools of rule. The Sri Lanka Army arose from the Ceylon Light Infantry and the Ceylon Garrison Artillery, and although the Navy and Air Force were created after 1948, they were commanded by British officers well into the 1950s and carry on British imperial traditions. Kilted bagpipe bands outnumber hewisi bands, and crenelated parapet walls resembling European castles front military encampments.
Anti-colonial, democratic customs should displace these traditions. More joint exercises should take place with non-Western armed forces. Overseas training should involve multiple countries, not just a very few as at present. Parliament should also, as insurance create a loyal “republican guard”, to safeguard the constitution.
Defense self-reliance
To be effective, modern defense systems should adapt to new technologies and innovations, such as artificial intelligence, robotics, and cyber security. The long-term prospects for the security of Sri Lanka require that the country have a level of military industry sufficient to sustain a defense effort in the event of a blockade or sanctions. The country needs to build its own military-industrial complex, which it lacks sorely.
A concerted effort must be made to achieve defense self-reliance. A large degree of independence from overseas sources is achievable, with the benefit of reducing foreign exchange costs considerably. The development of weapons manufacturing would go in concert with the growth of other, related industrial fields. The needs of the Navy require a large domestic shipbuilding industry, the transport needs of all services require a substantial motor industry, and the modern battlefield technological environment requires a sophisticated electronics/mechatronics/robotics sector.
Israel’s sophisticated military-industrial complex (the world’s 10th largest exporter) began small in 1931, when Zionist terrorists in Palestine started manufacturing small arms and mortars, building up their weapons manufacturing capabilities. Even the LTTE managed to build up its manufacturing facilities using the civil conflict. Conversely Sri Lanka’s armed forces, despite requiring large amounts of war material over nearly three decades, remained locked into imports, even though its engineers demonstrated their capabilities to build or rebuild Ferret armored cars, Unicorn mine-resistant lorries, and Colombo-class fast attack boats.
Military production has made some progress since the end of the civil conflict. The Air Force has collaborated with the scientific establishment to design and build an unmanned drone and is developing a short-range missile, while the army has increased the number of vehicles it fabricates or assembles.
Picking battle-winning devices from the Eelam Conflict and copying them or building them under license would be a way to begin, together with a process of domestic maintenance and refit to build capacity.
The country could also explore collaboration with other not so industrially-developed Third World nations, such as Angola, Bolivia, Cuba, Laos, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela, to develop appropriate weapons systems and equipment. Even quite large and advanced economies adopt similar measures; for instance, projects like Eurofighter Typhoon (the UK, Germany, Italy, and Spain), or the new European anti-submarine system (France, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden).
Armageddon?
A defense strategy prioritizing multilateralist nonalignment, deterrence, democratic decolonization, and self-reliance, has proven to be a successful approach for other countries. By adopting such an approach, Sri Lanka should be able to protect its citizens and interests effectively, while also maintaining good relations with other nations.
At the end of the 2000s, a UNSW DPhil dissertation argued that the Asia-Pacific “region has become more integrated but still lacks the multilateral, regional and bilateral safety nets that were missing at the end of the last decade.”* Sri Lanka could help strengthen such institutions by following its traditional nonaligned policies.
The decision to pursue a nonaligned stance has allowed the country to avoid being drawn into conflicts between other powers, while still being able to cooperate and work with other countries when it is in its own interests to do so. An emphasis on democratic decolonization should help Sri Lanka to shed the legacies of its colonial past and build a more equal and just society. Overall, these characteristics should continue to be key to the country’s national security strategy.
Unfortunately, however, instead of strengthening multilateralist “safety nets” the US adopted a unilateral and aggressive military strategy which ended the “cold peace.” The overarching cold conflict between a hegemonic sole superpower, choking on its own kryptonite, and an ascending, although amorphous, alternative alliance of multilateralist great powers, makes it difficult for an impoverished and weak country such as Sri Lanka to navigate the dangers in its path.
The prospects for Sri Lanka’s security appear to have worsened since the Aragalaya uprising of 2022. The influence of the US has increased, weakening the delicate balance that Sri Lanka kept between rival powers, and sucking it into military alliances aimed against the SCO powers.
Muddying the waters, US Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Jedidiah Paul Royal made an unannounced visit to the country, apparently to talk directly with the heads of the armed forces.
Analysts are pondering on its significance, following on from that of US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland, famed for her role in the “Maidan Coup” in the Ukraine. Informed speculation has it that a joint Indo-US base at Trincomalee is on the cards, joining the approximately 750 bases that the US has scattered all over the planet, and making the country a potential target for a nuclear counterstrike in a world poised on a cusp of Armageddon.
Sources
* Royal, Jedediah Paul. Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus. Master’s Thesis, UNSW Canberra, 2011, p 157. https://doi.org/10.26190/unsworks/15071
Vinod Moonesinghe read mechanical engineering at the University of Westminster, and worked in Sri Lanka in the tea machinery and motor spares industries, as well as the railways. He later turned to journalism and writing history. He served as chair of the Board of Governors of the Ceylon German Technical Training Institute.
Factum is an Asia Pacific-focused think tank on International Relations, Tech Cooperation and Strategic Communications accessible via www.factum.lk.
The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the organization’s.