By Ajith P. Perera, Attorney-at-Law, Member of Parliament, Member of the Constitutional Council.
- Sri Lankan Precedent and Practice
The starting point must be Sri Lankan parliamentary practice itself. As Priyanie Wijesekera, the respected former Secretary-General of Parliament and the most authoritative writer on this subject, explains in Parliamentary Practice in Sri Lanka, no-confidence motions are not confined solely to Cabinet Ministers. Indeed, “no official of the Executive or Legislature is entirely insulated from the possibility of a no-confidence motion if Parliament sees fit to debate it” (Wijesekera, p. 31).
This position emphasizes that the mechanism is not a narrow legal tool reserved for Cabinet accountability, but a political instrument available to the House whenever public responsibility is in question. The absence of any specific reference either to Cabinet Ministers or to Deputy Ministers in the Standing Orders does not amount to a prohibition; rather, it underscores that the scope of no-confidence motions is not restricted, and can extend to any office-holder whose authority flows from Parliament.
- Standing Orders are silent on No-Confidence Motions or Censure Motions
The Standing Orders of Parliament do not explicitly mention no-confidence motions against Cabinet Ministers or Deputy Ministers. As Priyanie Wijesekera explains, “the Standing Orders do not make specific reference to motions of no-confidence against Ministers” (Parliamentary Practice in Sri Lanka, p. 23). Importantly, this silence has never barred such motions; rather, they have been accommodated within the broader procedural framework governing substantive motions.
The implication is significant: since even Cabinet Ministers are not mentioned by name in the Standing Orders, the long-standing practice of entertaining no-confidence motions against them shows that explicit reference is not a prerequisite. By extension, Deputy Ministers appointed under Article 46(1) of the Constitution and exercising delegated executive powers also fall within the same scope of accountability.
- The Opposition Leader Precedent (1981)
Sri Lankan practice provides a striking example that reinforces the wide scope of no-confidence motions. In 1981, a motion of no confidence was successfully passed against the Leader of the Opposition – A. Amirthalingam, on the ground that he had allegedly advocated separatism
(Wijesekera, Parliamentary Practice in Sri Lanka, p. 32). This was unprecedented, as it extended the use of a no-confidence motion beyond the Executive and applied it to a parliamentary officeholder. The case demonstrates two points of enduring relevance: first, that no-confidence motions are a political instrument available wherever the House seeks to register disapproval; and second, that no office is immune from parliamentary sanction if public confidence is undermined. If a motion could be directed against the Opposition Leader, who does not exercise executive authority, then certainly a Deputy Minister holding constitutional office and discharging delegated executive functions cannot be beyond its reach
- Constitutional Recognition under Article 46(1)
Article 46(1) of the Constitution of Sri Lanka confirms that the President may appoint Deputy Ministers to assist Ministers in the performance of their duties. Once so appointed, a Deputy Minister assumes constitutional status within the Executive and becomes responsible to Parliament. The fact that Standing Orders do not expressly list Deputy Ministers as subjects of noconfidence motions does not mean exclusion; it means that their accountability is folded into the broader principle of ministerial responsibility. The constitutional principle of responsibility, as confirmed by Article 45(3) and the broader constitutional framework, ensures that all who exercise executive authority whether Cabinet Ministers, State Ministers, or Deputy Ministers remain answerable to the House.
- Westminster Authority and Erskine May
Because Sri Lanka’s parliamentary model is based on the Westminster tradition, Erskine May’s Parliamentary Practice offers persuasive authority when Standing Orders are silent or ambiguous. As Erskin May records, no-confidence motions are primarily political devices, and while they often target the Government as a whole, they can also be directed against individual ministers —including junior office-holders where parliamentary disapproval exists. Importantly, Erskine May gives practical examples of such motions being entertained in the UK House of Commons, showing that accountability applies across the ministerial spectrum. The rationale for drawing on Westminster authority is clear:
Sri Lanka inherited not just the structure of Parliament but its conventions, and in the absence of domestic written provisions, Westminster practice provides the most credible interpretive guidance.
- Can a No-Confidence Motion Be Brought Against the Speaker?
The ultimate responsibility for adapting and applying parliamentary practice lies with the Speaker, who is recognized as the guardian and custodian of the House. It is the Speaker who determines whether a no-confidence motion is admissible and whether it may be tabled for debate. Priyanie Wijesekera (the leading authority on parliamentary practice in Sri Lanka) stresses that the Speaker’s rulings carry decisive weight in filling gaps where Standing Orders are silent (Wijesekera, Parliamentary Practice in Sri Lanka, p. 29).
This raises an important question: can a no-confidence motion itself be brought against the Speaker? Comparative practice suggests the answer is yes. While rare, Parliaments modelled on Westminster allow members to move such motions where the impartiality or integrity of the Speaker is in doubt. In Sri Lanka too, although Standing Orders are silent, the principle of parliamentary supremacy implies that the House may, through political will, register its loss of confidence in the Speaker. Thus, the custodian of Parliament is not immune from parliamentary sanction.
- Indian Precedent: The Vice President’s No-Confidence Motion
A recent and instructive comparative example comes from India. In 2023, opposition parties in the Rajya Sabha moved a motion of no confidence against Vice President Jagdeep Dhankhar, who serves ex officio as the Chairman of the Upper House. While ultimately unsuccessful, this episode underscores that no-confidence motions are not confined to Cabinet Ministers or the Executive alone. They may extend to constitutional office-holders whose conduct is seen as undermining parliamentary confidence.
- No Real Distinction Between Censure and No-Confidence Motions
Priyanie Wijesekera observes that in Sri Lanka the terms censure motion and no-confidence motion have historically been used interchangeably (Parliamentary Practice in Sri Lanka, p. 31).
Both mechanisms serve the same purpose: to express the House’s disapproval and to test the political confidence reposed in a minister, office-holder, or even the government as a whole. In practice, whether labelled as “censure” or “no-confidence,” the effect is identical—its passage exerts overwhelming political pressure and often compels resignation. This functional equivalence is reinforced by precedent, including the 1981 motion against the Leader of the Opposition, which demonstrates that Sri Lankan parliamentary tradition recognizes no rigid distinction between the two.
- Conclusion: Validity of a No-Confidence Motion Against a Deputy Minister
In light of (i) the Sri Lankan precedent of applying no-confidence motions to non-executive figures like the Opposition Leader, (ii) the constitutional recognition of Deputy Ministers under Article 46(1), (iii) the authority of Westminster conventions as recorded by Erskine May, and (iv) comparative practice in UK and India.
A No-Confidence Motion against a Deputy Minister is procedurally valid and fully consistent with Sri Lanka’s constitutional structure and parliamentary tradition. As Wijesekera explains, the Standing Orders ‘do not make specific reference to motions of no-confidence against Ministers’ (p. 23). Yet, despite this silence, such motions have historically been moved against Cabinet Ministers, which demonstrates that the absence of express mention does not preclude their use. By the same reasoning, Deputy Ministers; whose authority also derives from parliamentary appointment under Article 46(1) fall within the scope of accountability.