One year has passed since the terrorist attack in Pahalgam that killed 26 innocent people, leaving behind not only human loss but also a deep imprint of fear and instability across the region of Jammu and Kashmir. The cold-blooded execution of the victims—after they were segregated based on their religion—laid bare the human cost of terrorism and the systematic targeting of civilians as an instrument of political violence. And while Pakistan now seeks to reshape its international image by leveraging the external validation of its perceived mediating role in U.S.–Iran tensions, the underlying reality remains unchanged: the country continues to function as a breeding ground and safe haven for terrorist organizations that not only persist but regenerate, steadily undermining regional stability and security.
The attack in Pahalgam cannot be dismissed as an isolated incident; it represents a clear manifestation of a systematic and enduring machinery of violence. At the core of this mechanism lies The Resistance Front (TRF), an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), underscoring the deliberate and continued use of extremist proxies by Pakistan. The operations of such groups are neither accidental nor spontaneous; they form part of a broader strategy aimed at destabilizing the region, sustaining tension, and undermining any prospects for peace. In this context, terrorism does not merely function as a tool of pressure—it constitutes a structural component of a policy that continues to generate violence with consistency and intent.
In just the first months of 2026, a series of deadly attacks confirms that terrorist violence is not episodic but rather a sustained and recurring pattern. In February 2026, a bombing at a mosque killed at least 31 people, while already in January seven police officers had died in a bomb blast. During the same period, coordinated attacks in Balochistan resulted in more than 36 deaths, highlighting both the intensity and geographic spread of the violence.
These attacks are not detached from the broader political context. They occur at a time when Jammu and Kashmir had entered a trajectory of relative stability following successful elections and signs of economic progress and development. Within this environment, the resurgence and escalation of terrorist activity point to a deliberate effort to undermine stability and reverse developmental gains. It is no coincidence that Jammu and Kashmir continues to show signs of progress, while Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir remains underdeveloped.
The involvement of Pakistani elements in the Pahalgam attack further reinforces this picture. Following the killing of three militants on the outskirts of Srinagar on July 28, 2025, identification documents revealed that one of the perpetrators, Habib Tahir, originated from the village of Koiyan near Khaigala in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, while the second, Bilal Afzal, was also of Pakistani origin.
Alongside the intensity of attacks, the evolution of financing and support mechanisms for terrorism is equally concerning. According to recent security analyses and reports, terrorist networks operating in the region have adapted to the digital era, shifting funding toward encrypted transactions via digital wallets and cryptocurrencies. This transition makes tracking financial flows particularly difficult, allowing organizations to maintain operational flexibility and international connectivity. At the same time, the continued rise in attacks—from the February 2026 bombing of a Shiite mosque in Islamabad, which killed at least 31 people, to the Bajaur attack—demonstrates that these structures are not only surviving but evolving operationally.
In parallel, recent years have seen a clear trend toward the “mainstreaming” of terrorist organizations within Pakistan. Groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) have expanded their activities beyond traditional operational domains. In 2025, under the leadership of Masood Azhar, JeM intensified recruitment networks in Punjab and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir and established a women’s wing, “Jamaat-ul-Mominat,” functioning as a mechanism of ideological dissemination and social mobilization. At the same time, between 2024 and 2026, LeT expanded its training infrastructure by developing specialized units such as the so-called “Water Wing,” aimed at maritime operations. These developments, combined with ongoing recruitment campaigns, public mobilization rallies, and anti-India rhetoric, indicate that these organizations are no longer operating solely as underground networks but as structures with increasing social presence and the capacity to systematically reproduce radicalization.
Beyond this, in recent years, the activities of organizations based in or supported by Pakistan have extended beyond operational attacks into mechanisms of economic destabilization. Investigations by India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA) between 2025 and 2026 revealed funding networks linked to groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, utilizing cryptocurrencies, digital wallets, and fragmented financial transfers through nodes in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. These practices enable the movement of funds outside the international financial system, undermining both security and economic stability in regions such as Jammu and Kashmir.
Yet, perhaps the most striking contradiction lies in how Pakistan’s leadership presents this reality. According to repeated public statements by Shehbaz Sharif, Pakistan is not a source but a victim of terrorism, with the Prime Minister emphasizing that the country is a “frontline state in combating terrorism,” having made “unparalleled sacrifices” in this struggle. In remarks following attacks such as those in Peshawar in 2023 and Islamabad in 2026, he described terrorism as a “cowardly act” and pledged that it would be “completely eradicated” from the country, underscoring his government’s commitment to dismantling extremist networks. Through this rhetoric, Islamabad seeks to consolidate the position that it is not associated with terrorism, but rather plays a leading role in combating it at the international level. In the same vein, Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir has adopted an equally categorical stance, asserting that “there is no space for extremism” in Pakistan and that the state adheres to a policy of “zero tolerance for terrorism.” In coordination with the political leadership, he has stressed that “full state power” will be deployed to neutralize terrorist organizations, while military rhetoric consistently rejects international accusations, portraying Pakistan as a target—rather than a sponsor—of terrorism.
However, the picture that emerges from international assessments and documented incidents is more complex and often contradictory. Pakistan’s role in the global terrorism landscape is consistently reflected in official international evaluations and recorded cases. The United Nations Security Council’s 1267 sanctions list includes numerous individuals and organizations linked to Pakistan, among them Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, as well as figures such as Hafiz Saeed and Masood Azhar. At the same time, the presence of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad—less than one kilometer from the Pakistan Military Academy—prior to his killing in 2011 reinforced longstanding global concerns regarding the internal contradictions of the Pakistani state. The 2008 Mumbai attacks (26/11), the 2019 Pulwama attack, and the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament—each linked to organizations operating from or based in Pakistan—collectively highlight a recurring pattern that stands in stark contrast to Islamabad’s official narrative.
As Tariq Ali notes in The Clash of Fundamentalisms, “the struggle against terrorism cannot be won by military means.” Yet Pakistan’s trajectory points to a deeper and more troubling reality: its global footprint—reflected in recurring sanctions, terrorism listings, and documented cross-border attacks—underscores its enduring role as a net exporter of terrorism. This pattern extends well beyond South Asia. From the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, associated with Ramzi Yousef, to the September 11 attacks, whose principal architect Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was captured in Pakistan, and the discovery of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad—living undetected near a major military academy—the intersection between global terrorism and Pakistan-based networks has been repeatedly documented. From networks operating in Jammu and Kashmir to internationally active organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, the pattern is not incidental but systemic, reinforced by UN sanctions regimes, assessments by bodies such as the U.S. Congressional Research Service, and Pakistan’s continued ranking at the top of the Global Terrorism Index 2026. Without sustained international action that moves beyond containment and directly targets the infrastructure enabling these networks, the export of instability will persist—and expand.
For Europe, the implications are immediate. The historical record already demonstrates that networks with operational or logistical links to Pakistan have been able to project violence far beyond South Asia, reaching Western targets through transnational planning, training, and financing structures. Today, this capacity is further amplified by digital radicalization, diaspora linkages, and decentralized funding channels. If left unaddressed, this dynamic will likely translate into harder-to-detect, low-intensity attacks, while significantly increasing pressure on European security and intelligence systems. In this context, terrorism incubated in Pakistan is no longer a distant or abstract threat—it represents an evolving security challenge for Europe itself, one that risks transforming external instability into a persistent internal vulnerability. (Eurasia Review)